Thailand’s Upper South: The Conservative Swing State
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While the 2026 Thai elections were marked by a win by conservative elements, the situation in the Upper South was marked by the lack of a hegemon among conservative parties.
Thailand’s 2026 general election on 8 February delivered an unprecedented “conservative win”. Yet within the traditionally conservative Upper South, comprising 11 provinces between the Andaman Coast and the Gulf of Thailand, no party prevailed convincingly.
All key prime ministerial candidates made appearances in the Upper South ahead of the vote. The region’s geostrategic importance in maritime trade, defence, and coastal tourism attracts investment and policy initiatives, such as the Land Bridge and the Andaman Wellness Corridor. This has in turn generated political value. More importantly in 2026, the region was up for grabs like never before.
Once a longstanding vote bank for the centre-right Democrat Party (DP), the region’s loyalty has been swayed by shifting political contexts, fluctuating krasae (momentum), and the proliferation of new parties over the past decade. The 2019 election saw Southerners back General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the 2014 coup-maker depicted as uncorrupted and the most credible in countering reformist agendas, at DP’s expense. The 2023 election produced a more fragmented but still pro-conservative picture. Prayut-associated forces split from the Palang Pracharath Party to the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party, DP experienced internal turmoil, and the Northeast-rooted Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) made significant Southern inroads.
The post-Prayut era’s 2026 election featured the two-ballot system, giving voters two separate ticks for a constituency candidate (constituency-ballot) and a political party (party-list ballot). Out of the national 400 constituency seats, 46 were in the Upper South. The 100 party-list seats, meanwhile, were calculated proportionally based on the total share of votes each party received nationwide, making it difficult to pinpoint a regional quota beyond determining which party won the most votes in each constituency.
The 2026 election also featured a constitutional referendum and a big campaign question surrounding coalition alignments. No party was expected to win an outright majority. With Prayut-associated parties in terminal decline, the Upper South’s battleground was contested by the conservative wing’s remaining and emerging players: DP, BJT, and Kla Tham. The progressive People’s Party (PP), formerly the Move Forward Party (MFP), deserves a mention. MFP stunningly claimed all constituencies in Phuket, which has increasingly sought autonomy from the central authorities, and topped the party-list vote in over half of the region’s constituencies in 2023. In 2026, however, PP, with a diminishing krasae, held two out of three constituency seats in Phuket (Table 1). Its region-wide share of party-list votes, too, waned. (Table 2)
Table 1. Tidy Logic
| Constituency | Year | Winner (Party) | Runner-Up (Party) | Vote Margin |
| Phuket 1 | 2023 | Somchart Techathavorncharoen (MFP) | Piya Sidokbuap (UTN) | 4,769 |
| 2026 | Somchart Techathavorncharoen (PP) | Ploytalay Lakshmi Saengchan (BJT) | 2,242 | |
| Phuket 2 | 2023 | Chalermpong Saengdee (MFP) | Nuanchan Samat (UTN) | 6,946 |
| 2026 | Chalermpong Saengdee (PP) | Sanakorn Keesin (BJT) | 2,414 | |
| Phuket 3 | 2023 | Thitikan Thitipruethikul (MFP) | Orathai Gerdsub (Chartpattanakhla) | 3,952 |
| 2026 | Orathai Gerdsub (Kla Tham) | Thitikan Thitipruethikul (PP) | 10,124 |
Table 2. People’s Party Toehold
| Constituency | Year | Most Supported Party | Second Most Supported Party | Vote Margin |
| Phuket 1 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 4,285 |
| 2026 | PP | DP | 4,006 | |
| Phuket 2 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 7,483 |
| 2026 | PP | DP | 3,266 | |
| Phuket 3 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 9,605 |
| 2026 | PP | DP | 1,543 | |
| Phang Nga 2 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 2,544 |
| 2026 | DP | PP | 16,751 | |
| Krabi 1 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 7,926 |
| 2026 | DP | PP | 11,140 | |
| Krabi 2 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 1,173 |
| 2026 | DP | PP | 33,354 | |
| Krabi 3 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 7,143 |
| 2026 | DP | BJT | 31,366 | |
| Trang 2 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 7,646 |
| 2026 | DP | PP | 46,740 | |
| Trang 3 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 1,747 |
| 2026 | DP | PP | 45,837 | |
| Trang 4 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 3,595 |
| 2026 | DP | PP | 42,989 | |
| Satun 1 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 7,938 |
| 2026 | DP | BJT | 5,880 | |
| Satun 2 | 2023 | MFP | UTN | 16,187 |
| 2026 | DP | PP | 21,213 |
The 2026 election unfolded as Thai politics sank deeper into elite bargaining and compromise that eroded the ideological distinctions between major parties. Southerners, whose political culture particularly prizes moral uprightness, naturally found solace in DP’s brand of conservatism and clean politics under former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s reinstated leadership. As a result, the DP topped the party-list vote in 42 Upper Southern constituencies. Yet in Thailand’s current political climate, pragmatic manoeuvring has become the key for parties seeking to join a governing coalition. For competitive MP hopefuls, then, joining the more fluid conservative parties like BJT and Kla Tham made better sense (Table 3). The result was a mismatch between constituency and party-list gains. DP, for its part, secured just nine constituency seats in 2026 compared to 16 in 2023.
