Light Footprint, Strong Signal: Rethinking US-Cambodian Cooperation

The world’s geopolitical landscape is shifting rapidly, and Cambodia is feeling the effects. Renewed tensions along its border with Thailand over disputed temples and historical maps exemplify this transition. For Phnom Penh, this is not simply a question of global instability, but local vulnerability. The lesson is straightforward: maintaining stability requires more than international law and caution. It requires options.

The US does not need a large military presence in Cambodia to make a meaningful difference; it needs a more focused one. Practical and measured defence cooperation can strengthen Cambodia’s strategic flexibility, broaden its options, and quietly reinforce stability in Southeast Asia through deeper engagement. US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s recent visit to Cambodia should be viewed in this context. It does not portend a dramatic shift in relations, but serves as another indication that both countries are willing to explore a more pragmatic defence relationship.

Cambodia’s relationships with major powers are often viewed through the narrow assumption that it is in complete lockstep with Beijing. While understandable, this perception does not do justice to Cambodia’s broader diplomatic strategy. For decades, Phnom Penh has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy aimed at preserving sovereignty and maintaining flexibility in its external relationships.

Cambodia’s participation in initiatives such as US President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace” reflects this tradition. The country has shown a willingness to engage in dialogue and conflict prevention, regardless of the initiative’s origin. As regional dynamics shift and international law faces increasing strain, expanding practical cooperation with the US offers Cambodia another tool to preserve its independence and broaden its strategic options while simultaneously increasing its defence readiness and deterrence.

This should not be viewed as a shift in alignment from one power to another; it is an effort to preserve the flexibility of choice during a period of rapid change. A broader set of partnerships gives Cambodia more options to respond to emerging challenges without feeling constrained. In a region increasingly shaped by strategic competition, flexibility remains one of Cambodia’s greatest strategic assets.

Renewed defense cooperation can help rebuild trust between Phnom Penh and Washington, create opportunities for professional exchanges, and reinforce a relationship that has too often been viewed through outdated assumptions.

A light-footprint approach is a practical way to achieve this. In simple terms, it means expanding defence cooperation without permanent bases or stationed foreign troops. Regular port visits, refuelling access, logistical coordination, and joint exercises can deepen ties while remaining fully consistent with Cambodia’s Constitution and longstanding preference for strategic balance. Just as important, a lighter-footprint approach allows Cambodia to expand its strategic options without creating the impression that it is turning away from its traditional partners. To date, there have been regular statements from officials from both nations seeking to build stronger bilateral ties. However, there have not been public comments on expanded military cooperation beyond the resumption of the Angkor Sentinel drills and US Navy port visits to Ream Naval Base.

Because this model is limited in scope and focused on practical engagement rather than permanent military presence, it is less likely to be interpreted as a dramatic shift in foreign policy. Cambodia can continue to maintain strong ties with China while simultaneously broadening its relationships with the US and other partners. In this sense, the goal is not to replace one relationship with another, but to widen Cambodia’s diplomatic and security toolkit in a way that preserves balance and strategic autonomy. In the past, there have been disruptions to US-Cambodian relations due to mutual mistrust and misunderstandings. Cambodia’s current engagement with the US, and vice versa, is a return to constructive relations that both countries seek.

This type of collaboration is modest in form but meaningful in effect. It allows Cambodia to host, assist, and respond alongside partners when needed, while strengthening Cambodian-owned infrastructure, such as fuel storage and maritime support facilities, to enable more regular cooperation. These investments would serve Cambodia’s national requirements first while also supporting future cooperation.

The best example of what this approach can achieve is Angkor Sentinel.

First established in 2010, Angkor Sentinel provided a steady framework for US–Cambodia military cooperation focused on peacekeeping and joint training. The exercises were paused in the late 2010s as bilateral defence engagement slowed. Their anticipated return is particularly timely. The Royal Cambodian Army and the US Army Pacific are exploring opportunities to resume the exercise in early 2027.

This is significant because Angkor Sentinel offers a familiar and practical mechanism that can be expanded far more easily than an entirely new initiative. Additional training modules, increased coordination, and limited participation by regional partners could deepen cooperation with minimal lead time and little political risk. Following Hegseth’s visit in November 2025, the US and Cambodia agreed to future U.S. Navy visits to Ream Naval Base. This culminated in the January 2026 visit of the USS Cincinnati Independence-class littoral combat ship to the base.

Critically, exercises, port visits, and military cooperation of this nature send a quiet but meaningful signal. They demonstrate that Cambodia has partners, that communication channels remain open, and that regional escalations will draw the attention of a great power. The purpose of expanded cooperation is not to provoke confrontation, but to raise the costs of coercion and reduce the likelihood of miscalculation. By deepening cooperation with the US, Cambodia will raise the political and strategic costs of unilateral escalation by neighbours such as Thailand (a US military ally).

The broader benefits extend beyond the military sphere. Renewed defence cooperation can help rebuild trust between Phnom Penh and Washington, create opportunities for professional exchanges, and reinforce a relationship that has too often been viewed through outdated assumptions. Cambodia, for its part, gains additional flexibility and another practical avenue through which to protect its sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

In an increasingly uncertain regional environment, the question is not how much engagement Cambodia needs, but what kind. A light and targeted approach to defence cooperation allows Cambodia to expand its options, strengthen its position, and maintain control over its strategic direction.

Stability will not come from the size of a military presence, but from the ability to act with flexibility and purpose when it matters most. In the end, the most effective signal is not the largest one (a US military presence), but the one that is understood.

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