Kla Tham in Thailand’s 2026 Election: Dark Horse or Greenhorn?

Thailand’s general election (GE) results on 8 February 2026 sent shockwaves across the country. In many districts, the traditional Baan Yai (Big Houses), which are familiar power structures, endured. Smaller factions and mid-sized political parties largely fell in line behind the Bhumjaithai Party, allowing established political networks to retain their dominance.

In Thailand’s peripheral political arena in Isan (Northeastern Thailand) and Patani (the three southernmost provinces), the electoral outcomes show the Kla Tham party, a new political force, gaining prominence. Kla Tham has advanced through similar brokerage strategies in both regions, signalling a wider reconfiguration of centre-periphery politics.

While Isan has historically anchored pro-Thaksin electoral support, the Patani region has long endured grievances toward Thaksin’s security policies following the Tak Bai and Kruesae incidents. Yet, despite these divergent political trajectories, both regions created space for Kla Tham’s expansion, suggesting a gradual reworking of local political networks beyond earlier Thaksin-centred political alignments. Evidence of this shift is also visible in Chiang Mai, long considered Thaksin Shinawatra’s electoral stronghold, where Kla Tham took over Pheu Thai in several peripheral constituencies.

Kla Tham, a mid-sized political party identified by its light-green banner, was unfamiliar to much of the public earlier, except through its controversial de facto leader, advisory board chairman Thammanat Prompoa. Thammanat’s political profile has been shaped in part by his past criminal convictions related to drug trafficking and a homicide case. Yet Kla Tham won 58 seats, making it the fourth-placed party in the GE. This unexpected success raises an important question: does Kla Tham’s rise reflect genuine transformation in Thailand’s party system or merely the adaptation of entrenched patronage networks under a new organisational label?

While Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai fiercely competed to retain their strongholds, Kla Tham made notable inroads, securing 13 seats in the Upper Northeast. Most of these were constituencies previously held by Pheu Thai.

We argue that Kla Tham is far from a greenhorn, as Thammanat knows Thai politics intimately and carefully paved his path to national prominence through years of engagement in local elections. By building ties with Thaksin during the Thai Rak Thai period (1998-2006) and later with General Prawit of the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) from 2018 to 2024, Thammanat strategically positioned himself within Thailand’s shifting political landscape. Thammanat’s political ascent was gradual, but his stint as Deputy Minister of Agriculture in 2019 helped to seed his ties with local villagers in the agricultural sector. He built his network from the ground up, relying on villagers, vote brokers and a new generation of local powerholders, which we term the “Neo-Baan Yai”. This differs from its predecessor (traditional) Baan Yai in how it is organised: Neo-Baan Yai comprises flexible networks which are mobile rather than territorially fixed, coordinated through political brokers rather than powerful political families. Such actors operate with a “grey” political reputation, characterised by transactional, patronage-based dealings rather than clear ideological lines.

… Kla Tham is far from a greenhorn, as Thammanat knows Thai politics intimately and carefully paved his path to national prominence…

In Isan, Kla Tham’s successful candidates were seasoned political operators rather than newcomers or primarily dynastic heirs. In Kalasin and Roi Et, winners emerged from Thammanat’s former faction within the PPRP. In Khon Kaen, the party mobilised networks aligned with vice party leader Eakarat Changlao, who is closely linked to Thammanat. Others, such as Thanik Masiphithak in Khon Kaen’s 8th constituency, defected from parties like the United Thai Nation. In several constituencies, observers noted widespread speculation of informal electoral coordination between Kla Tham and Bhumjaithai, particularly where direct competition appeared muted. Even where Kla Tham lost, notably to Chaiya Promma, a former long-term MP who moved from Pheu Thai in Nong Bua Lamphu, the party saw other candidates with deep local roots, often embedded in political families and local teams, continuing to prevail.

New political dynasties have also emerged in some areas of Patani, displacing established Baan Yai networks and reshaping the political landscape. In Narathiwat, the long-dominant Yawohasan clan led by Kuseng, the patriarch who consolidated his local power through four consecutive terms as Chief Executive of the Narathiwat Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) since 2004, was sidelined by a Neo-Baan Yai formation led by Sampan Mayusoh and his brother Ameen, whose ties to Thammanat date back to the PRPP period. The Mayusoh clan defeated Wachara Yawohasan and his brother, Kuheng. This was not merely a change of families. Unlike territorially rooted Baan Yai structures, the Mayusoh network was embedded within Kla Tham’s wider brokerage network, signalling central coordination rather than hereditary control. The contestation was so fierce that multiple sources reported vote-buying, ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 baht (USD64 to USD128) per voter, though these claims were not formally adjudicated.

Moreover, Thammanat’s childhood spent in Narathiwat has enabled him to present himself as an insider. Disillusioned with Wan Nor and Tawee Sodsong from the Prachachat party, several former Wadah faction figures have aligned with Kla Tham. According to author interviews with former Wadah members, Thammanat assured these Malay-Muslim political elites that he would allocate a cabinet portfolio to a member of parliament from the region should they secure electoral victories, pledging renewed efforts to resume peace talks.

In a region fatigued by prolonged polarisation, programmatic indeterminacy may have worked to Kla Tham’s advantage, as constituency voters appeared to prioritise accessibility, deliverability, and administrative competence over partisan or moral purity. Its consolidation in Isan and Patani, therefore, reflects a shift not in political values but in political practice. Traditional Baan Yai have not disappeared in Thailand; they have instead been reconstituted. Through territorial expansion, access to executive power and the coordination of local factions, Kla Tham’s constituency strategy signals a move away from rigid partisan loyalty toward a more networked and adaptive mode of competition, where strategic flexibility and the efficient channelling of resources determine victory.

In this sense, Kla Tham does not represent new politics but the scaling and reconfiguration of entrenched patronage networks under a central strategic command. If sustained, this model is likely to reshape future GEs by privileging scale, coordination, and executive access over ideological coherence, placing reformist or programmatic parties at a structural disadvantage in constituencies where electoral competition is organised more around brokerage capacity than policy appeals or ideological commitments.

Kla Tham’s 2026 GE performance shows it is neither a dark horse nor an inexperienced newcomer but rather a strategic re-organisation of entrenched local power under the figure of Thammanat. Across Isan and Patani, it did not dismantle the Baan Yai system but absorbed and, in places, reconfigured it through Neo-Baan Yai networks. Kla Tham thus represents not new politics, but old power reclothed in light green.

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