When US Leadership Loses Its Sheen

Over the past decade, Southeast Asia has tried to live with a difficult but workable strategic reality: while China was the region’s dominant economic force, the US remained a key security counterweight and ASEAN provided enough diplomatic space for its members to avoid being forced into binary choices. The State of Southeast Asia 2026 Survey suggests this balance is becoming harder to maintain. While the region is not turning away from Washington, it is becoming less assured by the direction of US leadership.

This shift is not dramatic enough to suggest a rupture, nor uniform enough to indicate a clear regional realignment. However, across a range of indicators — from geopolitical concerns and perceptions of US economic and political-strategic influence to Washington’s leadership on free trade and the rules-based order, assessments of the trajectory of bilateral relations and trust — the US’ broader standing in the region has weakened. This matters because Southeast Asia’s long-standing balancing strategy has depended not just on the continued presence of the US, but on the assumption that Washington still offers a degree of assurance, economic weight and normative leadership. These are qualities which China has traditionally been seen as offering to a lesser degree. All of them appear to be less secure.

Across the eight geopolitical issues surveyed, US leadership under President Donald Trump now ranks as Southeast Asia’s top geopolitical concern at 51.9 per cent, overtaking aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea at 48.2 per cent, which was the top concern last year (Figure 1). Concerns over Trump’s leadership are especially high in Singapore (76.8 per cent) and Indonesia (67.8 per cent). This new preoccupation suggests that Southeast Asians are increasingly uneasy not only about Sino-US rivalry, but also about the wider consequences of a deterioration in US leadership, in particular the use of tariffs and trade measures, policy unpredictability and the weakening credibility of Washington’s long-term commitments. This shift is significant because the South China Sea dispute has been the region’s foremost concern. The fact that the dispute now sits behind concerns about US leadership shows that Washington is no longer seen only as a stabilising counterweight.

Growing Doubts about Uncle Sam
Figure 1: Which of the following current geopolitical events are the top concerns for the government in your country?

The Survey’s economic and political-strategic findings reinforce that point. The US remains Southeast Asia’s second most influential economic power at 15.3 per cent, behind China (Figure 2). It is also the second most influential political-strategic power at 29.9 per cent (Figure 3). However, in both domains, the percentage of respondents who are concerned about US power exceeds those who welcome it.  This is the first time that this has occurred since the first Survey in 2019. Concern is particularly pronounced in Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia, indicating greater unease in these countries.

Concerns About US Mount
Figure 2: In your view, which country/regional organisation is the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia, and what is your view of this economic power’s influence on your country?

Figure 3: In your view, which country/regional organisation has the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia, and what is your view of this political and strategic power’s influence on your country?

This makes the forced-choice result easier to understand. When respondents were compelled to choose between China and the US, 52.0 per cent chose China and 48.0 per cent chose the US (Figure 4). This reverses the previous year’s narrow US lead. Although Washington appears to be paying a price for diminished reassurance, it would, however, be a mistake to read this as a regional pivot towards Beijing. The slim margin underscores a finely balanced regional sentiment.

China Pips the US Again
Figure 4: If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the strategic rivals, which should it choose?

That erosion is especially evident in two areas where the US has traditionally claimed leadership: the promotion of free trade and the rules-based order. On the former, confidence in the US to champion global free trade has fallen to 14.8 per cent, down from 19.0 per cent last year. It now sits in fourth place, behind ASEAN (25.5 per cent), China (21.3 per cent) and the EU (19.2 per cent) (Figure 5). On the latter, the decline is similarly telling. For the first time, respondents ranked ASEAN first to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law, at 23.4 per cent, edging ahead of the US at 22.3 per cent. The EU follows close behind at 20.5 per cent (Figure 6). For Southeast Asia, the US no longer enjoys an uncontested position as the region’s normative anchor.

Dip in Confidence
Figure 5: Who do you have the most confidence in to champion the global free trade agenda?

Figure 6: Who do you have the most confidence in to provide leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law?

These findings relate to the Survey’s more specific questions on perceptions of the US. On the question of how respondents see their country’s relations with the US evolving under the Trump 2.0 administration, the largest share (37.7 per cent) believes relations will remain the same, while 29.5 per cent expect them to worsen and 32.8 per cent foresee improvement. Compared with last year, optimism has clearly weakened while pessimism has edged up, pointing to a more cautious regional outlook towards the future of US relations with Southeast Asian countries.

This year’s Survey suggests that the foundations of US influence in Southeast Asia are gradually narrowing. This does not suggest that the region is turning away from the US, but it does point to a more cautious assessment of Washington’s regional role.

When respondents were asked what could worsen their positive impression of Washington, the top choice was the US use of sanctions, tariffs and other trade measures, at 43.4 per cent. This far outpaced concerns about military activities, domestic interference, support for Israel or assistance to Taiwan. It is clear that economic concerns now shape perceptions of the US; Southeast Asians are most concerned about a more transactional, punitive economic approach.

Conversely, when asked what the US could do to improve relations with their countries, respondents placed the greatest emphasis on respecting international law and its institutions and not undermining the global system, at 38.5 per cent. This was followed by pursuing free trade and strategic partnerships rather than punitive tariffs at 24.9 per cent, and by respecting national sovereignty and foreign policy autonomy at 19.6 per cent. The message is clear that Southeast Asians are not asking the US for grandiose rhetoric. They are asking for greater predictability, economic reassurance and a clearer commitment to the institutional rules it once championed.

Put together, the collective sentiment should not be interpreted as an outright rejection of American leadership. On the contrary, the Survey shows that the US still retains considerable strategic value, especially in security terms. On the question of whether the US is a reliable strategic partner and provider of regional security, 42.7 per cent expressed confidence or strong confidence, compared to 32.3 per cent who expressed little or no confidence. Support is especially strong in the Philippines, Timor-Leste, Cambodia, and Brunei. Even in countries with more complex political ties with Washington, such as Laos and Vietnam, the US’ security role is still widely recognised. To many Southeast Asians, Washington still matters in the realm of security, but its economic and normative appeal has softened.

This year’s Survey suggests that the foundations of US influence in Southeast Asia are gradually narrowing. This does not suggest that the region is turning away from the US, but it does point to a more cautious assessment of Washington’s regional role. While the US’ regional presence will still matter, Southeast Asians are increasingly looking to the US to provide greater economic reassurance and a more consistent commitment to the rules and institutions that it once championed. Southeast Asians who are more astute might deem this to be too big an ask for a Trump 2.0 administration, or even successive administrations.

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