Momentum, Alliances, Incumbency: The Bhumjaithai Party’s Ingredients for Election Success

The Bhumjaithai Party’s (BJT) remarkable rise and potential return to power is one of the intriguing plotlines heading into Thailand’s 8 February election. The BJT, founded in 2008 by former members of Newin Chidchob’s factions aligned with Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party, has become a major force known for its political pragmatism. Following the 2019 General Election — the first after the 2014 military coup — the BJT experienced a substantial political upswing, increasing its parliamentary presence from 51 seats in 2019 to a powerful 71 seats in the 2023 election. This growth was particularly significant in Thailand’s constituency system as the party claimed 68 district seats in which Thai voters elected BJT candidates (out of a total 400), while winning three out of the 100 party-list seats that are associated more with voter affiliation and party ideology. The 2023 election thus signalled a consolidation of support at the grassroots level.

The BJT’s power peaked in September 2025 when its leader, Anutin Charnvirakul, was elected Prime Minister after the Pheu Thai Party’s Paetongtarn Shinawatra was removed from office by the Constitutional Court due to her ethical disqualification over a controversial phone call with Cambodia’s former leader, Hun Sen. The People’s Party, with the largest contingent of 143 MPs, forged a strategic partnership with the BJT to support Anutin’s bid for prime minister despite fundamental differences between the parties.

Since taking power, the BJT has vigorously expanded its political influence and popular base. The party consolidated its power by absorbing numerous political factions from rival camps. Factions, known in Thai as Ban Yai (Big House), are informal regional networks comprising politicians and their support bases both within and outside formal party organisations. These factions, often resulting from divisions within parties and led by an influential figure, have been pivotal actors in the Thai political arena for decades. By leveraging their deep-seated regional influence, Ban Yai from a range of parties have enabled the BJT to significantly broaden the government’s political base – and electoral outreach of BJT-led factions, particularly in the constituency system where grassroots presence and candidate popularity matter.

Anutin’s administration also reshuffled many important government positions in various ministries, utilised the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute to fuel nationalist sentiment, and enlisted seasoned experts to bolster its administrative credibility. These strategies could enhance the BJT’s standing with the electorate to rank second place or even to be in the driver’s seat to form the government after the upcoming election.

The BJT has successfully garnered the support of numerous factions from across the political spectrum. This influx included incumbent MPs from the United Thai Nation, Palang Pracharath, Democrat, Chart Thai Pattana, and Thai Sang Thai parties. This strategic consolidation is expected to significantly bolster the BJT’s prospects, potentially yielding 50 more seats than in 2023 and pushing the BJT-plus-factions’ projected total seat count to at least 140-150 of the 500 seats in the upcoming February 2026 election, as reported by National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) Poll in mid-January. The faction led by Varawut Silpa-archa, a former leader of Chart Thai Pattana, for example, has allied with the BJT, bringing 12 incumbents MPs who are running for reelection. Other regional factions, including the Khunpluem and Suchart factions from Chonburi province, the Trang factions from the Democrat Party, and the Isan factions from the Pheu Thai Party also migrated to the BJT’s side in preparing for the February election.

Consolidating with a major party enables small parties and regional factions to better compete against the People’s Party, a progressive movement popular among the younger generation that secured the most seats in the previous election. This collaboration among factions, especially through averting competition against each other to minimise vote-splitting, would significantly increase their collective chances of securing seats. In key provinces such as in Chonburi and Chachoengsaod, BJT and election allies have reportedly reached an agreement on which districts each party or faction will contest, thereby concentrating their resources to challenge the People’s Party more effectively.

The BJT has successfully garnered the support of numerous factions from across the political spectrum.

Beyond managing political alliances, Anutin consolidated his authority upon becoming Prime Minister by initiating a sweeping reshuffle within the Ministry of Interior, replacing 45 high-ranking officials with trusted allies. This strategic wave of transfers has allowed the BJT to exert greater influence over provincial administration. Political experts widely interpret this wave of transfers as facilitating voter mobilisation and strengthening the BJT’s position in key constituencies, effectively neutralising rival influence before the upcoming election.

The BJT also capitalised on issues surrounding Thai-Cambodian relations to expand its voter base. By seizing on the border disputes and empowering the military to lead border policy, Anutin established a strategic alliance with the defense establishment. This move strategically aligns him with the military, using it as a platform to score points on “nationalism“, effectively positioning the party to capture conservative votes.

Through various strategies and the appointment of credible, highly capable individuals to ministerial positions, including Dr Ekniti Nitithanprapas as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Dusit Thani CEO Suphajee Suthumpun as Commerce Minister, and former Foreign Ministry permanent secretary Sihasak Phuangketkeow as Foreign Minister, the BJT has established a key competitive edge in the upcoming election. Although the People’s Party has implemented a similar approach by showcasing their potential executive lineup, their candidates appear to lack comparable administrative experience as those appointed by Anutin, some of whom may be returned to their Cabinet posts.

On balance, the BJT is well-poised to do better than it did in the 2023 election. It might even secure a sufficient number of seats to lead the formation of a coalition government, with allies already by its side.

2025/25