Pheu Thai’s Military Reforms: Keeping the Military Onside

In a country known for its military-led coups, prime ministers go to great lengths to retain civilian control. Civilian leaders such as Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin and Defence Minister Suthin Klangsaeng, have attempted to establish rapport with security service chiefs, especially the commanders of the defence forces and army, General Songwit Noonpakdi and General Jaroenchai Hintao respectively.

Within the Ministry of Defence, Suthin does not have a Deputy, while his underlings are not totally under his control. He is assisted by a committee of Assistant Defence Ministers, presided over by loyalist Pheu Thai attorney Chamnong Chaiyamongkol. But Suthin also must work three powerful individuals. One of them is the civilian Secretary to the Defence Ministry (retired) General Natapol Nakpanich, a disciple of Deputy Secretary to the Royal Household (retired) General Apirat Kongsompong. The other two are General (retired) Prayuth Chan-o-cha, Privy Councilor and former Prime Minister, and General Sanitchanok Sangkachantra, Permanent Secretary of Defence. General Sanitchanok holds an active-duty military post and he is close to Prayuth.

Meanwhile, in mid-2024, preparations are being made to name the successor to the retiring holder of the most powerful military post, Army Commander Jaroenchai. His last day in office is 30 September. There are three candidates. General Ukrit Buntanon, an Assistant Army Commander from the Green Rim faction. He is from pre-cadet class 24 and retires in 2027. Assistant Army Commander General Tharapong Malakam is from the Red Rim faction. He is from pre-cadet class 24 and will retire in 2026.  Like General Tharapong, Army Chief of Staff General Pana Klauplaudtuk also comes from the Red Rim faction. He is from pre-cadet class 26 and will retire in 2027. Any army commander from the less arch-royalist Red Rim faction might be less inclined to sustain elected civilian control. As a result, the Srettha government is more supportive of General Ukrit becoming the next Army Commander.

Srettha’s Pheu Thai government, endorsed by ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, has sought to implement some military reforms, which were somewhat resisted by the military.

First, it has expedited the military’s programme to reduce the number of generals to approximately 300 active-duty generals by 2027. The number reportedly stands at 1,700. This will be done by moving many of them to expert or special expert postings. This was seen in the 19 March mid-year military reshuffle, which included 233 senior armed forces officers. Almost all were appointed to advisory positions. The only significant promotion was that of Army Major General Kittipong Jaemsuwan (a pre-cadet class 23 friend of Army Commander General Jaroenchai Hintao) to the post of Third Army Region cohort commander.

Second, Suthin has reluctantly agreed to support the continuance of conscription, despite a promise made in September 2023 that it would be reduced in April 2024. In April, military chiefs told Suthin that the number of volunteer soldiers was not enough to diminish conscription.  However, he promised that the military would ensure time for conscripts to do their educational studies after military training and that complaints about bullying in the military could be made online.

But Suthin’s resilience does not prove his ability to control the military; rather, he will need to continue to cooperate with them. In the view of the military, Pheu Thai, with its slated military reforms, still retains an edge over the progressive Move Forward party.

Third, the government has slightly reduced the defence budget by 2,485.1 million baht (US$67.31 million) from the previous year. This fulfils a campaign promise to establish civilian control over (and limits on) armed forces spending.

Fourth, the Srettha government amended Ministry of Defence regulations such that any appointed generals must not 1) have been involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, or the destruction of natural resources/environment; 2) be doing business with the Ministry of Defence; and 3) be under disciplinary investigation or criminal prosecution. The changes also abolished the Military Provincial Court and permitted the Prime Minister to immediately suspend generals when it appeared they would participate in a military coup.  Finally, the Minister of Defence was empowered to name five instead of three members of the nineteen-person Defence Council.

In April 2024 a rumour swirled that conservative resistance to Suthin’s military reforms would lead to a cabinet reshuffle whereby Prime Minister Srettha would also become Defence Minister (replacing Suthin). Ultra-royalist General Natapol would become Deputy Defence Minister and de facto Defence Minister. But following the 28 April reshuffle (a group of Red Shirts even protested in parliament), Suthin remained as Defence Minister, demonstrating support from Pheu Thai and trust from Thaksin.

But Suthin’s resilience does not prove his ability to control the military; rather, he will need to continue to cooperate with them. In the view of the military, Pheu Thai, with its slated military reforms, still retains an edge over the progressive Move Forward party.

Move Forward had wanted more extensive reforms. It wanted to make the Defence Council an advisory body rather than one which could influence ministerial decisions. It wanted to eradicate military courts altogether except in times of war, and make the appointments of generals merit-based. In order to improve civilian control over the military. Move Forward also wanted to abolish the seven-member, military-dominated “superboard” which decides the promotions of senior military officials.

In this context, Suthin’s modest reform proposals do not vex the armed forces as much as those of Move Forward: He has not sought to diminish the powers of the military-dominated Defence Council or even attempt to eradicate the “superboard”. He has only reduced the power of military jurisprudence in the provinces rather than all over Thailand. Suthin’s plan to reduce the number of generals follows a plan proposed by the military.  Furthermore, with regard to the Suthin-proposed amendment designed to deter potential coup makers, a retired senior general told this author that it was “useless, just a symbolic” move.

In other defence matters, Suthin has acquiesced to permitting the military to spearhead Thailand’s southern Malay-Muslim counterinsurgency. However, Suthin does face some consternation from the Navy, which has not given up on obtaining submarines from China and is unhappy with the 2024-2025 budget.

Suthin and Srettha’s Pheu Thai conciliatory policy toward the military is thus far clearly one with which the military can find common ground with compared to Move Forward. In Parliament, Suthin even denounced Move Forward’s military reform proposals as “revolutionary”. The military reform proposals of Sutin and Srettha give the appearance of some change, but the reality is that substantive change is absent. For the future, though this Pheu Thai government would like to exert more control over the military, it may choose not to upset the apple cart of military autonomy and perks, if only to remain in office and not suffer from a military coup, as two other Thaksin-supported governments did in the past.

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