What the Trump-Takaichi Summit Revealed About the US-Japan Alliance

The 19 March summit between US President Donald Trump and Japan’s Prime Minister (PM) Sanae Takaichi will be remembered less for a breakthrough than for what it avoided. Held in the shadow of the US’ and Israel’s war against Iran and renewed US pressure on its allies to do more, the meeting carried a real risk of exposing a serious rift in the bilateral alliance.

PM Takaichi upheld her country’s red line, that Tokyo will not send its military to assist US-led military efforts in the Persian Gulf, redirecting the conversation towards areas where Tokyo could demonstrate value without crossing its constitutional and political limits.

The bigger concern is whether the two allies see eye-to-eye on the issue of Taiwan and how to manage the challenges posed by China. At one level, the two sides reiterated willingness to cooperate on deterrence against potential adversaries (read: China), the ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific strategy, missile co-development and coordination over China and North Korea. Trump, however, has made little secret of his disappointment that allies dependent on Gulf energy flows have not done more to support the US’ efforts to secure shipping lanes.

For Japan, the US request puts it in a delicate situation: the need to secure the shipping lanes is a direct result of the US’ attack on Iran, but Tokyo’s hands are tied. Tokyo is constrained by constitutional interpretation and the legality of any decision to sanction the use of force by its military. Japan’s 2014 security legislation allows the use of force in support of an ally only when Japan’s survival is at stake and no other “appropriate means” are available. The threshold has not been crossed here, given that Japan’s survival is not at stake.

In this context, Takaichi’s task was to decline to join a US-led military effort in the Gulf and to convince Trump that this does not amount to disloyalty to their alliance. By that measure, she appears to have succeeded. Tokyo’s official account of the meeting struck a careful balance, expressing concern over Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and threats to freedom of navigation, while reiterating that Iran must not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons (Japan had opposed Iran’s nuclear programme following the US-Israeli strikes on the country’s nuclear-related facilities in June 2025). At the same time, Japan shifted the discussion towards enhancing US-Japan coordination on energy security, increasing imports of US energy and stockpiling arrangements, the summit’s most important takeaway.

The alliance remains strong. In its 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), the US deems the western hemisphere to be of paramount importance, followed by a focus on managing the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. The US-Japan alliance would be central to Washington’s strategy. While the situation in Iran and the Middle East is serious, the US’ and Japan’s challenges lie in the Indo-Pacific. The challenge posed by China, the world’s second-largest economy and a formidable military power, is on a different level compared to Iran.

In its readout of the summit, Japan sought to downplay the issue of Taiwan, which China ranks as one of its highest priorities. This was understandable, given that China has intensified its pressure on Japan. In November 2025, PM Takaichi had said that Japan will encounter a ‘survival-threatening situation’ in the event of a Taiwan contingency, which led to a downward spiral in Sino-Japanese relations.

Washington’s readout contained long-standing statements pertaining to the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and opposing any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo (usually taken to refer to China). These statements are important, but given the downturn in Sino-Japanese relations, Washington’s apparent inability to be sensitive to Japanese inclinations is telling, given that careful management of the US-Japan alliance is needed to manage the challenge posed by China.

For Japan and many Southeast Asian countries, the biggest fear is that the US could abandon its military footprint in the region…

This gets to the heart of the disconnect between Japan and the US. Tokyo is reportedly set to downgrade its official description of ties with China in its 2026 Diplomatic Bluebook. Trump did not stand up for Japan when the country came under heavy Chinese fire over its comments about Taiwan. Despite entreaties by Japanese officials, such as the Japanese ambassador to Washington, asking for a show of US support, Trump asked his officials to stay quiet, so that he could pursue the trade deal he reached with Xi Jinping in October 2025. This is likely to continue as Trump plans for his upcoming meeting with Xi, scheduled for May.

The problem is that the US — as indicated by its NSS — has downplayed the challenge posed by China. The NSS states that the US seeks to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China”, a stark departure from the phrasing of previous documents (for example, the 2022 NSS), which called China a “strategic competitor”. Trump’s focus on the economic aspect gives Japan less wiggle room, since Tokyo sees China’s challenge as primarily strategic, not economic.

Beyond the bilateral relationship with Japan, Trump’s unpredictability and inability to maintain focus on the challenge posed by China will aggravate concerns in Japan and Southeast Asia, which together depend on the sustainability of US engagement and military deployments in the region. Due to Trump’s insistence on logic-defying tariffs and denigration of American alliances, US allies and partners have been cosying up to China, as seen in the series of high-level visits to Beijing. Moreover, the war in the Middle East has drawn down US munitions that would have in a different scenario been possibly used to fight a war in the Indo-Pacific, a situation that will take months if not years to rectify.

For Japan and many Southeast Asian countries, the biggest fear is that the US could abandon its military footprint in the region to pursue a so-called “Group of Two” (G2) condominium with China, where the two powers carve up the region into spheres of influence. Trump’s transactional instincts have fuelled such anxieties, especially if he prioritises a deal with Beijing over reassuring allies.

PM Takaichi might have dodged a bullet and bagged some gains from her recent summit in Washington, but for Japan and Southeast Asia, serious unanswered questions over the solidity of the US’ security commitment in a Taiwan contingency and its strategic approach to managing China continue to cast a long shadow.

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