Trump 2.0 Hollowing US Human Connections to Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia’s experience thus far with the second Trump administration could be characterised as whiplash, from the closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and tariff spikes to soaring fuel prices due to the ongoing Iran conflict. Beyond the bluster and bombast, a quieter but equally significant erosion is underway: the hollowing out of America’s human and intellectual connections to Southeast Asia that long underpin US influence in the region.

The erosion starts with America’s knowledge of the region. Area studies in the US trace their origins to the post-World War II period, when they were embedded in the broader national security imperative through the 1958 National Defense Education Act. Consequently, Title VI of the 1965 Higher Education Act established government funding for National Resource Centres (NRCs) focusing on foreign language and area studies (FLAS). Successive US administrations had subsequently invested in building a deep reservoir of regional expertise, supporting language training and academic research on Southeast Asia across eight American universities.

That foundation is now being dismantled. The Trump administration’s termination of USD60 million federal funding for Title VI NRCs and FLAS fellowships has had immediate consequences. In terms of NRCs and language grants for the 2025–26 academic year, the universities of Washington have lost USD2.5 million, Michigan USD3.4 million and Kansas USD2 million. Together, they host homes to well-established Southeast Asian and East Asian studies centres. 

Even well-endowed institutions are not immune. At Cornell University — home to the oldest Southeast Asia programme in the US and an NRC since 1958, funding for FLAS fellowships is no longer sustained. As its Vice Provost observed, the loss “goes well beyond the dollar amount”, as these programmes have long been instrumental in bringing “knowledge, insight and cultural understanding to US interactions with some of the world’s most populous and strategic countries”.

The cumulative effect is a thinning of the pipeline of experts on the region: fewer scholars, analysts and diplomats with the regional knowledge that effective policy requires. For Southeast Asia, where foreign influence rests as much on understanding as on power, the stakes are not hypothetical. The Vietnam War remains among the most sobering cautionary tales in American foreign policy: Washington misread what was, at its core, a nationalist struggle rooted in anti-colonial resistance, framing it instead through a purely Cold War ideological lens.

If the cuts to area studies constitute a slow bleed in the US’ long-term capacity to understand the region, the ongoing bureaucratic hollowing out is an immediate wound. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) restructuring has shrunk the State Department and related agencies. This included the closure of the Office of Multilateral Affairs within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, which handled US engagement with ASEAN, diplomatic responses on the South China Sea and the Mekong subregion. Likewise, the shutdown of USAID has not only reduced development assistance to Southeast Asia but also erased decades of institutional memory. The loss of seasoned diplomats and development practitioners cannot be easily rebuilt. They embody expertise built through decades of sustained, on-the-ground engagement across the region.

This reservoir of goodwill and human connection is being drained — to the detriment of both US influence and the long-term vitality of US-Southeast Asia relations.

To compound matters, there is the retrenchment of flagship engagement programmes, with total cuts of USD100 million in FY2025. Among the casualties is the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI). Launched in 2013, the initiative has cultivated an influential alumni network across the region, including former Malaysian Minister of Youth and Sports Syed Saddiq and Philippine Mayor of Pasig City Vico Sotto. Described by its designers as “Seeds for the Future”, YSEALI exemplifies US investment in the region’s human capital and network-building that yields long-term strategic dividends.  As participants moved up into leadership roles, they carried with them the relationships and values forged through YSEALI. Curtailing such initiatives forfeits their compounding returns for the long-term strengthening of US-Southeast Asia relations.

A further gap is emerging in people-to-people ties. Education is a powerful instrument of American soft power in Southeast Asia, with the US consistently ranking as the most popular higher education destination for students in the region, according to the State of Southeast Asia survey. Over 50,000 students from Southeast Asia have enrolled annually in American institutions over the past decade, with Vietnam ranking among the top five sources of international students to the US.

That foundation is now cracking. New international student enrolments in American universities fell by 17 per cent in 2025, due to visa-related obstacles and an increasingly unpredictable regulatory environment. The one-month suspension of new student visa interviews in May 2025, alongside US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainments and deportations of international students, such as those from Indonesia, has amplified anxieties among prospective students. The same fears are held by foreign students already in the US.

ICE enforcement has also reached into the three million-strong Southeast Asian diaspora, a vital connective tissue sustaining remittances and inter-personal relationships that underpin diplomatic goodwill. ICE arrests of Asian nationals — including green card holders — surged from 2,000 in 2024 to over 7,000 in 2025, with Vietnamese, Lao, Filipino, and Cambodian communities among the most affected nationalities. In January 2026, the Trump administration imposed an indefinite pause on immigrant visa processing to applicants from 75 countries, among them Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and US treaty ally Thailand. The suspension included spousal and dependent visas, leaving families stranded across borders. This was such a blunt measure that Thailand’s foreign minister questioned the logic of the US moves, noting that it was “not good for the relationship”.

Throughout the ebb and flow of American economic and security engagement with Southeast Asia, US soft power — the pull of its universities and the ties forged through grassroots exchanges and diaspora networks — has endured as the bedrock of its influence. Even when American policies were resented, families continued to send their children to US universities, and many Southeast Asians aspired to work and build their lives in America. This reservoir of goodwill and human connection is being drained — to the detriment of both US influence and the long-term vitality of US-Southeast Asia relations.

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