Prabowo’s Nutrition Agency Shake-Up Reveals Deeper Structural Problems

President Prabowo’s recent decision to replace Dadan Hindayana as head of the National Nutrition Agency (BGN) did little to address the serious structural problems plaguing the institution. Dadan had overseen the administration’s flagship Free Nutritious Meals programme (or MBG, Makan Bergizi Gratis) but the policy remains deeply flawed in its design and implementation. Consuming nearly 7 per cent of Indonesia’s state budget, MBG has become one of the most controversial initiatives of the Prabowo administration. Policy analysts and protesters have pointed to the programme as contributing to Indonesia’s recent fiscal pressures.

The most devastating blow came with the corruption charges against Dadan and his two BGN deputies, retired police major general Sonny Sonjaya and retired army major general Lodewijk Pusung. All three were detained shortly after being dismissed from their BGN posts; they are accused of contract rigging, procurement markups and embezzling operational funds. Dadan’s fall was remarkably swift. In August 2025, President Prabowo had awarded him the Bintang Mahaputera Utama, one of Indonesia’s highest civilian honours, and in February 2026, with the Bintang Jasa Utama.

Prabowo has appointed Nanik S. Deyang, a former tabloid journalist and member of his campaign team, to lead BGN, but Nanik has no experience managing an institution as large and complex as this. Nanik will be assisted by two deputies: Agustina Arumsari, deputy chair of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), and Major General Trenggono, an active-duty military officer previously deputy director of PT Agrinas Pangan, a state-owned enterprise involved in managing another of Prabowo’s policy flagships, the Merah Putih (red and white) Village Cooperative programme.

Corruption and mismanagement have forced Prabowo to take steps to improve the MBG programme. First, his government has cut the BGN budget from IDR335 trillion (US$18.4 billion) to IDR268 trillion (US$14.7 billion). Second, it has halted the expansion of MBG kitchens (also known as Nutrition Provision and Fulfillment Units, or SPPG). According to the Coordinating Minister for Food Affairs Zulkifli Hasan, there are currently 28,700 kitchens, far exceeding this year’s target of 21,000. The future expansion of the MBG programme will be refocused on Indonesia’s underdeveloped, frontier and outermost regions (or “3T” areas) and it will no longer primarily target schoolchildren, but focus on pregnant women, breastfeeding mothers and toddlers.

These changes raise a critical question: do shifts in leadership, development priorities and programme targets address the deeper structural problems confronting BGN? From the outset, this policy has been controversial. Its original goal was to reduce stunting among Indonesian children. Yet instead of focusing on combating stunting, the government expanded the meals to become a universal entitlement for all school-age children and expectant mothers. To date, it has reportedly reached 62.4 million registered beneficiaries.

MBG is now the largest welfare programme in Indonesian history. The government has claimed that the programme employs 1.28 million workers. The 2026 allocation (about 7 per cent of the state budget) exceeds the country’s defence budget of IDR185 trillion (US$10 billion) and the police budget of IDR145.65 trillion (US$8.1 billion). MBG funding also came at the expense of other ministries and regional transfers (TKD). Thus, the programme has been widely criticised as unproductive, populist and a major burden on state finances. President Prabowo, however, has remained committed to its implementation. For him, the Free Nutritious Meals are not merely the fulfillment of a campaign promise but are central to his broader political project.

Inefficiency, corruption, collusion and food poisoning will remain difficult to address unless the programme is radically reformed.

MBG is administered centrally by the National Nutrition Agency, which works with SPPG across Indonesia where food is prepared and cooked before being distributed. Most of these partners are foundations, classified as non-profit entities under Indonesian law. In practice, however, SPPG operators receive a profit from each meal served, or IDR2,000 of the IDR15,000 (US$0.11 of US$0.83) the state has allocated per portion. Each SPPG also receives an incentive of IDR6 million (US$333.61) per day for 313 days a year, including during the respective kitchen’s construction.

Of the 27,208 SPPGs, most are formally registered under foundations, but many are in fact controlled by individuals linked to national and local politicians. In South Sulawesi, for example, a local politician’s daughter reportedly controls 41 SPPGs, while in West Java, a former regent’s son reportedly controls 16. Further, SPPG ownership is not limited to private individuals: state institutions are also involved. The Indonesian National Police owns 1,376 SPPGs, most of which are operational, while the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) owns 452 SPPGs and plans to build as many as 2,000 units. Mass organisations, religious groups and even universities manage SPPGs.

This design, which relies on partners functioning largely as private contractors, lies at the root of MBG’s problems: it has become a lucrative business controlled by political forces supporting President Prabowo. The profit-sharing mechanism for each meal portion, which the BGN itself calls “rent”, combined with the Rp6 million daily incentive (per kitchen), makes SPPG ownership highly profitable. MBG can thus be seen as a political project to generate support for his possible re-election in 2029, as it rests on institutionalised rent distribution.

BGN’s most serious failure has been its exclusion of key stakeholders: schools, teachers, parents, local communities and local governments. In contrast, similar programmes such as Posyandu (community-based health centres serving mothers and children under five, first established in Indonesian villages in the 1970s) have endured precisely because they are rooted in community participation and the lowest levels of government. This grassroots structure has helped Posyandu provide basic nutrition, such as mung bean porridge and milk, without the food safety scandals associated with MBG.

The shake-up at BGN and the arrest of its former head do not resolve MBG’s deeper structural problems. Inefficiency, corruption, collusion and food poisoning will remain difficult to address unless the programme is radically reformed. This means incorporating grassroots stakeholders, eliminating the foundation-contractor model and establishing an independent audit mechanism. In short, the president’s MBG programme requires a fundamental overhaul. The BGN’s new management has promised reforms, including setting up kitchens inside schools. Yet these steps are unlikely to resolve the programme’s structural problems, which are more political than nutritional.

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