Former government officials standing trial for corruption in Hanoi, on 3 January 2024. (Photo by Vietnam News Agency / AFP)

Vietnam Must Not Let Political Rumours Online Undermine Its Anti-Corruption Campaign

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Although it is not easy to pinpoint the leaker of each rumour, the disseminators of such leaks are famous, well-connected social media influencers.

In April, the Chairman of Vietnam’s Parliament Vuong Dinh Hue stepped down after weeks of rumours of his downfall swirling about on social media.

As a faction in the Communist Party seems to have “weaponised” Vietnam’s anti-corruption campaign in a ruthless power struggle, political rumours and leaks are used as ammunition, with negative impacts on the very goal of restoring popular trust in the ruling elite.  

Since 2022, two former presidents, two former deputy prime ministers, and some Politburo members have been “named and shamed” on the rumour mill long before their dismissal. Previously, rumours of certain leaders’ deaths circulated.

Controlled by the state, Vietnam’s media can report on corrupt officials only after the Party has officially denounced them. A law on state secrets from 2018 forbids the dissemination of “personal data of state officials in high position, and their health”, which in theory bans reporting or speculation on the elite. These restrictions have ironically pushed the public to seek alternative news sources.

The Party’s Inspection Commission is the only organ authorised to investigate government officials, order the police to detain suspects for alleged corruption, and announce important corruption cases. Due to this privileged access to the government’s anti-corruption files, it is possible that staff from either agency might have been the source of some political rumours, leaked to serve a political purpose.

The Vietnamese authorities’ tight control of public media leaves the public “primed to believe any criticism of the Vietnamese government, even if such criticism is not well substantiated”, overseas critics have said. Therefore, corruption rumours, once released, can potentially neutralise political rivals and prepare the public for a pre-planned story.

In the past, some rumours found their way to overseas web blogs. Sites like Quan Làm Báo (“A Mandarin’s Newspaper”) and Chân dung Quyền lực (“The Face of Power”) published materials compromising senior politicians at that time, including PM Nguyen Tan Dung, who retired in 2016.

Although it is not easy to pinpoint the leaker of each rumour, the disseminators of such leaks are famous, well-connected social media influencers.

The advent of social media has allowed over 72 million Vietnamese to regularly use various social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and TikTok. These platforms have become fertile ground for corruption accusations and unsubstantiated news, mixed with innuendo and character assassination gossip.

Although it is not easy to pinpoint the leaker of each rumour, the disseminators of such leaks are famous, well-connected social media influencers. They might be politically neutral or associated with certain politicians, living in Vietnam or overseas. They have large followings, often in the hundreds of thousands, and claim to have access to confidential sources.

For instance, on 17 April 2024, Berlin-based dissident Le Trung Khoa claimed on his YouTube channel (673,000 subscribers) that he was “told by a source in Hanoi” that Vuong Dinh Hue’s personal assistant had been detained, meaning that Hue “would be brought down soon”.

In January 2023, Ho Chi Minh-based Facebooker Le Nguyen Huong Tra (590,000 followers) announced that “the star footballer of team Quang Nam (the home province of President Nguyen Xuan Phuc) has been booked and is about to leave the pitch”. Phuc resigned four days later.

The leaking of information from anti-corruption investigations is worrying for the rule of law. Whether accidental or intentional, this degrades the Vietnamese state authorities because their use of covert tactical operations and the information they produce is not strictly controlled by an independent body. In Britain, for example, there is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000) to prevent investigators from abusive practices. A lack of similar oversight in Vietnam makes official police announcements the only news that the public is told to believe.

The problem becomes serious with social media leaks because the principle of presumed innocence of the suspects no longer applies. In Vietnam’s one-party state, the investigator also holds judicial power, making it unlikely for any victim of such rumours to seek a fair trial. Worse, any trial may be prejudiced by a ‘social media verdict’ before it begins.

Second, political rumours can compromise individuals’ right to online privacy. This was evidenced by a recent incident in which photos of a woman and two baby boys were shared on Facebook to allege that a leader had extramarital affairs. He was brought down because of other charges, but a stain was stuck to the names of the woman and children.

Third, corruption rumours and innuendos can stoke divisions and reinforce the feeling that the entire political class in Vietnam is tarnished by corruption because “every comrade is the same” and that they attack one another “in a messy power struggle”. It also creates an atmosphere of fear that no one is safe from online attacks. Even Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong was subject of false rumours claiming his death in January this year.

Finally, rumours breed more rumours, further undermining people’s trust in the noble aims of rooting out corruption, as declared by the Party. In recent cases, several top leaders were rumoured to have sealed deals to step down without facing charges, despite serious corruption allegations circulating online.

To end this vicious cycle, Vietnam must allow journalists to independently and transparently pursue corruption scandals and accurately report the truth. The police should alleviate the prevalence of rumours by scrutinising their own ranks for leaks. Leaking confidential information to anti-government or dissident influencers abroad damages the government’s reputation.

In 2021, Vietnam set up a centre to combat misinformation by “spreading truths”, a philosophy that would be useful to stop this self-destructive rumour mill and clean up social media. The Party believes that its survival is dependent upon its capability to tackle corruption to regain the people’s confidence in Vietnam’s system of governance. Circulating political rumours goes against that objective and undermines the very aim of the anti-corruption campaign.

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Nguyen Thanh Giang is a Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and a former news editor at BBC World Service Languages in London, United Kingdom.