Nuclear Energy Renaissance in Southeast Asia: A Role for China?

Southeast Asia stands at the threshold of a nuclear renaissance. Vietnam and Russia signed an agreement in March 2026 for the Ninh Thuan 1 nuclear power plant. The Philippines and Indonesia aim to have operational reactors by the early 2030s. Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore are studying small modular reactors (SMRs). Given heightened energy insecurity, climate commitments, and the imperative to meet surging electricity demand from industrial growth, data centres and AI development, nuclear energy is featuring more saliently in Southeast Asian economies’ development strategies. Against this backdrop, China stands as an attractive partner alongside established exporters such as France, Russia, South Korea, and the US.

China’s nuclear export strategy is anchored in domestic industrial capacity built over six decades. With 61 operational reactors and 36 under construction as of 2026, China operates the world’s third-largest nuclear reactor network and is leading in new reactor construction. This experience has yielded technological self-sufficiency: China now designs, manufactures, and constructs reactors domestically with primarily indigenous intellectual property rights (IPR).

The flagship of China’s export push is the Hualong One (HPR1000), a third-generation pressurised water reactor developed by China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN). With 41 units operational or under construction, it is one of the world’s most widely deployed reactor designs. It features advanced active and passive safety systems, can operate for 72 hours without external power, and generates 1,090-1,100 MW per unit, which can meet the electricity needs of up to one million homes.

The design is highly localised, with around 90 per cent of components produced domestically. This enables China to offer integrated turnkey packages covering engineering, procurement, construction, financing, training, and fuel supply, strengthening its competitiveness in global markets.

Beijing has set the target of exporting 30 nuclear reactors to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries by 2030, potentially generating 1 trillion yuan (US$145 billion) in revenue. It has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with multiple countries, with projects operational or under negotiation in Pakistan, Argentina, Kenya, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia.

Relative to other reactor-exporting states, China’s key strengths lie in state backing for capital costs of nuclear plant construction abroad and integrated nuclear supply chains. Its high degree of self-sufficiency in reactor design, engineering, and construction has enabled tighter cost control and faster deployment. While still relying on imported uranium, China is advancing alternative technologies. The Wuwei Thorium Molten Salt Reactor (TMSR-LF1) attained full power capacity in June 2024, highlighting China’s emerging edge in next-generation reactors. Compared to conventional pressurised water reactors, TMSRs use liquid fuel dissolved in molten salt coolants. This allows for refuelling without shutting down reactors.

Thorium-based energy could be especially attractive to developing countries, as it offers long-term energy security through wider resource availability, enhanced safety features, and a significantly reduced burden of high-level radioactive waste compared to conventional uranium cycles. Uranium is more mature commercially, but thorium has lower potential to be diverted for use in nuclear weapons. Thorium’s long-term potential makes it an appealing option for countries seeking cleaner energy pathways.

China has been engaging Southeast Asian countries on nuclear development via forums such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002) and the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia. The latter has been hosted by the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan since 2000. Exchanges among nuclear scientists, industry regulators, corporations, research institutions and civil society cover a wide range of topics, including nuclear energy and utilisation of radioactive sources for non-power applications.

These exchanges contribute to ASEAN’s pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear policy framework and nuclear safety culture in East Asia. In these and other networks, Southeast Asian countries are not mere recipients of knowledge exchange and capacity building. They also play an increasingly active role in the search for effective regional mechanisms to ensure nuclear safety and security.

Thailand’s operational partnership with China is notable. In 2015, Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding – Thailand’s largest private power company – took a 10 per cent stake in two Hualong One reactors at the Fangchenggang nuclear power plant in Guangxi. CGN has also been training Thai nuclear professionals, making the project a demonstration site for Hualong One exports. This cooperation helped underpin the 2025 China-Thailand Memorandum of Understanding on peaceful nuclear energy use.

For Southeast Asian countries preparing to develop nuclear energy, selecting a technology partner is more than a commercial transaction: it establishes long-term partnerships and dependencies across capital, technology, expertise, fuel supply and spent fuel disposal. With reactor lifetimes exceeding forty years, today’s vendor choices lock in tomorrow’s strategic relationships.

For Southeast Asia, China offers clear advantages: proven technology, rapid delivery, and strong capacity-building support. Concerns about technological and fuel-supply lock-in over decades notwithstanding, alignment with China carries potential for learning to build up indigenous nuclear industries capacities as well.

Fuel dependency is particularly significant, as conventional reactors rely on low-enriched uranium (LEU), typically enriched to below 20 per cent U-235. Only a few countries possess the technical capability to undertake uranium enrichment at scale. They are primarily the major nuclear powers and several technologically advanced states such as Brazil, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands. Russia remains the dominant global supplier of LEU, but China is rapidly expanding its own fuel cycle capabilities to support its growing reactor exports.

Technology lock-in is equally significant. Maintenance, upgrades, and technical support typically remain tied to the original vendor, shaping regulatory standards and institutional capacity over decades. Over time, this can embed long-term dependence in both technical systems and governance frameworks.

For Southeast Asia, China offers clear advantages: proven technology, rapid delivery, and strong capacity-building support. Yet these benefits come with the potential for technological and fuel-supply lock-in over decades. The key challenge is how to adopt, adapt, standardise, and ultimately indigenise imported technologies, while proactively seeking international assistance to address shortages of qualified engineers, scientists, skilled workers, and regulators. China’s own experience is instructive: it drew extensively on various technologies from Canada, France, Russia, and the US before developing reactors with independent IPRs – a process that took decades of sustained policy and financial commitment.

Ultimately, nuclear vendor selection is not merely a technical or commercial decision – it is a strategic choice that will shape energy security and technological trajectories for decades to come. In this context, engagement with China should be part of the region’s nuclear future. The challenge lies in structuring that engagement — alongside other partners — in ways that maximise benefits, safeguard strategic flexibility, and build indigenous capacity.

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