Quietly, not Silently: How Vietnam Deals with China on the South China Sea

On 11 July 2026, 14 countries, including the United States, Japan, and the Philippines, issued a joint statement in conjunction with the 10th anniversary of the landmark Tribunal Award, which invalidated China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. The statement reaffirmed the Award as a “significant milestone” that is “final, legally binding, and definitive,” and rejected China’s claim to “historic rights” in the South China Sea. The signatories were echoed by the EU, which issued its own statement the same day commending the ruling.

Yet observers note that ASEAN has stayed silent for a decade on an Award with substantial implications for the region, and wonder why Vietnam, despite its vocal opposition to China’s maritime claims, was not among the signatories — unlike the Philippines, the other country directly bordering the contested waters. Vietnam’s posture can be explained by its foreign policy, economic priorities, and distinct approach to the South China Sea.

Vietnam’s foreign policy does not accommodate collective campaigns against China or any other great power. Hanoi continues to uphold its “Four No’s” defence policy: no military alliances, no foreign military bases on its soil, no siding with one country against another and no use or threat of force. Like other Southeast Asian states, Vietnam is reluctant to take sides in any multilateral effort against China or major powers, even one that serves Hanoi’s own interests. Vietnam was not alone in this: no other ASEAN member besides the Philippines, a US treaty ally, signed the joint statement.

This “Four No’s” posture is embedded in Vietnam’s broader multi-directional (or “Bamboo”) diplomacy, a strategy of “adaptive siding” and balancing between major powers, particularly the US and China.

Moreover, under the pragmatic leadership of Vietnamese President and Communist Party General Secretary To Lam, Hanoi has set ambitious development targets: double-digit annual GDP growth from 2026, upper-middle-income status by 2030 (with per-capita income targeted at USD8,500), and developed-nation status by 2045. These goals are facing mounting headwinds from US tariffs, US-China competition and Middle East tensions.

To meet these targets, Vietnam has little choice but to sustain strong economic ties with China, its largest trading partner, second-largest export market, and a crucial infrastructure partner. In this context, publicly condemning China alongside a dozen other nations would likely be more costly than beneficial.

That said, Hanoi is far from standing idly by as China asserts itself in the South China Sea. For over a decade, Vietnam has consistently pursued a “speak less, do more” approach, combining public restraint with a range of quieter policy tools.

Vietnam refrains from publicly joining other nations to condemn China in the South China Sea due to its foreign policy, development priorities, and calibrated approach to the dispute.

First, since the 2014 oil rig crisis, Vietnam has largely refrained from public opposition to China, speaking out mainly when its legal position is directly challenged, such as by China’s unilateral fishing moratorium over Vietnamese waters, its vessels surveying in the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), or its upgraded construction in the disputed Paracels.

Second, Hanoi has confronted Beijing at sea, frequently though quietly, whenever Chinese vessels encroach on Vietnam’s EEZ, disrupt its oil exploration or harass its occupied features in the Spratlys. These interventions go unnoticed in international news but would register in Beijing.

Third, Vietnam has steadily consolidated its legal posture in the South China Sea: laying groundwork for potential future litigation like the Philippines v. China case, and filing a note verbale with the UN opposing China’s claims while asserting its rights under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to an extended continental shelf. Rather than joining the multilateral statement, Hanoi marked the exact date of the 10th anniversary with its own separate statement, reaffirming UNCLOS and, thus, implicitly endorsing the Award.

Fourth, over the past couple of years, Vietnam has quietly but sharply accelerated island reclamation and construction across the Spratlys, shifting from land reclamation to the construction of operational infrastructure. These operations would enhance its posture of confronting Chinese activities such as surveying Vietnam’s EEZs, harassing its fishing and oil exploration, and threatening its occupied features. Indeed, Vietnam is increasingly posing physical challenges to China’s expansive maritime claims against UNCLOS and international law.

Lastly, Vietnam has steadily deepened defence ties with other nations invested in the South China Sea. After elevating relations with the US to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2023, Hanoi received the third US Coast Guard cutter, welcomed US naval ships, and hosted US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in November 2025. It also deepened defence technology cooperation with Japan, including a training agreement signed in December 2025 and it signed a deal to acquire India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles in May 2026. Moreover, Vietnam upgraded ties to an “enhanced strategic partnership” and signed a memorandum on defence cooperation with the Philippines during To Lam’s visit to Manila in June, while explicitly reaffirming commitment to UNCLOS and the 2016 ruling bilaterally without the political cost of a multilateral statement.

Taken together, Vietnam refrains from publicly joining other nations to condemn China in the South China Sea due to its foreign policy, development priorities, and calibrated approach to the dispute. However, it continues to quietly counter Chinese claims and activities, both legally and on the ground.

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