Why ASEAN Must Hold the Line on Myanmar’s Election

In late December 2025 and January 2026, Myanmar’s generals will stage what seems to be a return to electoral politics. The polls, which the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) military regime is touting as a “return to democracy”, will be held under a new electoral system and introduce electronic voting. The existing first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, which has hitherto characterised all previous Myanmar elections, will be combined with proportional representation (PR) for seats in the bicameral legislature, including at state and regional-level assemblies. Such a move in Myanmar’s present political situation raises concerns, as the FPTP/PR combination would give the military and its allies the power to dominate the legislature, while ethnic nationalities would not gain more voice.

The polls will be held in three phases, amid an ongoing civil war that has not abated in several parts of the country. Nevertheless, the SSPC regime intends to turn the page on the 2021 coup to install a quasi-civilian government under continued military oversight. The military’s 25 per cent share of parliamentary seats remains intact, assuring the military of its continued political role, as does the electoral college in parliament that will nominate and vote on presidential candidates. Without any strong opposition party competing for votes, the military-backed or allied parties will fill most seats in parliament.

Myanmar representatives attending ASEAN’s high-level meetings have briefed ASEAN delegations on the SSPC’s election moves. Throughout 2025, ASEAN has collectively emphasised the importance of achieving peace over elections. Malaysia, as ASEAN Chair, has called for free, fair and comprehensive elections. The SSPC’s narrative is that the polls would address such concerns for peace and stability, citing continuing security challenges. For ASEAN, however, the concern is more about how the region will respond to the SSPC’s attempt to entrench the military’s political role in Myanmar with the elections, and sweep aside five years of conflict, including atrocities inflicted on civilians.

For months, ASEAN leaders have signalled unease. At the 47^th ASEAN Summit in October, the ASEAN Leaders’ Review and Decision on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), the third such review since 2022, candidly acknowledged “a lack of substantive progress” in Myanmar and reiterated that cessation of violence and the start of inclusive political dialogue should precede any election. ASEAN foreign ministers signalled that ASEAN as a grouping may not be sending observers to the polls. However, ASEAN cannot prevent individual member countries (AMS) from making such decisions.

ASEAN’s collective position on Myanmar’s 2025 elections adds to the unprecedented earlier decisions limiting Myanmar’s participation at ASEAN Summits and Foreign Ministers’ Meetings and postponing Myanmar’s 2026 chairmanship turn. However, these decisions have had little impact on the ground in Myanmar. Fighting has intensified, new governance actors flex their muscles, while humanitarian access remains tightly restricted by the military, even for ASEAN-led initiatives, undermining the grouping’s credibility as a people-centred organisation.

Against this backdrop, the SSPC’s election may be best understood as a gambit for legitimacy. The political playing field has been fundamentally reshaped with the National League for Democracy (NLD) and other opposition parties having been deregistered; the new electoral rules favour military-aligned groups. Large parts of Myanmar remain under active conflict, which will impede meaningful polling, while heavy-handed laws have been used to arrest critics, shrink civic space and deter dissent. The UN, the EU, Australia and several rights groups have expressed concern that the upcoming vote cannot be free or fair under such conditions and may deepen, rather than mitigate, Myanmar’s crisis.

ASEAN’s future engagement with Myanmar will be difficult, but needs to be explicitly conditional.

Myanmar’s 2025/2026 elections sharpen ASEAN’s choices: the region will have to decide whether and how to engage a government emerging from the tainted process. This decision will shape ASEAN’s credibility and the leverage it retains in any future political pathway for Myanmar.

With the poll results expected in late January, ASEAN’s more immediate task will be to avoid or minimise actions that could be read as endorsing the SSPC’s electoral exercise. At time of writing, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia appear to be among those countries which may send observers. If individual AMS send observers or issue congratulatory messages to the regime, ASEAN can make clear that such actions are taken in a national capacity and do not reflect the collective regional position. However, ASEAN’s credibility will weaken if similar actions by multiple member states create the impression of broader regional acceptance. For instance, immediate post-election statements, gestures, or participation in inauguration ceremonies for Myanmar’s ‘elected’ leaders, could confer an unearned recognition on the Myanmar military. This risks weakening an already fragile consensus on Myanmar within ASEAN.

ASEAN’s public messaging on these polls will matter; the leaders have already agreed that cessation of violence and inclusive dialogue must precede elections in Myanmar. A post-election statement anchored in such language would signal that the polls by themselves do not fulfil the 5PC commitments. Upholding compliance with the 5PC as the threshold for ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar will help ASEAN to maintain a principled approach while not shutting the door on Myanmar as a member and align ASEAN with the wider international position that elections under current conditions cannot deliver peace.

ASEAN’s future engagement with Myanmar will be difficult, but needs to be explicitly conditional. Cooperation on humanitarian access and transnational crime can and must continue. Political interaction should be contingent on Myanmar’s measurable progress on the 5PC. This approach will be tested by external dynamics. Russia will almost certainly recognise the post-election government, while China and India may choose pragmatic acceptance to secure their own interests. These countries’ endorsement may narrow ASEAN’s diplomatic space, but should not dictate ASEAN’s stance of not choosing sides in a fragmented geopolitical environment.

ASEAN holding the line on Myanmar, by refusing to treat the upcoming election as a source of legitimacy for the SSPC, maintaining principled engagement and keeping pressure on the 5PC criteria, will help preserve ASEAN’s normative clarity when others may choose strategic and moral convenience.

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