ASEAN Needs a Common Position on Myanmar

Thailand hosted two back-to-back regional meetings last week, for which the key agenda item was the crisis raging in Myanmar. The first, on 19 December, was a six-country ‘informal consultation’ for Myanmar and its immediate neighbours to discuss border security and cross-border challenges such as illicit drug trafficking, online scams, and the escalating conflict in Myanmar. Though ethnic armies and other resistance groups now control an estimated 42 per cent of Myanmar territory, their representatives were not invited to the 19 December meeting, which was convened ostensibly to discuss border issues. This meeting gave the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime’s foreign minister an opportunity to brief ministers from China, India, Bangladesh, Laos and Thailand on the SAC’s planned elections next year.

The second meeting was part of extended informal consultations Thailand proposed earlier this year to discuss the implementation of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC) on Myanmar and the way forward. Hosted by outgoing ASEAN Chair Lao PDR, the meeting presented an innovative modality of engaging interested members beyond the troika arrangement (comprising the past, present and future Chairs of ASEAN): all ASEAN members participated. Thai Foreign Minister (FM) Maris Sangiampongsa described Thailand’s role as a “bridge-builder” (between the two meetings). However, only Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand had ministerial-level representation. Indonesia’s FM Sugiono was conspicuously missing (as he was with President Prabowo Subianto on a visit to Egypt), causing speculation in Jakarta about Prabowo’s seemingly low regard for ASEAN issues. This perception may be remedied by upcoming separate meetings between Anwar with Prabowo and with Thaksin in Langkawi.

ASEAN’s 5PC has been derided as weak and ineffective for resolving Myanmar’s crisis. Weak as it may be, the 5PC remains the only consensus document that ASEAN Leaders had negotiated and agreed with coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in 2021. ASEAN has consistently reaffirmed the 5PC as its main reference for holding the SAC accountable. From 2022 onwards, ASEAN scaffolded the 5PC with an annual ASEAN Leaders’ Review and Decision on the Implementation of the 5PC. This mechanism conveys the nine (ex-Myanmar) ASEAN members’ views on the progress or lack thereof in Myanmar on 5PC implementation. ASEAN tightened the noose around the SAC by limiting Myanmar to non-political representatives, effectively barring Min Aung Hlaing or his designated ministers from ASEAN summits.

ASEAN has also denied Myanmar its rotational turn to chair ASEAN in 2026. The third and latest review in October 2024 reiterated that the Philippines will chair ASEAN in 2026 until “a different decision is made”.

These moves have not stopped the SAC from disrupting ASEAN decision-making processes. The Myanmar non-political representative’s behaviour at the 18th ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) in November drew a stern response from Singapore’s defence minister, who called Myanmar out for undermining ASEAN unity and centrality. (Myanmar had apparently blocked ASEAN consensus on admitting new observers to the ADMM Plus.) Minister Ng Eng Hen asked Myanmar not to conduct its “own politics of retaliation”.

Briefing the press on 20 December, the Thai FM said that his counterparts agreed that a “peaceful, stable and unified Myanmar” was in the region’s interest. FM Maris also said neighbouring countries supported Myanmar in finding solutions and that ASEAN would want an inclusive process, but left out details. He added that Myanmar has “opened the door for inclusive political dialogue”.

How it will be opened and who will go through that door remains unclear. Some critics noted the NUG’s absence (even on the sidelines) of the two Bangkok meetings. The briefing by the SAC-appointed foreign minister to the 19 December six-country consultation, later conveyed to ASEAN, merely stated broad timelines, indicated the intention to invite international (election) observers, and mentioned a national census as a prelude to elections.

If ASEAN were to accept the SAC’s planned elections without demanding adherence to the 5PC or ensuring proper, fair, and due process, it would risk making a mockery of its “Myanmar-owned, Myanmar-led” advocacy. Experts have warned that the SAC’s ‘census-to-election’ narrative belies its true intention to flush out the opposition and that elections might cause further violence.

If ASEAN were to accept the SAC’s planned elections without demanding adherence to the Five-Point Consensus or ensuring proper, fair, and due process, it would risk making a mockery of its “Myanmar-owned, Myanmar-led” advocacy.

If ASEAN goes along with the SAC’s attempt to paper over deep cracks of distrust, it would exclude key stakeholders and undermine the process started during Indonesia’s 2023 chairmanship to engage all key stakeholders in Myanmar including the NUG in independent dialogue, to build trust. It is understood – outside Myanmar – that the deposed National League for Democracy (NLD) and other political parties the junta dissolved, the different ethnic armed organisations, and members of the current resistance movement must be part of discussions on Myanmar’s political future. Myanmar stakeholders who participated in the informal engagement process facilitated by the 2023 and 2024 ASEAN Chairs are interested in continuing such engagements.

Responding to media queries on whether ASEAN could accept Myanmar’s election plans, the Thai foreign ministry spokesman said that ASEAN would have to find a common position regarding how to respond to events next year. Singapore’s FM Vivian Balakrishnan has called for the cessation of violence, the start of constructive dialogue, and the immediate release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, “who is vital for national reconciliation”.

In a twist, on the cusp of Malaysia taking over as ASEAN Chair, PM Anwar Ibrahim has surprised the region by appointing former Thai premier Thaksin Shinawatra as his “personal adviser” after bilateral talks with Thaksin’s daughter, current Thai PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra. Recent reports list other former FMs, including Singapore’s George Yeo and Indonesia’s Retno Marsudi, as among those asked to join PM Anwar’s unprecedented “ASEAN study group”.

There is more scepticism than optimism about whether Mr Thaksin or the others have any innovative ideas to resolve the Myanmar conflict. Still, no ASEAN member is about to contest PM Anwar’s prerogative. Taking a leaf from Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship theme, “Inclusivity and Sustainability”, ASEAN desperately needs a new strategy for Myanmar, one that is inclusive, sustainable and united.

2024/380