That the party-list vote reflects national appeal and ideology while the constituency vote reflects local dynamics, favouring resourceful and well-known candidates, is straightforward. Whether party strength compensates for weak candidates, and vice versa, generally follows a tidy logic: ideology matters more in urbanised constituencies, while strong candidacy matters more in provincial constituencies, where patronage networks are resilient. Though not irrelevant, there were anomalies in 2026 that this logic cannot capture.
Whether party strength compensates for weak candidates, and vice versa, generally follows a tidy logic: ideology matters more in urbanised constituencies, while strong candidacy matters more in provincial constituencies, where patronage networks are resilient.
One such example is Trang’s Constituency 3, dominated by baan yai (local political dynasty) Losathapornpipit. BJT candidate Sunutcha Losathapornpipit, formerly a DP MP, lost badly to her relatively unknown cousin, DP’s Krit-It Phak-Ichon. The script was similarly flipped in urbanised Phuket’s Constituency 3, where Kla Tham’s locally entrenched candidate, Orathai Gerdsub, beat PP MP Thitikan Thitipruethikul with ease (Table 1). The aforementioned tidy logic would not have forecast this win, not least because Kla Tham, by most accounts, had the thinnest party identity and policy platform. Kla Tham’s capture of eight Upper Southern constituency seats in total was ultimately a critical spoiler, preventing a more dominant showing by DP or BJT across the region, and even PP in Phuket.
Table 3. Toss Up Between Conservative Parties
| Name | Constituency | Original Party in 2023 | New Party and Result in 2026 | Remarks |
| Wichai Sudsawad | Chumphon 1 | UTN | BJT (Won) | |
| San Saetang | Chumphon 2 | UTN | Kla Tham (Lost) | |
| Suphon Chunlasai | Chumphon 3 | UTN | BJT (Won) | baan yai |
| Kansini Ophasarangsan | Surat Thani 1 | UTN | BJT (Won) | |
| Phiphit Rattanarak | Surat Thani 2 | UTN | BJT (Won) | |
| Phansak Bunthaen | Surat Thani 4 | UTN | BJT (Lost) | |
| Poramet Jina | Surat Thani 5 | UTN | Kla Tham (Won) | |
| Thanin Nuanwat | Surat Thani 7 | UTN | BJT (Lost) | |
| Chakat Phatthanakitwibun | Phang Nga 2 | Palang Pracharath | BJT (Won) | |
| Rachit Sutphum | Nakhon Si Thammarat 1 | DP | BJT (Lost) | |
| Yutthakan Rattanamat | Nakhon Si Thammarat 4 | DP | Kla Tham (Lost) | |
| Auypornsri Chaowalit | Nakhon Si Thammarat 9 / 8 | DP | BJT (Won) | |
| Pimphattra Wichaikul | Nakhon Si Thammarat 10 / 9 | UTN | BJT (Won) | baan yai |
| Thawi Suraban | Trang 2 | Palang Pracharath | BJT (Won) | |
| Sunutcha Losathapornpipit | Trang 3 | DP | BJT (Lost) | baan yai |
| Supatcharee Thammapetch | Phatthalung 1 | DP | Kla Tham (Lost) | baan yai |
| Sanphet Bunyamanee | Songkhla 1 | DP | BJT (Won) | baan yai |
| Sattra Sipan | Songkhla 2 | UTN | BJT (Lost) | |
| Somyot Phlaiduang | Songkhla 3 | DP | BJT (Won) | baan yai |
| Chanonphat Naksua | Songkhla 4 | Palang Pracharath | Kla Tham (Won) | |
| Surin Palarae | Songkhla 8 | DP | Kla Tham (Won) |
With neat logic losing explanatory power, it appears that electoral success requires both strong candidates and party appeal, albeit unevenly. BJT, 2026’s most successful party overall, appeared to be heading this way. It prioritised local candidates as the guaranteed safety net. By co-opting the most baan yai and cultivating local networks, with its members managing welfare-related ministries since 2019, the party predictably won 26 of 46 Upper Southern constituency seats. BJT’s Southern campaign strategist Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn himself has overseen the tourism, labour, and transport ministries.
Meanwhile, the unyielding leadership style of BJT leader and incumbent prime minister Anutin Charnvirakul combined with his appointments of action-oriented ministers, including respected Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, has given the party a newfound appeal. This comes amid rising nationalism driven by Thailand’s tensions with Cambodia and the broader geopolitical turbulence. In 2023, BJT ranked far down in the Upper South’s party-list vote as the least ideological out of key parties. It gained traction in 2026, claiming Ranong and ranking second in eight other constituencies. BJT’s considerable gap vis-à-vis DP in the party-list vote is still expected. Not only is BJT’s version of conservatism less ideologically grounded than DP’s, but BJT leadership lacks the “Southern pride” embodied in DP’s leadership under the shadow of former Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, himself a Southerner.
The 2026 election indicates that the Upper South, which also recorded the highest “disagree” vote on constitutional changes, stays strongly attached to conservatism. Prospective local MPs’ shifting allegiances likewise remained within pro-conservative ranks. But neither DP nor BJT, and certainly not Kla Tham, won across-the-board, given the complex brew of factors now influencing voters’ choices. With its emphasis on economic and security stability, the Upper South will likely endure as a conservative “swing state” in the foreseeable years. The dominant mood against extensive reforms will persist, though determining which, if any, pro-conservative party will be the regional hegemon is difficult.
2026/70
Tita Sanglee is an Associate Fellow with ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, an independent analyst and a columnist at The Diplomat based in Thailand.


















