Supporters of the Bhumjaithai Party (C) hold placards on the first day of the registration for Thailand's upcoming general election at the provincial hall in the southern province of Narathiwat on 27 December 2025. (Photo by Madaree Tohlala / AFP)

Supporters of the Bhumjaithai Party (C) hold placards on the first day of the registration for Thailand's upcoming general election at the provincial hall in the southern province of Narathiwat on 27 December 2025. (Photo by Madaree Tohlala / AFP)

Thailand’s Upper South: The Conservative Swing State

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While the 2026 Thai elections were marked by a win by conservative elements, the situation in the Upper South was marked by the lack of a hegemon among conservative parties.

Thailand’s 2026 general election on 8 February delivered an unprecedented “conservative win”. Yet within the traditionally conservative Upper South, comprising 11 provinces between the Andaman Coast and the Gulf of Thailand, no party prevailed convincingly.

All key prime ministerial candidates made appearances in the Upper South ahead of the vote. The region’s geostrategic importance in maritime trade, defence, and coastal tourism attracts investment and policy initiatives, such as the Land Bridge and the Andaman Wellness Corridor. This has in turn generated political value. More importantly in 2026, the region was up for grabs like never before.

Once a longstanding vote bank for the centre-right Democrat Party (DP), the region’s loyalty has been swayed by shifting political contexts, fluctuating krasae (momentum), and the proliferation of new parties over the past decade. The 2019 election saw Southerners back General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the 2014 coup-maker depicted as uncorrupted and the most credible in countering reformist agendas, at DP’s expense. The 2023 election produced a more fragmented but still pro-conservative picture. Prayut-associated forces split from the Palang Pracharath Party to the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party, DP experienced internal turmoil, and the Northeast-rooted Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) made significant Southern inroads.

The post-Prayut era’s 2026 election featured the two-ballot system, giving voters two separate ticks for a constituency candidate (constituency-ballot) and a political party (party-list ballot). Out of the national 400 constituency seats, 46 were in the Upper South. The 100 party-list seats, meanwhile, were calculated proportionally based on the total share of votes each party received nationwide, making it difficult to pinpoint a regional quota beyond determining which party won the most votes in each constituency.

The 2026 election also featured a constitutional referendum and a big campaign question surrounding coalition alignments. No party was expected to win an outright majority. With Prayut-associated parties in terminal decline, the Upper South’s battleground was contested by the conservative wing’s remaining and emerging players: DP, BJT, and Kla Tham. The progressive People’s Party (PP), formerly the Move Forward Party (MFP), deserves a mention. MFP stunningly claimed all constituencies in Phuket, which has increasingly sought autonomy from the central authorities, and topped the party-list vote in over half of the region’s constituencies in 2023. In 2026, however, PP, with a diminishing krasae, held two out of three constituency seats in Phuket (Table 1). Its region-wide share of party-list votes, too, waned. (Table 2)

Table 1. Tidy Logic

ConstituencyYearWinner (Party)Runner-Up (Party)Vote Margin
Phuket 12023Somchart Techathavorncharoen (MFP)Piya Sidokbuap (UTN)4,769
2026Somchart Techathavorncharoen (PP)Ploytalay Lakshmi Saengchan (BJT)2,242
Phuket 22023Chalermpong Saengdee (MFP)Nuanchan Samat (UTN)6,946
2026Chalermpong Saengdee (PP)Sanakorn Keesin (BJT)2,414
Phuket 32023Thitikan Thitipruethikul (MFP)Orathai Gerdsub (Chartpattanakhla)3,952
2026Orathai Gerdsub (Kla Tham)Thitikan Thitipruethikul (PP)10,124
Source: Author’s compilation based on the 2023 and 2026 election results.

Table 2. People’s Party Toehold

ConstituencyYearMost Supported PartySecond Most Supported PartyVote Margin
Phuket 12023MFPUTN4,285
2026PPDP4,006
Phuket 22023MFPUTN7,483
2026PPDP3,266
Phuket 32023MFPUTN9,605
2026PPDP1,543
Phang Nga 22023MFPUTN2,544
2026DPPP16,751
Krabi 12023MFPUTN7,926
2026DPPP11,140
Krabi 22023MFPUTN1,173
2026DPPP33,354
Krabi 32023MFPUTN7,143
2026DPBJT31,366
Trang 22023MFPUTN7,646
2026DPPP46,740
Trang 32023MFPUTN1,747
2026DPPP45,837
Trang 42023MFPUTN3,595
2026DPPP42,989
Satun 12023MFPUTN7,938
2026DPBJT5,880
Satun 22023MFPUTN16,187
2026DPPP21,213
Source: Author’s compilation based on the 2023 and 2026 election results. These constituencies in the Andaman zone saw MFP emerge as the top party-list pick in 2023.

The 2026 election unfolded as Thai politics sank deeper into elite bargaining and compromise that eroded the ideological distinctions between major parties. Southerners, whose political culture particularly prizes moral uprightness, naturally found solace in DP’s brand of conservatism and clean politics under former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s reinstated leadership. As a result, the DP topped the party-list vote in 42 Upper Southern constituencies. Yet in Thailand’s current political climate, pragmatic manoeuvring has become the key for parties seeking to join a governing coalition. For competitive MP hopefuls, then, joining the more fluid conservative parties like BJT and Kla Tham made better sense (Table 3). The result was a mismatch between constituency and party-list gains. DP, for its part, secured just nine constituency seats in 2026 compared to 16 in 2023.

