Laos' Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone addresses the closing ceremony of the 44th and 45th ASEAN Summits in Vientiane on 11 October 2024. (Photo by ASEAN Secretariat via Flickr)

A Small Country’s Big Moment in ASEAN Amid Challenges

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Joanne Lin, Sharon Seah, Melinda Martinus, and Kristina Fong examine the outcomes of the 44th and 45th ASEAN Summits and assess Laos’ achievement as the ASEAN Chair.

The 44th and 45th ASEAN Summits in Vientiane, Laos on 9-11 October 2024 was a big moment for Laos to elevate its diplomatic profile on the global stage. Under the theme “ASEAN: Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience,” the summits sought to reaffirm ASEAN’s place in a world marked by shifting geopolitical developments.

True to its cautious and risk-averse diplomatic style, Laos prioritised stability and community-building over bold initiatives. The 90-plus summit deliverables focused on practical cooperation—such as sustainable agriculture and supply chain connectivity—while avoiding contentious political issues. This reflects Laos’ preference for measured progress and collaboration while steering clear of divisive geopolitical challenges. However, its inability to mitigate external pressures and manage major power rivalries within ASEAN-led mechanisms resulted in the failure to adopt the East Asia Summit statement, once again raising concerns about ASEAN’s relevance amid great power competition.

Low-Hanging Fruits, Big Impact

The summits marked the first official foreign visits for Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. It was also Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s first ASEAN Summit. While not all heads of state were present—Indonesia was represented by Vice President Ma’ruf Amin, Secretary of State Antony Blinken represented the US, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov attended on behalf of Moscow—these high-level engagements remained critical.

Amid challenging geopolitical circumstances, Laos strategically shifted focus to deliver tangible results by concentrating on pragmatic, lower-hanging fruit. This approach allowed Laos to make meaningful progress in areas such as economic integration, advancing ASEAN’s Community Post-2025 Vision, and pushing forward Timor-Leste’s membership in ASEAN, while diverting attention away from divisive geopolitical uncertainties.

One of the key achievements was the successful conclusion of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) 3.0 upgrade negotiations. This has shifted the narrative away from South China Sea tensions to a more optimistic focus on economic growth through five new chapters, including the digital economy and green economy. Notably, ACFTA 3.0 is the first ASEAN+ agreement to feature an environmental chapter, setting a precedence for future upgrades to other ASEAN-led trade agreements, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

In parallel, Laos oversaw significant progress in the much-anticipated upgrade negotiations for the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), which is expected to be completed next year. ATIGA 2.0 will align with ASEAN’s ambitions to become future-ready by incorporating digital and green economy elements. Progress was also made in advancing digital trade standards and establishing Regionally Comparable and Recognized Unique Business Identification Numbers (UBIN), crucial steps toward enhancing the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA). These initiatives, now halfway toward their 2025 completion target, are vital for facilitating cross-border digital trade and ensuring ASEAN remains competitive in an evolving global economy.

Another significant milestone under Laos’ Chairmanship was advancing the ASEAN Community’s Post-2025 Vision. Unlike previous visions, which were typically renewed every decade, the upcoming political-security, economic, and socio-cultural blueprints will extend until 2045, making them more agile and strategic in nature. Laos’ inclusive leadership has facilitated the development of these long-term visions through a consultative process, led by the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Community’s Post-2025 Vision (HLTF-ACV). This process involves sectoral groups, regional think tanks, civil society and external partners. It addresses critical themes such as major power rivalries, minilateralism, maritime security, supply chain resilience, protectionism, climate change and future pandemics. The process will culminate in the adoption of the Post-2025 Vision next year.

Under Laos’ watch, ASEAN has continued to pave the way for Timor-Leste’s enhanced participation in ASEAN meetings. Timor-Leste officially established an ASEAN Mission in Jakarta in October 2023. The country has also put in the elbow grease by making voluntary contributions for instance, to the ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief Fund. It has also committed to supporting a special Timor-Leste Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat in August 2024. The special Unit has been tasked to monitor Timor-Leste’s progress in implementing the roadmap and to provide capacity-building assistance. With the implementation of Timor-Leste’s roadmap more or less in place, expectations are high that the country will finally attain full membership next year during Malaysia’s Chairmanship.

