ASEAN and Myanmar: The Need for Sustained Engagement

Three years ago, nine ASEAN leaders sat down with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, chairman of Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), at a special leaders’ meeting in Jakarta. They agreed on a broad list of priorities that would enable ASEAN to lend assistance to the unfolding crisis in Myanmar. However, the leaders who forged the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC) that emerged from that meeting in April 2021 could not have anticipated the extent of conflict escalation in Myanmar, nor that of the SAC’s intransigence.

Myanmar’s approach to the 5PC has effectively stymied its implementation. The Senior General had agreed to the 5PC, of which the first priority was “immediate cessation of violence”.  Subsequently, he rescinded cooperation, insisting that compliance with the 5PC could only occur after restoring stability in Myanmar.  This conflation of the SAC’s 5-point roadmap (which listed steps for restoring peace and stability by the SAC’s own standards) with the 5PC’s priorities has caused deeper divisions within ASEAN, as views are split on holding the SAC accountable for non-compliance with the 5PC.

The Senior General’s persistent conflation made the implementation of the 5PC a Sisyphean task from the onset. Three years on, however, the challenges facing Myanmar have been compounded. The SAC is facing mounting challenges, with the economy in shambles, resistance forces taking control in more contested areas, and significant border-trade points. ASEAN members are also losing patience. A recent statement by ASEAN foreign ministers on the escalation of violence near the Thai border town at Myawaddy reflects mounting concerns about the spillover effects of escalating conflict and conflict, and a reaffirmation of the need for “a peaceful and unified Myanmar”. The ASEAN statement demonstrates how much ASEAN has dug in its heels to the point they have made before: to implement the 5PC “in its entirety”.

Findings in the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey are a sober reminder that three years after the 2021 coup, only Myanmar respondents remain most concerned (89.9 per cent) about the crisis in their country. The Myanmar crisis ranked sixth out of ten geopolitical events presenting the greatest concern for governments, below the Israel-Hamas war, aggression in the South China Sea, the Russia-Ukraine war and global scam operations.

In 2022, regional views of ASEAN’s response were split, with 37 per cent approving, 33.1 per cent disapproving, and 29.9 per cent neutral about ASEAN’s response. Respondents in that year agreed, however, that independent dialogue must continue.

The same preference for independent dialogue with all stakeholders in Myanmar persisted in 2024. The 2024 findings showed that scepticism of the 5PC’s effectiveness remained, whether due to neutrality about the 5PC (31.1 per cent), the SAC’s intransigence (22.4 per cent) or being “fundamentally flawed in addressing complex issues” (17.8 per cent).  Yet, the region remained in agreement that engaging in independent dialogue (38.6 per cent) was an important step forward. This was strongly felt by respondents from 2021 ASEAN Chair Brunei (50.9 per cent), Vietnam (50.7 per cent) and 2023 ASEAN Chair Indonesia (50.4 per cent). Myanmar respondents showed the least enthusiasm for this option from 2022 to 2024.

If anything, the survey findings are a reminder of the need for longer-term commitment and interest to keep Myanmar from failing. The multiple complexities surrounding the Myanmar conflict should not deter ASEAN members from setting new precedents in their interventions.

Three years of survey results thus show that ASEAN’s engagement with key stakeholders in Myanmar remains the top choice of respondents from all ten ASEAN countries, including Myanmar. The percentage of respondents choosing this option rose from 38.1 per cent in 2023 to 38.6 per cent in 2024.

Among all respondents, using harder methods to deal with Myanmar’s failure to comply with the 5PC was second-most favoured option. The percentage of respondents choosing this option, however, fell from 19.6 per cent in 2022 to 14.9 per cent this year.

ASEAN mounting a coordinated response with international partners was the third most chosen option. However, the percentage of respondents choosing this route has fallen to 13.0 per cent this year, from 15.1 per cent in 2023 and 24.4 per cent in 2022. This adds a layer of uncertainty for Australia’s former Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who was recently appointed as the new United Nations Secretary-General’s special envoy to Myanmar. It would also complicate the range of options that she could employ.

The next two options for ASEAN were even less palatable for respondents: non-interference in Myanmar’s domestic politics (12.7 per cent) and downgrading/ limiting engagement with the SAC until the situation improves (12.5 per cent). The option — reinstating the SAC’s involvement in ASEAN meetings — was the least popular, at 8.3 per cent.

The Need to Engage

To move the Myanmar issue forward, ASEAN should:

If anything, the survey findings are a reminder of the need for longer-term commitment and interest to keep Myanmar from failing. The multiple complexities surrounding the Myanmar conflict should not deter ASEAN members from setting new precedents in their interventions. The Myanmar military is being challenged as never before by internal forces seeking an end to authoritarian rule. The increased visibility of ethnic resistance organisations, the Peoples’ Defense Forces aligned with them, and the demands of the Myanmar people for a right to peace and development indicate that the country needs sustained attention from the region. This will ensure that Myanmar’s armed forces transition to a responsible entity that contributes to regional peace and stability.

The recent ASEAN foreign ministers’ statement noted that a “peaceful and unified Myanmar is in the interests of ASEAN”. It is indeed in ASEAN’s interests to assist Myanmar in navigating a course that can help build trust towards preventing future cycles of violence and a path that will prioritise recovery over revenge. Engagement with all key stakeholders remains a preferred option for the entire region, including Myanmar respondents themselves. This is what ASEAN and its trusted partners should work on.

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