What Can Timor-Leste Bring to ASEAN?

Timor-Leste’s application to join ASEAN has been described as harder than entering heaven. After 14 years of waiting, Timor-Leste may formally become ASEAN’s eleventh member state (AMS) at the ASEAN Summit this October. Dili’s membership journey began with the existing AMS expressing reservations about Timor-Leste’s readiness for accession and showing concern about ASEAN’s readiness to welcome a new member. While Timor-Leste has the second smallest population (behind Brunei) and the lowest per capita gross domestic product in the region, the developing island-nation may revitalise ASEAN with its strong support for international law and faith in ASEAN’s leadership.

For the first time, the 2025 edition of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) survey asked elite opinion leaders from Timor-Leste about their perceptions of geopolitics and other driving forces, alongside respondents from the ASEAN-10. Comprising 3.3 per cent of the 2,033 respondents, Timor-Leste’s sample had the largest share of those aged 22-35 and 36-45 years old (almost 80 per cent) and those affiliated with regional or international organisations, of the 11 national samples (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Timor-Leste Respondents’ Affiliations

Affiliation	Percentage of sample
Regional / International Organisations	25.8%
Business / Finance	18.2%
Academia	15.2%
Others	40.8%

Results show that Timor-Leste may be more aligned with ASEAN than some might have previously thought. When asked to choose their top three (of eight) challenges facing the region (Q8), Timorese respondents chose “climate change and more extreme weather events” (77.3 per cent) as the most serious, with “rising income inequality” second (60.6 per cent) and “unemployment and economic recession” third (57.6 per cent). Given the consistency of this ranking with the region’s, ASEAN may not need to be overly concerned that Timor-Leste would pursue different interests vis-à-vis the region.

Where divergences emerged between ASEAN and Timor-Leste was in their perceptions of major power competition. When asked which entities had the most economic influence in the region, ASEAN-10 respondents ranked China far ahead of the US and ASEAN, while Timorese respondents ranked ASEAN a strong second behind China (Figure 2). Timorese views on the most influential political and strategic power in the region, however, chimed with ASEAN-10’s (Figure 3). Separately, Timorese respondents placed a higher level of trust in ASEAN than the regional average.

Figure 2. Most Influential Economic Power in Southeast Asia

	China	US	ASEAN
ASEAN-10	56.4%	15.4%	14.8%
Timor-Leste	51.5%	13.6%	31.8%

Figure 3. Most Influential Political & Strategic Power in Southeast Asia

	China	US	ASEAN
ASEAN-10	37.9%	31.2%	15.6%
Timor-Leste	39.4%	30.3%	21.2%

From the authors’ experience in public forums and closed-door settings, some Timorese diplomats are quick to assert that they are independent of Chinese influence but the survey results reveal that Timorese respondents share fears of Chinese dominance (“Worry”), while their concern about the US is noticeably lower than the regional average (Figures 4 and 5). On the binary choice question asking respondents to ‘choose’ between the US and China (Q32), 59.1 per cent of Timorese respondents chose the US (“Welcome”). This could potentially tip the region’s balance; the other countries are equally split between the two great powers.

Figure 4. Worry versus Welcome – US & China: Economic Influence

	US	China
Timor-Leste: Worry	22.2%	70.6%
ASEAN-10: Worry	43.2%	61.9%
Timor-Leste: Welcome	77.8%	29.4%
ASEAN-10: Welcome	56.8%	38.1%

Figure 5. Worry versus Welcome – US & China: Political & Strategic Influence

	US	China
Timor-Leste: Worry	30.0%	69.2%
ASEAN-10: Worry	49.0%	68.8%
Timor-Leste: Welcome	70.0%	30.8%
ASEAN-10: Welcome	51.0%	31.2%

Of the 11 national samples, Timorese respondents had the most optimistic view of ASEAN. First, they had “the most confidence” in ASEAN to champion global free trade (43.9 per cent) and to uphold international law and the region’s rules-based order (39.4 per cent), higher than the ASEAN-10 average of 23.8 per cent and 23.1 per cent respectively. However, Timorese respondents were most concerned that ASEAN was “becoming an arena of major power competition” (Q10), with 62.1 per cent listing this as their top concern. Only 29.8 per cent of ASEAN-10 respondents were similarly worried, with most expressing greater unease that “ASEAN is slow and ineffective”. This may reflect the Timorese’ awareness of the vagaries of major power competition or lack of familiarity with the pace of ASEAN’s decision-making processes.

Still, Timor-Leste respondents seem to understand the challenges faced by ASEAN. Asked to pick the top three geopolitical concerns (at the time of survey) for their government (Q9), Timorese respondents selected the “Myanmar crisis” (59.1 per cent) while “new US leadership” and “global scam operations” tied for second, at 47 per cent each. The region’s average top choice – “aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea” (SCS) – reflects non-claimant Timor-Leste’s geopolitical distance from the conflict.

To the Timorese, international law and ASEAN’s leadership might be the answer to global uncertainty. For ASEAN, Timor-Leste’s admission could potentially bring greater cohesion to the bloc in a fragmented world by asking hard questions that need to be asked. 

More than any other national sample, the Timorese thought that ASEAN should engage in independent dialogue with all key stakeholders in Myanmar “to move the Myanmar issue forward” (Q11). Timor-Leste has been most vocal and long-standing in criticising ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis; Myanmar has lodged a formal objection to Timor-Leste’s impending membership. However, the other nine AMS have supported Malaysia’s commitment to bring Timor-Leste into ASEAN (which occurred after the survey). At the time of the survey, 44.5 per cent of regional respondents favoured the status quo (to admit Timor-Leste per ASEAN’s timeline), another 30.0 per cent supported accelerating its admission, while a quarter wanted a delay or reversal of admission.

The Timorese’ unwavering faith in international law, while idealistic, may inspire the region. When asked what ASEAN could do to respond to the SCS situation, for instance, 86.4 per cent of Timorese respondents wanted ASEAN to take a principled stand on international law, far higher than the regional average (69.5 per cent). In the follow-up on the SCS Code of Conduct (CoC), 63.6 per cent of Timorese respondents – far exceeding the regional average of 41 per cent – wanted the CoC to be aligned with international law.

In the 2024 edition, over a third of survey respondents believed that Timor-Leste’s accession would enhance ASEAN’s unity and centrality. ASEAN has come under fire for its lack of unity and purpose: this is evident in internal differences on how to handle Myanmar, the Ukraine-Russia conflict, SCS, and major power rivalry. Yet ASEAN continues to promote its centrality, which risks ringing hollow without concrete unity of purpose. To the Timorese, international law and ASEAN’s leadership might be the answer to global uncertainty. For ASEAN, Timor-Leste’s admission could potentially bring greater cohesion to the bloc in a fragmented world by asking hard questions that need to be asked. 

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