State of Southeast Asia Survey 2024: Indonesia Doubling Down on ASEAN and Japan

Indonesian respondents in the State of Southeast Asia Survey 2024 (SSEA 2024) seem to have grown sceptical that the EU, the US, and India would do the right thing for the region and world order, primarily due to their positions on the Israel-Hamas conflict. Conversely, ASEAN, Japan and China fared better among Indonesian respondents.

In a noticeable shift, the EU, the US, and India fell from the second, third, and fourth positions in 2023 to the third, fourth, and fifth places respectively in the trust rankings (Figure 1). All three experienced a spike in distrust levels.

Japan Tops the Trust Rankings

Figure 1. Trust Rankings of Major Powers (Indonesian Responses only)

The SSEA 2024 was conducted between January and February 2024, three months after Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack against Israel. As the Indonesian government and people are longstanding, staunch supporters of the Palestinian cause and independence, it was expected that this conflict loomed large for Indonesian respondents. It was their top geopolitical concern – chosen by 74.7 per cent of respondents, followed by aggression in the South China Sea (SCS) at 43 per cent and the Russia-Ukraine War at 36.6 per cent.

The EU, the US, and India all showed solidarity for Israel following the Hamas attack. It is not surprising, then, that responses by Indonesian participants demonstrate the increasing fallout from the trio’s diplomatic stances on the Israel-Hamas conflict. When asked about the most likely impact of the conflict on Southeast Asia, a large proportion of Indonesian respondents (47.5 per cent) believed that it would diminish their trust in international law and the rules-based order.

While Indonesia has not singled out specific countries, its foreign minister has expressed deep disappointment over the seeming double standards, especially of the Global North. At the EU-Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum, Retno Marsudi called for consistent respect for international law, highlighting that this should also apply to Palestine. Indonesia has repeatedly called for a ceasefire, in bilateral, regional, and international fora. It has sent multiple aid shipments to Gaza. Indonesians widely support their government’s position, which 78.2 per cent of Indonesian respondents approved or strongly approved. One-third believed that the international community should support a ceasefire and prioritise the provision of humanitarian aid (36.2 per cent), followed closely by supporting Palestine’s right to self-determination (35.1 per cent).  

Economic factors can also explain decreases in trust. For the US, this can probably be linked in part to Indonesian elites’ disappointment in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). More respondents held a negative view of IPEF’s overall impact and effectiveness, rising from 13.2 per cent in 2023 to 25.7 per cent in 2024. These are still fewer than those who were either unsure (41.9 per cent) or viewed the IPEF positively (32.5 per cent). Negative views were primarily due to respondents’ perceptions that the IPEF will not offer greater market access or will worsen US-China competition (both at 39.7 per cent). Of the 32.5 per cent who were positive about IPEF, 38.4 per cent said it would strengthen global trade governance and 26.7 per cent said it would underscore the US’ economic engagement of the region.

Amid the uncertainties of US-China rivalry, Indonesian respondents still rated the EU as their preferred “third party” to hedge with. The EU tied with Japan, each being the preferred choice of 34.3 per cent of respondents.

Despite the elevation of US-Indonesia relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023 and 2024 marking the 75th anniversary of bilateral relations, Indonesian respondents still feel neglected by the Biden Administration. More respondents felt that US engagement with the region had decreased or decreased significantly (from 21.5 per cent in 2023 to 37.7 per cent in 2024), along with a drop in confidence in the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security (from 31.4 per cent in 2023 to 20.7 per cent) (Figure 2). This underscores how diplomatic milestones may not translate into Indonesians’ perceptions of a bilateral relationship’s strength.

Confidence in Uncle Sam Flags

Figure 2. View of the US as a Strategic Partner & Provider of Regional Security (Indonesian responses only)

Among the major powers, China saw an improvement in trust levels among Indonesian respondents, rising from 22.3 per cent in 2023 to 34.0 per cent in 2024. (Among all ASEAN respondents, trust levels in China slid downward from 29.5 per cent in 2023 to 24.8 per cent in 2024.) Of those who trust China, 62.2 per cent see China having vast economic resources and political will for global leadership while 15.6 per cent deem China a responsible stakeholder which champions international law. However, worries about China persist. Highlighting it as Indonesia’s second most important geopolitical concern, 40.9 per cent chose (China’s) strong-arm tactics in the SCS and the Mekong as a potential factor that could worsen Sino-Indonesian relations. This came after fears of China’s growing economic dominance and political influence in Indonesia at 41.4 per cent (Figure 3).

How Indonesian Views of China Could Go South

Figure 3. Factors that Could Potentially Worsen Indonesia’s Positive Impression of China (Respondents chose two responses)

This sentiment was echoed by 49.0 per cent of Indonesian respondents who distrust China, where 42.3 per cent of that group are concerned that its economic and military power could be used to threaten Indonesia’s interests and sovereignty. Although Indonesia is a non-claimant state in the SCS, overlapping claims with China over the Natuna Islands have resulted in standoffs and escalating tensions.    

Against this backdrop, Indonesian respondents turned towards ASEAN. Indonesian respondents were more confident in the bloc’s ability to champion free trade (50.2 per cent) and to provide leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law (49.1 per cent). However, like SSEA 2024 respondents from elsewhere, most Indonesian elites are still wary that the bloc is slow and ineffective (86.4 per cent), becoming an arena of major power competition (70.6 per cent), and fear that it cannot return to pre-pandemic growth levels (53.2 per cent).

Japan maintained its top spot as the most trusted major power: a significant 58.1 per cent were either confident or very confident that Japan will “do the right thing”. Underscoring this soft power influence, Japan remained Indonesians’ most preferred holiday destination (30.6 per cent) and second-favoured relocation preference (22.6 per cent).  

Amid the uncertainties of US-China rivalry, Indonesian respondents still rated the EU as their preferred “third party” to hedge with. The EU tied with Japan, each being the preferred choice of 34.3 per cent of respondents. The most prominent reason was respondents’ view that these two powers are responsible stakeholders that respect and champion international law.

Indonesia’s trust perceptions of other powers are shifting as it navigates an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. When read against an Indonesia-based, non-elite survey taken in July 2022, the Indonesian elite worldview as captured in the SSEA 2024 is a sophisticated one that harks back to Indonesia’s longstanding free and active foreign policy, with its elites assessing partners in a clear-eyed manner as different challenges arise.

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