Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election: How Political Personas and Policy Platforms Influenced Swing Voters

A two-wave, national panel survey conducted jointly by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) before and after Indonesia’s 2024 election campaigns (17-27 November 2023 and 2-9 February 2024) showed that the winners Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka gained the lion’s share of 50 per cent of previously undecided voters’ support (6.7 per cent of all respondents). This contrasts with the Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar pair’s gain of 19.3 per cent and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD’s 19.7 per cent.

Of the 1,919 panel respondents from both waves of the survey, 602 prospective voters (about 31 per cent) switched choices from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (Figure 1). This means they could have had no clear choice of who they wanted to vote for in Wave 1, but by Wave 2 had decided on one of the candidates (so-called “shy voters”). Alternatively, these respondents changed the preferences they indicated in Wave 1 by Wave 2. Significantly, almost a third of Ganjar-Mahfud’s early supporters switched to the Prabowo-Gibran camp between the survey’s first and second wave.   

Figure 1. Indonesian Voters Changing Their Minds

This article examines how changes in voter perceptions about the candidates’ personalities and policy platforms might have influenced the choices of respondents who changed their minds (“swing voters”). As campaigning took place, personality and policy platforms alike influenced how voters voted in Indonesia’s personality-centric electoral landscape. However, the survey findings show how political polarisation between the eventual victors Prabowo-Gibran and second-placed Anies-Muhaimin became more evident after campaigning began. The leakage of Ganjar-Mahfud’s support to Prabowo-Gibran could be explained by the former pair’s failure to carve out a distinct platform, while Anies-Muhaimin’s support base remained relatively stable as loyalists doubled down on their preferences as elections approached.

In an earlier piece, we concluded from the first wave of the survey that “personality still outweighs policy”. Judging from the approval ratings for personality vis-à-vis policy, both of which determined votes, each candidate pair continued to receive higher approval ratings for their perceived personalities. However, the gaps between personality and policy narrowed in Wave 2 compared to Wave 1. This was presumably because, during the election campaign, each candidate pair pitched their future policy platforms to prospective voters, thus making their policies more prominent.                

Controlling for respondents’ gender, age, education, income and religion, statistically significant results from the survey show that swing voters were more likely to switch their vote to Anies-Muhaimin if they viewed this pair’s personalities and policy platform more positively in Wave 2 than in Wave 1, while registering higher negative responses to Prabowo-Gibran’s personalities and policies.

In a mirror image, swing voters were more likely to vote for Prabowo-Gibran if they registered higher positive changes towards this team’s personalities and policies in Wave 2 compared to Wave 1, while showing higher negative changes towards Anies-Muhaimin.

There is no evidence of such mirroring, however, for Ganjar-Mahfud versus either set of opponents. Unlike the contestation between Anies-Muhaimin and Prabowo-Gibran, swing voters who voted for Ganjar-Mahfud were significantly influenced only by increasingly liking this team’s policy platform. Their votes were not determined by any additional dislike of the other candidates’ personalities and policies.   

Overall, the survey shows how the election was closely fought between victors Prabowo-Gibran and second-placed Anies-Muhaimin, with Ganjar-Mahfud on the margin of voters’ preferences as the elections approached.

Political polarisation between the top two presidential candidates became more evident after campaigning began.       

Another indication of the intense contestation between Anies-Muhaimin and Prabowo-Gibran after election campaigning started is the cross-correlation across policy and personality likes and dislikes among the three pairs. In Wave 1, there was no evidence that those who liked a certain candidate’s policy/ personality disliked the others’ personalities and policies. However, by Wave 2, some data showed that those who liked Anies-Muhaimin’s personalities and policies disliked those of Prabowo-Gibran, and vice versa. Political polarisation between the top two presidential candidates became more evident after campaigning began.             

Although many dynamics were at play, these findings could partly be explained by Ganjar-Mahfud’s measured campaign strategy. They pitched more moderate political and policy views compared to their rivals, which was less polarising but left voters wanting — or even confused. Their failure to come up with distinct political personas and clear policy platforms was evidently detrimental. Ganjar’s oft-praised “close to the people” or “president of the people” personality was probably too similar to President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) and, by attribution, Gibran’s. Overall, Ganjar-Mahfud’s  “continuity and improvement” campaign could have been seen as similar to Prabowo-Gibran’s.                                  

The leakage of Ganjar-Mahfud’s supporters to Prabowo-Gibran’s camp could also be explained by how Ganjar was previously under the shadow of Jokowi’s influence and popularity.  The Indonesia Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) was Ganjar’s political base and Jokowi’s then-affiliated party. Meanwhile, Anies and Prabowo may have had loyal — even fanatic — supporters as their electoral base. Consequently, after Gibran’s nomination as Prabowo’s running mate, Jokowi’s supporters shifted their votes away from Ganjar-Mahfud to support Prabowo-Gibran. In response, Ganjar-Mahfud’s team started to attack Jokowi for his political betrayal and alleged intervention in the electoral process but this proved counter-productive. 

Swing voters who completed a university degree or higher were more likely to vote for Anies-Muhaimin but less likely to vote for Prabowo-Gibran, compared to uneducated swing voters (defined as those with less than primary school education). Swing voters who were Gen-Z (born after 1996 to early 2010s) were more likely to vote for Anies-Muhaimin compared to their older counterparts. Millennial and Baby Boomer swing voters were more likely to vote for Prabowo-Gibran compared to Gen-Z ones. There was no significant bias for Ganjar-Mahfud when analysing swing voters by age or education, which further suggests that their campaign strategy might have been acceptable to all types of voters but not appealing enough to win. The results remain robust when controlled for respondents’ access to the Internet.

February’s election seemingly ended up as a two-way, highly polarised race in terms of ideology, personality and policy between the eventual victors Prabowo-Gibran and second-placed Anies-Muhaimin. Although swing voters who shifted to Ganjar-Mahfud were less polarised in their views of the candidates, the election showed that for Indonesia’s politicians, failing to distinguish oneself from other political candidates in terms of political persona and policy platform is indeed detrimental.        

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