ASEAN leaders attend the opening ceremony of the 44th and 45th ASEAN Summits and Related Summits in Vientiane, Laos on 9 October 2024. (Photo by Kusuma Pandu Wijaya / ASEAN Secretariat via Flickr)

Geopolitical Balancing Acts are Never Easy

While Laos achieved notable success by focusing on pragmatic deliverables, geostrategic tensions proved far more difficult to navigate. As expected, geopolitical concerns dominated Summit discussions led by the Myanmar crisis and South China Sea tensions. Underscoring months of frustration over incidents at sea, Philippines President Bongbong Marcos called for parties to be “earnestly open to seriously managing differences” and for the negotiations over the SCS Code of Conduct (COC) to be concluded quickly at the 27th ASEAN-China Summit. In his response, Chinese Premier Li Qiang cited “external forces” at play while the ASEAN Secretary-General defended progress over the COC negotiations as “not (at a) standstill”.

Heightening the geopolitical tensions further, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in a press briefing, accused his “Western colleagues” of undermining the region’s economic and security architecture. He charged that Western nations were pulling the Asia-Pacific into NATO’s orbit by fostering exclusive, US-led military and political alliances that were fragmenting forums like the East Asia Summit (EAS), dividing participants into “friends and foes.” Lavrov’s critique echoed China’s frequent denunciations of US “bloc politics.” Consequently, the two camps—between the US and its allies versus China and Russia—succeeded in stalling the EAS statement. As a result, Laos was left to issue a Chair’s EAS statement. This used largely recycled language from previous ASEAN statements and offered little in terms of new developments.

Amid these uncertainties, ASEAN leaders continued to emphasise the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Surprisingly, Laos—a country with limited direct interests in the Indo-Pacific—managed to sustain momentum on this initiative by hosting the second ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum. The Forum, held as part of the ASEAN Business and Investment Summit, highlighted economic cooperation and sustainability, two core pillars of the AOIP. Laos pushed through the adoption of yet another ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on the AOIP aimed at “future-proofing” the region through ASEAN-led mechanisms, almost as if it were in its own multiverse. The polarisation of the EAS between the two camps casts doubts on whether the Forum can continue to serve as a vehicle to advance the AOIP, especially given intensifying major power competition.

The Myanmar crisis continued to weigh heavily on the agenda, with Laos struggling to find meaningful solutions. The country pursued its “neighbourhood approach” by sending Special Envoy Alounkeo Kittikhoun on two visits to Myanmar in early 2024, and by convening the Troika-Plus mechanism of past, present, and future ASEAN Chairs in July 2024 in Vientiane. The third ASEAN Leaders’ review of the Five-Point Consensus that was adopted brought no significant new insights or progress. These efforts, while earnest, underscored the limitations of Laos’ cautious diplomacy in dealing with such a complex and entrenched crisis. Looking ahead, expectations are high that Malaysia might adopt a different approach. The new Thai PM has urged for greater engagement with Myanmar ahead of the latter’s planned elections and offered to host another Troika-Plus meeting in mid-December.

Laos’ ASEAN Verdict

As ASEAN Chair, Laos demonstrated diplomatic acumen by navigating a tumultuous geopolitical landscape by focusing on practical cooperation, such as enhancing connectivity and economic resilience. However, its cautious, risk-averse approach hindered its ability to lead on more contentious issues, including the South China Sea tensions and the Myanmar crisis. Still, Laos’ leadership shows how smaller states can adeptly balance regional cooperation with the competing interests of larger powers, by charting a pragmatic yet restrained path for ASEAN’s future.


Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre. 

Joanne Lin is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.


Sharon Seah is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Climate Change in Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.


Melinda Martinus is the Lead Researcher in Socio-cultural Affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.


Kristina Fong Siew Leng is Lead Researcher for Economic Affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute.