Making Sense of Unorthodox Change in the Thai Navy Command

Admiral Jirapol Wongwit’s appointment as the new commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN), handpicked by outgoing chief Admiral Adoong Pan-iam, breaks radically from tradition. This development merits a review as Thailand charts military reforms amidst an increasingly treacherous maritime landscape.

For starters, Jirapol bypassed the hierarchy by not being a part of the elite “five sharks” (5 ฉลามทัพเรือ) – the traditional quintet of the most senior RTN officers (Figure 1). Even if he was, Jirapol’s career record appears lacklustre. His key posts beyond commanding two corvettes — including the infamously sunken HTMS Sukhothai — include commander of the Coast Guard Squadron under the Royal Thai Fleet (RTF), deputy director-general of the Naval Education Department, and chief staff officer to the RTN commander-in-chief.

Figure 1. Past and Current Lineup of the “Five Sharks”

Furthermore, whereas his predecessors graduated from the Royal Thai Naval Academy, Jirapol attended Germany’s Marineschule Mürwik and Bundeswehr University, becoming the first overseas-educated RTN commander-in-chief. Among Thailand’s three military branches, only the air force has been somewhat liberal in appointing top commanders with international qualifications. The army, too, demands that its chiefs graduate domestically from the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy.

The preference for locally-trained officers is due to various factors: misalignment in military culture and training doctrine, perceived disloyalty to national interests and military objectives, and the lack of cohort and local connections. The last point is critical because military promotions in Thailand are heavily influenced by political and patronage affiliations. Moreover, Jirapol strays further away from his predecessors by not having attended the National Defence College, Thailand’s most prestigious venue for military, political, and private sector networking.

So Jirapol’s rise is anything but a morale booster for the RTN. Thai media outlets such as Krungthep Turakij and Matichon reported that many retired and active officers feel personally slighted. Heated criticisms targeting Adoong, the engine of change, have been made public. Last month’s RTN retirement ceremony saw both visible absentees and a walkout in protest. Hardliners have even vowed not to support Jirapol during his tenure.

The more cooperative officers, meanwhile, may well question Jirapol’s ability to navigate bureaucratic obstacles to obtain necessary funding for the RTN. Under Adoong, a hard-nosed institutional battler proven by his sole and successful nomination of Jirapol, the RTN’s budget request for 10 per cent (1.7-billion-baht) of its 17-billion-baht frigate procurement was still rejected.

Whoever leads the RTN will face considerable challenges in securing funding. First, past controversies surrounding procurement decisions and Thailand’s relatively benign strategic environment have made the Thai public sensitive to arms purchases. Such sensitivity naturally rises alongside economic stagnation and pervasive climate change that demand more investment in recovery efforts and warning systems. Second, economic growth is vital to the Pheu Thai (PT)-led government’s support. While conceding to defence procurement (thereby appeasing military elites) is important for political survival, PT’s priority remains the economy, evident in the Finance Ministry and the central budget’s spiking allocations (much of the latter is for the stimulus handout scheme). Third, in competing for the scarce defence budget, the army — a political titan — and the air force face acute land-based threats from Myanmar. They would likely have the upper hand.

Aside from loyalty, Adoong’s backing of Jirapol could stem from two reasons.

One reason concerns public relations. Thailand’s bureaucratic state, encompassing the military, is often associated with inefficiency, stifled creativity, and entrenched elite domination. Appointing a “dark horse” like Jirapol, then, might resonate positively with the public. His average credentials may escape public scrutiny, considering people’s tendency to only read the headlines.

Displaying attunement to public demand for clarity, Jirapol gave an interview to The Nation upon taking office, insisting that the stalled submarine deal with China would proceed. Jirapol’s German connections help create the impression that he can persuade Berlin to approve MTU-396 diesel engines for Thailand’s Chinese-made submarines, though this looks unattainable in reality given NATO’s pushback against Beijing. To further manage public expectations, Jirapol noted that the final say (hence ultimate responsibility) regarding Thailand’s submarine purchase rests with civilian Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai. Jirapol also asserted that Thailand needs at least four submarines and eight frigates to defend its two coasts, broadly aligning with the RTN’s first-ever white paper released last year.

Appointing a “dark horse” like Jirapol, then, might resonate positively with the public. His average credentials may escape public scrutiny, considering people’s tendency to only read the headlines.

Another reason is that Jirapol’s unique background and isolated position could make him less susceptible to political interference from politicians. This is possibly the most prized quality that Adoong sees in Jirapol. The RTN guards Thai territory amid renewed Thailand-Cambodian maritime boundary talks. Thailand sees its sovereignty over Koh Kood — a district in Trat province — in the Gulf of Thailand as absolute according to the 1907 Franco-Siamese Treaty. But Cambodia’s 1972 maritime claim, which was made unilaterally in line with the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, challenges this. The lasting presence of a naval operational unit on Koh Kood since 1978 speaks volumes about Thailand’s concerns.

With the RTN excluded from maritime boundary negotiations and Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s close ties to Cambodian leadership through her father Thaksin, military personnel and nationalists are perpetually anxious that Koh Kood could be compromised for joint oil and gas development.

Ultimately, rather than a 180-degree turn, Jirapol’s arrival transcends tradition to ensure continuity. Beyond Koh Kood, Thailand must look out for increased Chinese naval activity near its territorial waters and potential entanglement into the South China Sea confrontation as a treaty ally of the United States. The combination of the languid Thai-US alliance, Thailand’s status as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea, and Thailand’s friend-to-all foreign policy has made the latter case unlikely but not unthinkable. Should tensions rise, Thailand could find itself pressured to take a stance, much like its alignment with Japan during the Second World War. Stronger justifications exist for Thailand to enhance naval deterrence. The onus is on Jirapol and the RTN to bridge their differences and convince the public, politicians, and competing security apparatuses of these genuine dangers.

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