Myanmar’s Silent Disease: How Everyday Bribery Fuels Autocratic Control

In Myanmar, paying bribes has become a reality ingrained in people’s daily lives. The assumption that these ‘unofficial contributions’ are necessary for obtaining any service, whether administrative permissions or essential public services, has grown so commonplace that it is no longer viewed as illegal but rather as a survival tactic. Pervasive corrupt practices in Myanmar occur not simply because of weak institutions and administrative incapabilities. Experts researching corruption in autocracies have identified such practices as a purposeful tactic that authorities use to consolidate power, secure loyalty, and suppress dissent.

Bribery as a covert tactic of control is not just the domain of high-level corrupt officials in Myanmar; it is a ubiquitous influence in the day-to-day activities of ordinary citizens. According to one local who worked as a housing agent in Yangon, in the past three years, no incident goes by without paying unrecorded money to officials or those in charge. It also applies to dealings with officers for traffic offences, paying electricity bills, or withdrawing pensions from government banks. People must pay to cut the long queue or get the service quickly. Obtaining a Smart Card, introduced by the State Administration Council (SAC) junta to replace paper identification cards, arguably one of the most straightforward bureaucratic processes in the post-2021 coup period, could be a time-consuming, complex process unless accompanied by a covert payment to officials. A recent report from the Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar) found that daily bribery and corruption practices are heavily present in township-level offices, particularly those dealing with immigration, administrative and tax collection functions, and courts and municipal offices. 

These offices are often the primary touchpoints for citizens needing essential services or permits. Without paying bribes, applicants — regardless the validity of their documentation — risk inexplicable delays or even outright denial of services. Cash is preferred for such everyday bribes, although local ISP-Myanmar research teams reported a few cases involving cars, gold, and foreign currencies as payment.

Figure 1. Townships with Reported Bribery Cases (110 Townships), July-November 2024

The more stringently the SAC enforces security measures in Myanmar, the greater the opportunities for bureaucratic abuse. For instance, registration for overnight guests, a practice abolished in 2016 but reintroduced by the SAC after the 2021 coup, now comes with an unofficial payment requirement. If overnight guests hold national identification cards issued in the dry zone (such as Monywa, Sagaing, Magwe, and Meiktila), which host different revolutionary forces against the military, ward administrators may ask more questions and demand higher rates, which can go up to 30,000 Myanmar kyat (MMK) — about US$15 — in Yangon.

Furthermore, the SAC’s enforcement of the 2010 Military Service Law in February 2024 inadvertently created a bonanza for bureaucratic corruption. Enforcing recruitment in cities and villages became a profitable business for officials and administrators. A local researcher in Yangon shared that families across Myanmar routinely pay bribes starting from MMK500,000 (about US$238 at the official rate) to secure exemption from or avoid conscription. In well-off residential areas, the asking rate can be as high as MMK100 million (about US$47,600).

Local administrators, particularly in rural areas, often urge villagers to pay additional fees on the pretext that they will be conscripted if they fail to do so. Individuals seeking to avoid conscription often face exorbitant bribes at various stages of evasion. Local sources shared that any man aged 18 to 40 would be asked to pay airport officials up to MMK6 million (about US$2,850) in bribes if he planned to leave the country via air.  

Rising living costs and the low wages of civil servants have significantly contributed to this dismal rise of bribery and corruption in Myanmar. Even with recent revisions, civil servant salaries cannot keep up with inflation. Entry-level civil servants may earn as little as MMK204,000 (about US$97) per month, which cannot cover their accommodation, food, and healthcare costs.

For the SAC rulers, there is more reason to keep the corrupted system going. This is to trade the loyalty of the bureaucrats, especially after around 420,000 officials (out of one million), joined the Civil Disobedient Movement after the 2021 coup. As much as the public needs their services, the SAC needs to retain the loyalty of existing bureaucrats and new recruits to continue with its administration.

Myanmar is a cautionary tale about understanding corruption as a symptom of weak governance and a strategic tool that autocrats wield to consolidate their grip on power.

Unsurprisingly, Myanmar’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has continued its downward spiral, hitting a new low in 2023. With a score of 20 out of 100 (where 100 is an ideal score where a country is perceived as having no corruption), Myanmar ranks among the most corrupt countries globally and scored the worst in Southeast Asia.

The SAC often ignores corruption among its supporters, allowing them to operate with impunity. This tacit approval of corrupt practices in turn fosters dependency on the SAC. The SAC uses anti-corruption laws selectively, targeting mainly the political opposition. According to SAC’s Anti-Corruption Website, persecuted cases in 2021 were mostly those of the former leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government. In the first year after the coup, 87 per cent of anti-corruption cases were brought against those who held political positions or who were high-ranking executives. Of these, nearly 6 per cent were bureaucrats and 4 per cent private citizens or business owners.

In contrast, the SAC’s immigration ministry, a notorious institutional bribe-seeker, received only one case against it in the same year (2021). The SAC’s recent anti-corruption efforts have targeted generals and businessmen who have fallen out of the regime’s favour. Such selective enforcement and impunity reinforce the impression that corruption is acceptable if the corrupt officials continue to support the regime.

Myanmar is a cautionary tale about understanding corruption as a symptom of weak governance and a strategic tool that autocrats wield to consolidate their grip on power. The cumulative effect is that these intentional acts accepting everyday bribery not only exacerbate citizens’ socioeconomic burdens in the immediate term but also stifle Myanmar’s development in every sector — economic, political, and social — in the long run, even if a long-awaited regime change occurs.  

2025/17