Negeri Sembilan’s Tenuous State Assembly: Procedural and Political Tests

On 27 April 2026, 14 United Malays National Organisation-Barisan Nasional (UMNO-BN) members of the Negeri Sembilan state assemblty announced the withdrawal of confidence from the Chief Minister (CM), the Pakatan Harapan (PH)-appointed Aminuddin Harun. PH was left with only 17 members — falling below the 19 seats needed to form a majority in the 36-member state assembly. The Ruler (Yang di-Pertuan Besar, YDPB) of Negeri Sembilan, Tuanku Muhriz Tuanku Munawir, himself battling a dispute over his position amongst the state’s chieftains, directed that Aminuddin remain in office, presiding over a minority government. After meeting with UMNO President Zahid Hamidi, however, the 14 politicians have since reversed their positions and remain within the PH-BN state unity government.

These events are taking Malaysian politics into a new, highly volatile phase, with ripple effects now escalating quickly. With Johor officially dissolving its state assembly on 1 June for state elections to take place within 60 days, and key PH political leaders now openly advocating for a simultaneous dissolution in Negeri Sembilan to return the mandate to the people, resolution remains distant. The stability of the BN-PH Madani coalition has been shaken. For instance, BN is already, through its Chairman Zahid, stating publicly that it is almost certain to contest the next general election alone. Previously, it had announced that it would work alongside PH.

This incident raises several relevant questions about historical precedent and the role of institutions in determining state government leadership. First, what is a minority government, and has this ever occurred in the past within state or federal governments? Legally and constitutionally, is a minority government technically acceptable?

The concept of a minority government may seem counter-intuitive to the democratic tenet of majority rule but has, in fact, been accepted within Westminster systems, including Canada, Ireland and the UK.

Under the Federal Constitution 1957 and various State Constitutions (which are all similarly worded), the ruler must appoint a person who, in his judgment, is likely to command the confidence of the majority. However, how the ruler makes this assessment and comes to his conclusion about who is “likely” to command the “confidence of the majority” is not explicitly spelled out.

Minority governments have occurred in Malaysia, but only for relatively brief periods. For instance, Stephen Kalong Ningkan continued to lead a minority government in Sarawak in 1966. Minority governments have also taken place at the federal level. Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin led a minority government from July to August 2021.

The concept of a minority government may seem counter-intuitive to the democratic tenet of majority rule but has, in fact, been accepted within Westminster systems.

Despite legal legitimacy and historical precedence, however, minority governments may not necessarily augur well in terms of perceptions of political or economic stability. In the case of Negeri Sembilan, for example, the SME Association of Malaysia has urged the state’s royal and political turmoil be resolved quickly, as it believes prolonged uncertainty carries economic consequences.

A second point of interest is the role of the ruler in granting an audience with the incumbent or alternative leader. In this case, UMNO had reportedly requested an audience with Ruler Tuanku Muhriz to inform him of their withdrawal of support for Aminuddin and claimed they had the numbers to form a new state government, with the backing of five representatives from Perikatan Nasional (PN), making up 19 seats. It is not known how the palace would have responded, if at all, but this was overtaken by the reversal.

Table 1 provides a historical overview of cases in Malaysia in which state governments changed as a result of defections or loss of support. Of the 16 documented cases, only four had no-confidence votes held in the respective state legislative assemblies (1961 Terengganu, 1966 Sarawak, 1977 Kelantan and 2020 Perak), whereas five had their state assemblies dissolved, leading to fresh elections (1977 Kelantan, 1987 Sarawak, 2020 Sabah, 2021 Malacca and 2022 Johor). Of the latter, only Kelantan (1977) saw a no-confidence vote and state dissolution. In all other cases, the governments of these states changed when there was no motion or vote of confidence/no-confidence, nor did their state assemblies dissolve. In other words, the changes occurred without any public means of displaying confidence in the new political leadership, whether by a vote in the state legislative assembly or fresh elections.

Table 1: Defections Through History

Based on Table 1, it would seem as if the current situation, where the disputed Chief Minister’s position is retained with no confidence vote or dissolution is unprecedented – for the time being, though this is being tested as events unfold. This is partially to do with the Ruler Tuanku Muhriz choosing not to grant an audience to the potential alternative leadership (UMNO-BN), and partly to do with the consequent reversal of the 14 UMNO politicians.

A third and fascinating development is that the Negeri Sembilan state government will now have to consult a national-level UMNO-PH Leadership Consultative Council, especially regarding sensitive executive decisions. While state governments are by nature an extension of the political parties that appoint individuals to represent them within the Executive Council (EXCO), there have been instances in the past when the Chief Minister and his own political party did not see eye to eye, such as in Selangor (Khalid Ibrahim), Terengganu (Ahmad Said) and Johor (Osman Sapian).

In the past, previous consultative committees have also been set up to ensure coalition stability between PH and BN, such as in Perak and Pahang shortly after they formed joint coalition state governments in 2022 and 2023 respectively. However, the Negeri Sembilan case is a rare instance of state party leaders deferring decisions that could “trigger sensitivities or create discord” to a national council, even while needing to navigate the delicate relationship with the rulers.

Although the situation has stabilised, there will still be pressure to determine a clear majority, or to determine methods towards a more sustainable minority government, such as via a confidence and supply agreement, as this may affect how decisions are made at the legislative assembly. However, this fragile status quo may be short-lived, given the dissolution of the Johor state assembly and rumours that Negeri Sembilan might do the same.  

Even if its state assembly does not dissolve immediately, the state government may find itself under pressure to ensure that the BN representatives do not vote against the state budget in November this year, which would be a proxy no-confidence vote against PH’s Aminuddin — indicating the Negeri Sembilan state government has a six-month lifeline. This episode will certainly affect future PH-BN cooperation, including seat negotiations and electoral strategies in the upcoming Johor state election ahead of GE16, not to mention other state elections that are coming up, including in Malacca.

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