Former Thai prime ministerial candidate and Move Forward Party (MFP) MP Pita Limjaroenrat (front L) speaks during a press conference at the Thai parliament in Bangkok on 31 January 2024, after Thailand's Constitutional Court court ordered Pita and MFP to stop campaigning for lèse majesté reform immediately. (Photo by Jack TAYLOR / AFP)

Move Forward Stands at the Brink of Dissolution

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Political tensions in Thailand have escalated following a court ruling that could potentially lead to the dissolution of the Move Forward Party over charges stemming from its campaign to amend the country's lèse majesté law.

Political uncertainty in Thailand has heightened again. The Constitutional Court has ruled that the party’s actions to reform the country’s lèse majesté law amounted to an exercise to overthrow the constitutional monarchy. This has sent the Move Forward Party (MFP) — the top vote-getter in the 2023 general election with support from over 14 million voters — into a potential death spiral.

At the core of this judicialised intervention is the ongoing struggle between the movement advocating for reform and the countermovement opposing changes to the kingdom’s lèse majesté law, Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code. This law carries a sentence of three to fifteen years of imprisonment per count of defamation, insult, or threat to the king, queen, heir-apparent, or regent. The MFP had won the 2023 general election on a platform which included a proposal to amend the law.

On 31 January, Thailand’s Constitutional Court unanimously ruled that under Section 49 of the 2017 Constitution, the actions of MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat and the party constituted an exercise of rights and freedom to overthrow the democratic system of government with the King as head of state. The court ordered Pita and the MFP to cease any activity, expression, or communication aimed at abolishing the law and prohibited any amendments to the law without due legislative process.

The verdict, while not imposing any immediate penalties, is widely expected to provide the Election Commission with grounds to push for the dissolution of the MFP and banning its executives from politics under Section 92 of the Organic Act on Political Parties. Furthermore, a petition may be filed with the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) against the party’s 44 MPs who signed the motion to propose an amendment to the law on 25 March 2021, accusing them of serious ethical violations. Under Section 235 of the 2017 Constitution, if the NACC finds sufficient evidence, it can refer the case to the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Political Office Holders. A guilty ruling could result in a lifetime political ban for these MPs, including, among others, Pita and deputy leader Sirikanya Tansakun.

To thrive, not just survive, the MFP must make a critical decision: whether to prioritise the demands of those committed to keep pushing for amendments to this law or avoid this issue entirely and focus on other reform agendas.

The looming threat of dissolution and potential ban of its executives and MPs may paralyze the party’s operations and planning, while fostering disillusionment and fatigue among its members and supporters. In the worst-case scenario, the party’s organisational structure and branches will be dismantled, and its ability to function as an effective opposition could be severely impaired due to the loss of parliamentary seats, seasoned debaters, and the possibility of defections by its MPs. Rebuilding the party organisation, similar to the process that followed the dissolution of its predecessor, the Future Forward Party (FFP), will consume significant time and resources, even if its political brand remains intact.

While the ideology and movements that propelled the MFP to election victory will likely endure, the party now faces clear limitations in translating pro-democracy sentiments and the desire to overturn the conservative status quo, especially concerning the monarchy, into concrete legislative actions. One significant precedent set by the ruling is that the inviolable and revered status of the monarchy is an inseparable part of national security. Certainly, the party’s current predicament may garner public sympathy and yield electoral dividends for future incarnations of the party. Yet, this may not be enough to address the impending identity crisis that the party will confront. To thrive, not just survive, the MFP must make a critical decision: whether to prioritise the demands of those committed to keep pushing for amendments to this law or avoid this issue entirely and focus on other reform agendas. At the time of writing, the MFP has taken down its policy to amend Article 112 from its website, presumably in compliance with the court’s verdict.

In the context of broader efforts to amend Article 112, any party wishing to amend it will now face a challenging legal precedent that stacks the odds against them. This impediment will remain in place, regardless of any public debate that may arise. While the Court has ruled that amendments can still be made with due legislative process, what this means in practice remains ambiguous, potentially subject to judicial discretion, and can only be clarified with further rulings.

For Thailand’s broader political landscape, one immediate effect is that the ruling has brought Article 112 back into the national conversation. Public discussion on this issue had peaked when the MFP’s proposal to amend this law had been used as the rationale by several political parties to explain why they could not back an MFP government. It became abundantly clear that there was no majority in the current parliament for amendment; even many of the MFP’s allies refused to support their proposal. Public attention in recent months had turned to other political issues, such as Pheu Thai’s digital wallet scheme. Now, however, popular discussion on Article 112 is bound to be re-ignited, with a renewed focus on the rights to freedom of expression. This is something that will not necessarily be welcome by conservatives.

The full consequences of this ruling will be known when there is greater clarity on whether or not the MFP will be dissolved. The dissolution of the FFP in 2020 had unleashed a torrent of social anger that resulted in mass protests. Should the MFP face the same fate, a similar series of events may once again play out. Progressives were already angry that their election-winning party was denied a place in government; now they have to rue the possibility that the party might be dissolved altogether. As such, they may now feel the need to once again take their grievances onto the streets. Conservatives, on the other hand, may not take kindly to a movement that they feel has put a beloved institution under increasing attack. An MFP dissolution will likely mean that Thailand must brace itself for more political turbulence as opposing sides clash on their differing visions of Thai democracy and constitutional monarchy.

2024/31

Napon Jatusripitak is a Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. He is a PhD Researcher at Northwestern University.


Ken Mathis Lohatepanont is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science, University of Michigan.