That the party-list vote reflects national appeal and ideology while the constituency vote reflects local dynamics, favouring resourceful and well-known candidates, is straightforward. Whether party strength compensates for weak candidates, and vice versa, generally follows a tidy logic: ideology matters more in urbanised constituencies, while strong candidacy matters more in provincial constituencies, where patronage networks are resilient. Though not irrelevant, there were anomalies in 2026 that this logic cannot capture.

Whether party strength compensates for weak candidates, and vice versa, generally follows a tidy logic: ideology matters more in urbanised constituencies, while strong candidacy matters more in provincial constituencies, where patronage networks are resilient.

One such example is Trang’s Constituency 3, dominated by baan yai (local political dynasty) Losathapornpipit. BJT candidate Sunutcha Losathapornpipit, formerly a DP MP, lost badly to her relatively unknown cousin, DP’s Krit-It Phak-Ichon. The script was similarly flipped in urbanised Phuket’s Constituency 3, where Kla Tham’s locally entrenched candidate, Orathai Gerdsub, beat PP MP Thitikan Thitipruethikul with ease (Table 1). The aforementioned tidy logic would not have forecast this win, not least because Kla Tham, by most accounts, had the thinnest party identity and policy platform. Kla Tham’s capture of eight Upper Southern constituency seats in total was ultimately a critical spoiler, preventing a more dominant showing by DP or BJT across the region, and even PP in Phuket.

Table 3. Toss Up Between Conservative Parties

NameConstituencyOriginal Party in 2023New Party and Result in 2026Remarks
Wichai SudsawadChumphon 1UTNBJT (Won) 
San SaetangChumphon 2UTNKla Tham (Lost) 
Suphon ChunlasaiChumphon 3UTNBJT (Won)baan yai
Kansini OphasarangsanSurat Thani 1UTNBJT (Won) 
Phiphit RattanarakSurat Thani 2UTNBJT (Won) 
Phansak BunthaenSurat Thani 4UTNBJT (Lost) 
Poramet JinaSurat Thani 5UTNKla Tham (Won) 
Thanin NuanwatSurat Thani 7UTNBJT (Lost) 
Chakat PhatthanakitwibunPhang Nga 2Palang PracharathBJT (Won) 
Rachit SutphumNakhon Si Thammarat 1DPBJT (Lost) 
Yutthakan RattanamatNakhon Si Thammarat 4DPKla Tham (Lost) 
Auypornsri ChaowalitNakhon Si Thammarat 9 / 8DPBJT (Won) 
Pimphattra WichaikulNakhon Si Thammarat 10 / 9UTNBJT (Won)baan yai
Thawi SurabanTrang 2Palang PracharathBJT (Won) 
Sunutcha LosathapornpipitTrang 3DPBJT (Lost)baan yai
Supatcharee ThammapetchPhatthalung 1DPKla Tham (Lost)baan yai
Sanphet BunyamaneeSongkhla 1DPBJT (Won)baan yai
Sattra SipanSongkhla 2UTNBJT (Lost) 
Somyot PhlaiduangSongkhla 3DPBJT (Won)baan yai
Chanonphat NaksuaSongkhla 4Palang PracharathKla Tham (Won) 
Surin PalaraeSongkhla 8DPKla Tham (Won) 
Source: Author’s compilation based on the 2023 and 2026 election results, and data from Rocket Media Lab.

With neat logic losing explanatory power, it appears that electoral success requires both strong candidates and party appeal, albeit unevenly. BJT, 2026’s most successful party overall, appeared to be heading this way. It prioritised local candidates as the guaranteed safety net. By co-opting the most baan yai and cultivating local networks, with its members managing welfare-related ministries since 2019, the party predictably won 26 of 46 Upper Southern constituency seats. BJT’s Southern campaign strategist Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn himself has overseen the tourism, labour, and transport ministries.

Meanwhile, the unyielding leadership style of BJT leader and incumbent prime minister Anutin Charnvirakul combined with his appointments of action-oriented ministers, including respected Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, has given the party a newfound appeal. This comes amid rising nationalism driven by Thailand’s tensions with Cambodia and the broader geopolitical turbulence. In 2023, BJT ranked far down in the Upper South’s party-list vote as the least ideological out of key parties. It gained traction in 2026, claiming Ranong and ranking second in eight other constituencies. BJT’s considerable gap vis-à-vis DP in the party-list vote is still expected. Not only is BJT’s version of conservatism less ideologically grounded than DP’s, but BJT leadership lacks the “Southern pride” embodied in DP’s leadership under the shadow of former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, himself a Southerner.

The 2026 election indicates that the Upper South, which also recorded the highest “disagree” vote on constitutional changes, stays strongly attached to conservatism. Prospective local MPs’ shifting allegiances likewise remained within pro-conservative ranks. But neither DP nor BJT, and certainly not Kla Tham, won across-the-board, given the complex brew of factors now influencing voters’ choices. With its emphasis on economic and security stability, the Upper South will likely endure as a conservative “swing state” in the foreseeable years. The dominant mood against extensive reforms will persist, though determining which, if any, pro-conservative party will be the regional hegemon is difficult.

2026/70

Tita Sanglee is an Associate Fellow with ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, an independent analyst and a columnist at The Diplomat based in Thailand.