The Philippines’ Near-Standoff with China at Sabina Shoal: Bolstering Preventive Deployment

The Philippines and China have nearly sparked a standoff at Sabina Shoal in the Spratly Islands. It began in April 2024 when the Philippines deployed Teresa Magbanua, a coast guard ship, to observe Chinese forces suspected of preparing to occupy the area. It ended in September when the Philippines withdrew Teresa Magbanua after Chinese vessels blockaded and rammed the ship. A replacement ship has since been sent, so far without any reports of harassment.

The Philippines’ deployment of a coast guard ship was a preventive measure to forestall a probable attempt at occupation of the shoal by an adversary. This is a new tactic, enabled by the maritime capabilities the country has gained in the past decade. The Philippines began to modernise its coast guard after the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff with China. That crisis erupted in part because Manila lacked a civilian maritime law enforcement asset available for dispatch then and instead deployed a military ship. As deploying a military ship (a “grey hull”) can be misconstrued as an act of war, it raised the tone of the 2012 encounter. A different scenario might have unfolded if Manila had deployed a coast guard ship (or a “white hull”) as these are traditionally regarded as benign.

Now, Manila can also employ other tactics, such as proactively using its coast guard to establish presence rather than merely to ascertain an adversary’s actions. However, coast guard encounters are only marginally less tense than naval confrontations, especially because Beijing operates its coast guard like a second navy. Still, Manila’s tactical toolkit has expanded. In Sabina Shoal, the government seemed to be testing its new tactic.

The deployment of Teresa Magbanua was initially preemptive, based on intelligence that China was about to begin island building. This was eventually disconfirmed, so the Filipino mission became preventive. The distinction matters. Following Colin S. Gray, a British strategic theorist, preemption is purely defensive (where an adversary’s imminent threat forces the preemptor’s hand), requires little justification (being purely defensive), and acts at the operational level (as the threat is imminent). In contrast, prevention against threats that are not imminent is discretionary, requires more justification, and acts on both operational and strategic levels. This distinction is useful for Philippine strategic planning: effective preventive deployment requires further justification and alignment with broader defence strategies.

China’s grey zone tactics in the South China Sea (SCS) blur the distinction between preemption and prevention for its opponents. The threat presented by Chinese vessels, even if they are from their coast guard, hangs below the threshold of war and is not only imminent but already present. In Sabina Shoal, there is the constant threat of illegal Chinese presence. China does not occupy the feature but essentially blockades the Philippines from going there.

Yet, Philippine presence in Sabina Shoal is justified under international law. The shoal, a low-tide elevation, cannot be the subject of a territorial dispute as it generates no territorial sea under Article 13 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The state whose exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in which the shoal sits — in this case, the Philippines — exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction over it. As China’s controversial “nine-dash line” is contrary to UNCLOS and “without lawful effect”, according to the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration award, only the Philippines has sovereign rights over Sabina Shoal.

Preventive deployment can form part of deterrence and be enhanced by hastening military and coast guard modernisation.

Still, there is an opportunity for further justification by Manila. Beijing accuses Manila of violating the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). It is unclear which DOC principle Manila has violated. Manila sent a single civilian ship, not an occupation force, to Sabina Shoal. Instead, the Philippines believes it is Beijing that is preparing for the shoal’s occupation. Moreover, it is Beijing’s disregard for international maritime law and resort to actions like water cannoning, ramming, and swarming that undermines the DOC.

Philippine public statements on Sabina Shoal were silent on the DOC. As the Philippines appeals to international law and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration award, it should also walk the talk on ASEAN centrality and cite the DOC in its protests against China. Doing so could reassure ASEAN neighbours and enhance regional support for the Philippines’ actions on this issue.

This was one of the missions of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr at the recent ASEAN Summit. He appealed for member states and leaders not to turn a blind eye towards undue and unlawful harassment in the SCS, and called for the swift completion of the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct. He also revealed that up to six ASEAN neighbours have privately expressed support for Manila’s cause.

In addition, the Philippines should think about broader strategies. Preventive deployment can form part of preventive diplomacy. The Philippines and China rightly activated their Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea (BCM) but this is insufficient. No deal has been agreed upon and the BCM came after hostilities had peaked. Manila should seek to convene a new meeting and shift the agenda towards preventing future incidents. On condition that China will reciprocate, the Philippines should adopt confidence-building measures (CBMs), including advance notifications of deployment of maritime assets. Traditional CBMs centre on information sharing on military matters; it is time to extend them to coast guard and maritime militia activities.

Preventive deployment can form part of deterrence and be enhanced by hastening military and coast guard modernisation. Manila must also continue working with allies and partners beyond assistance on asset modernisation. In this regard, joint patrols will continue but probably not in hotly contested areas. For instance, the Philippine military chief turned down a US commander’s offer to escort Philippine ships in SCS missions. Nonetheless, Manila can conduct missions alone while collaborating with others for planning and after-mission reviews.

Standing up to the Chinese is complicated by the Philippines’ developmental entanglement with Chinese trade, investment, and aid. Still, the Philippines can intensify diplomatic pressure and extend assurances, such as reducing pre-positioned US assets on Philippine soil in exchange for reduced Chinese maritime presence in the West Philippine Sea.

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