US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (2nd L) meets with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2nd R) during the 58th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting and related meetings at the Convention Centre in Kuala Lumpur on 11 July 2025. (Photo by Mandel NGAN / POOL / AFP)

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (2nd L) meets with China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2nd R) during the 58th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting and related meetings at the Convention Centre in Kuala Lumpur on 11 July 2025. (Photo by Mandel NGAN / POOL / AFP)

The State of Southeast Asia 2026 Survey

A Harder Balance to Keep in Southeast Asia

Published

Southeast Asia has traditionally preferred not to take sides in the long-standing Sino-US rivalry. A fall in confidence in the US makes this a harder choice to make.

For years, Southeast Asian countries have preferred to avoid taking sides between China and the US. The State of Southeast Asia 2026 Survey shows that this approach still holds, but a more contested geostrategic environment is making this position harder to sustain. The region continues to feel uneasy about China’s entrenched influence, is increasingly troubled by US leadership under US President Donald Trump and is more conscious of ASEAN’s institutional constraints. The weakening of confidence in the US is especially striking because it is occurring against a wider backdrop of mounting regional pressures.

Southeast Asia is facing a more contested environment in which pressures are building on multiple fronts simultaneously — from climate change and geoeconomic tensions to domestic political instability. The Survey makes clear that the region’s anxieties are no longer limited to conventional geopolitical flashpoints. Even as major power rivalry remains front and centre, climate change and extreme weather events remain the region’s top challenge at 60 per cent, rising from 55.3 per cent last year. It is telling that climate risks are increasingly seen as a direct threat to livelihoods and economic security across the region, even as recent geopolitical instability in the Middle East has reinforced the imperative of energy security. Intensifying economic tensions between major powers come next at 51.7 per cent, followed by domestic political instability at 46.1 per cent (see Infographic 1).

Challenging Environment for ASEAN
Infographic 1: What are the top three challenges facing Southeast Asia?

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2025 – 2026 Surveys

The Survey shows that Southeast Asia’s strategic anxieties have broadened. US leadership under President Trump now ranks as the region’s top geopolitical concern at 51.9 per cent, overtaking the South China Sea dispute. This suggests growing unease over the uncertainty and credibility of US leadership. Global scam operations come next at 51.4 per cent. Aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea now ranks third, ahead of the Cambodia-Thai conflict and the crisis in Myanmar (see Infographic 2).

Growing Doubts about Uncle Sam
Infographic 2: Which of the following current geopolitical events are the top concerns for the government in your country?

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2025 – 2026 Surveys 

A significant finding of the 2026 Survey is the softening of confidence in the US across several key questions. Worry outweighs welcome for the US in both the economic and political-strategic domains, marking a notable reversal from last year. Confidence in the US to champion global free trade has fallen to 14.8 per cent (from 19 per cent last year). This puts the US behind ASEAN, China and the EU. On maintaining the rules-based order and upholding international law, ASEAN has edged ahead of the US, which was the region’s top choice last year. The US has also continued to lose ground to China on strategic relevance (Infographic 5).

The fall in confidence in the US is also reflected in the widely-followed binary-choice question in which 52.0 per cent of respondents chose China and 48.0 per cent chose the US (see Infographic 4 below). This has reversed the US’ narrow lead in 2025 (the only other time that China pipped the US at this question was in the 2024 Survey). This could point to growing discomfort with the US unpredictability on trade, its increasingly transactional approach to partners and doubts about its commitment to international rules and institutions.

A significant finding of the 2026 Survey is the softening of confidence in the US across several key questions.

Despite the losses accruing to the US, Washington remains strategically important. It continues to be perceived as the region’s second most influential economic power (15.3 per cent) and political-strategic power (29.9 per cent). It is also perceived to be second overall in strategic relevance to ASEAN; and 42.7 per cent of respondents still express confidence in the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security.

The growing anxiety about US leadership is juxtaposed with a China perceived by regional thought leaders as growing in strength. China remains Southeast Asia’s most influential economic power at 55.9 per cent and its most influential political-strategic power at 40.0 per cent. Among ASEAN Dialogue Partners, it again ranks first in strategic relevance (see Infographic 3), ahead of the US and Japan. It should be noted on this question, the gap in mean score between China and the US has widened to 0.5 in 2026 (against 0.04 in 2025 and 0.19 in 2024).

Widening Gap between China and US
Infographic 3: Rank the following Dialogue Partners in order of strategic relevance to ASEAN

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2026 Survey

However, concerns about China continue to remain central. China’s growing influence does not necessarily bring reassurance. The percentage of respondents with concerns about China’s growing influence in both the economic and political-strategic domains still exceeds those who welcome it. When asked what could worsen positive impressions of China, for example, respondents pointed first to interference in the domestic affairs of ASEAN member states (30.3 per cent), followed by strong-arm tactics in the South China Sea and the Mekong (28.0 per cent). The broader message is that Southeast Asia sees China’s power as structural and unavoidable, but still wants it to be tempered by restraint, respect for international law, and reassurance.

China Pips the US for the Second Time
Infographic 4: If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the strategic rivals, which should it choose?

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2025 – 2026 Surveys

If external pressures on ASEAN are rising, ASEAN’s internal constraints are also becoming harder to ignore. ASEAN’s top concern, 34.7 per cent say the organisation is slow and ineffective and cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments. (See Infographic 5). This concern about ASEAN’s internal limitations runs through several parts of the survey. On the Cambodia–Thailand border conflict, 38.9 per cent say ASEAN has taken active steps to mediate the crisis, but 13.5 per cent believe it has not used all the tools at its disposal, while 11.2 per cent express concern that the involvement of external powers raises questions about ASEAN’s ability to address issues on its own terms. On intra-regional economic cooperation, the main impediments identified are domestic technocratic implementation capacity (30.2 per cent) and development disparities among member states (30.1 per cent), with geopolitical pressure close behind at 27.5 per cent. The issue is not simply that ASEAN faces external pressure, but that its ability to respond is constrained by uneven internal capacity, differing levels of development and lingering questions over its agency.

Sustained Concerns about ASEAN
Infographic 5: What is your top concern about ASEAN?

Source: The State of Southeast Asia 2025 – 2026 Surveys

Yet the survey also makes clear that respondents continue to look to ASEAN as the primary vehicle for strengthening the region’s collective resilience. When asked how ASEAN should enhance its resilience and demonstrate its relevance, the top responses were resolving differences over long-standing issues such as Myanmar and the South China Sea (29.9 per cent) and increasing intra-regional trade and investment (28.5 per cent). Likewise, in response to rising protectionism and nationalism, respondents place the strongest emphasis on accelerating regional integration among ASEAN member states (42.2 per cent), followed by deepening cooperation with like-minded partners (30.0 per cent) and strengthening ASEAN institutions that support the rule of law (24.6 per cent).At its core, the 2026 Survey suggests that Southeast Asians still see ASEAN as the region’s best available platform for preserving resilience, balance and collective agency. To remain relevant, however, ASEAN will need stronger internal cohesion, more effective implementation and a clearer ability to act on the region’s own terms.

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Joanne Lin is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. She is also a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the MIT Center for International Studies.