Takaichi and Taiwan: When Deterrence Looks Like Provocation

A Sino-Japanese spat has ensued after Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae said, in November, that a Chinese use of force on Taiwan would invite a response from Japan, prioritising evacuation, and if escalated into a “survival-threatening situation”, could legally enable Japan to activate its defence forces. Chinese responses have been fast and furious, including trade bans and restrictions on tourists, but Beijing’s bark may be worse than its bite. The intense pressure could derive as much from ire over Takaichi’s remarks as the need to isolate Japan on the issue of Taiwan.

The Japanese focus on Taiwan and the stability of the Taiwan Strait is not new. In Japanese parlance, a “survival threatening situation” poses a danger to the Japanese people’s “right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness”. This would involve Japan invoking collective self-defence in aid of a “foreign country” in a close relationship with Japan (it is commonly understood that this refers to the US-Japan mutual defence relationship).

Japanese policy planners have long been preparing for a Taiwan contingency. Prior to 2020, references to Taiwan in defence white paper were subsumed into general discussions over China’s military capabilities. In 2021, however, mentions of Taiwan became more specific. The defence white paper noted that “stabilising Taiwan is important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community”. The 2022 defence white paper stressed that Taiwan is an “incredibly vital partner and important friend to Japan” given shared values of freedom, democracy and human rights. The 2025 defence white paper discussed Chinese blockade strategies around Taiwan — thus moving beyond in-principle support for stability in the Strait to evaluation of real-world situations that Japan needs to “pay close attention” to with a “sense of crisis more than before”.

Japanese leaders have also been largely empathic in linking Japan’s security to Taiwan’s. In 2021, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that a “Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency, and therefore a contingency for the Japan-US alliance.” Earlier that year, his Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said that a Taiwan contingency “could relate to a survival-threatening situation” (this was code for Japan invoking the deployment of its self-defence forces; it was similarly used by Takaichi in November).

Any credible defence of Taiwan by the US would involve Japan, because many US military assets are based on the Japanese islands. In particular, Okinawa hosts Kadena Air Base, one of only two US air bases on the island that can conduct operations over Taiwan. In a Taiwan contingency, China would likely attack US (and Japanese) military facilities in Japan to prevent military intervention by the US and its allies. Such attacks would be tantamount to attacks on Japan’s homeland.

The reality is stark: thanks to Trump’s inaction, China’s ability to isolate Japan, a consequential power and formal US ally, raises troubling questions for smaller Southeast Asian countries, including US allies.

If Takaichi’s comments were not extraordinary, what warrants Chinese ire? It is likely that China’s actions are largely for political theatre. China has imposed curbs on seafood imports and cancelled flights. As a result, Japanese CEOs have put their annual visits to China on hold, since it would be difficult to meet Chinese political leaders. But there are mixed signals on the prospect of more concerted economic action. In 2012, anti-Japanese riots broke out against Japanese businesses in China over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu island dispute. This time, a senior Chinese diplomat has even reassured Japanese manufacturers in Dalian, telling them to do business in China without worries — yet, later, China announced its dual-use export restrictions.

China’s more sophisticated strategy is to isolate Japan diplomatically on the Taiwan issue, particularly at a time when the Trump administration appears to be focused on an economic deal with Beijing and getting formal US allies to bear their fair share of alliance burdens. Japan has sought to secure Trump’s backing on the issue, but the US president has done Beijing some favours by refusing to openly support Japan. As the commander-in-chief, he has told his officials to avoid actions that could jeopardise the trade deal he reached with Xi Jinping in October.

Deterrence stability should hold, for now. One view is that Takaichi has fired a “warning shot” that could help maintain deterrence and uphold the status quo in the Strait. The converse is also true; Chinese warnings to Japan serve as a deterrent to the US and its allies. Trump’s lack of reassurance to Japan on the issue would also prevent Japan from being over-emboldened by US security guarantees.

The danger in the current Sino-Japanese spat arises more from accidental escalation than deliberate provocation. In early December, Chinese J-15 fighters engaged their fire-control radars on Japanese F-15s, mirroring a 2013 incident when a Chinese frigate locked its radar on a Japanese helicopter. China and Russia have also increased their joint strategic air patrols around Japan. Attempts by Japanese aircraft to intercept such patrols raise the risk of accidental escalation.

ASEAN should use its diplomatic capital to ameliorate tensions between China and Japan. ASEAN lacks political heft, as evidenced by its first-ever statement on the “cross-strait development” of August 2022, which called for “maximum restraint” by all parties after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Notably, the statement avoided any mention of China, Taiwan or Pelosi, indicating ASEAN’s sensitivity to China’s reaction. The grouping’s capacity constraints, however, would be far surpassed by the impact it would encounter if shots are fired in anger.

A more consequential result of Chinese pressure on Japan is its effect on ASEAN states in times of contingency in the Strait. The reality is stark: thanks to Trump’s inaction, China’s ability to isolate Japan, a consequential power and formal US ally, raises troubling questions for smaller Southeast Asian countries, including US allies. One view is that China could influence more pro-China ASEAN countries, such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, to support China in the event of a conflict. This would undermine ASEAN’s unity and further marginalise its central role in regional multilateralism. This should provide food for thought.

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