Regional Responses to China’s Community of Shared Future for Mankind

According to the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey conducted by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, one-third of Southeast Asian respondents believe that the Community of Shared Future for Mankind (CSFM) complements ASEAN’s efforts, and another third view it as positive and beneficial for the region. However, a smaller percentage of respondents see the vision as potentially divisive, with a majority voicing concerns that it could force countries to choose sides and threaten ASEAN centrality.

In July, ASEANFocus+ invited regional experts to assess these responses and evaluate the broader implications of this initiative on the region.

Although Brunei has not openly supported the CSFM, are there specific areas of mutual interest between Brunei and China, such as energy cooperation, that could be particularly significant within the context of a shared future?

HASHIM: Brunei and China continue to enjoy close cooperation bilaterally since they elevated their relationship to a strategic cooperative partnership in 2018. Brunei recently expressed its interest in transforming the Sultanate to become a smart nation by creating a sustainable ecosystem while investing in the digital economy to help diversify its oil-dependent economy. Brunei is also looking to transition into renewable energy, as there is strong momentum in the demand for low carbon energy sources. Although China is the biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) provider in Brunei, the inward flow of FDI from China has been slow in recent years due to the global economic slowdown. Despite this, China is willing to collaborate with Brunei to help in these areas as it is already the main driving force in Brunei’s oil and gas downstream sector.

How does Brunei’s diplomatic strategy, characterised by maintaining friendly relations with all its allies, including China, serve to safeguard its national interests?

HASHIM: Brunei has been punching above its weight in its foreign relations. Despite its small size, Brunei has adeptly navigated the complex geopolitical landscape, leveraging its strategic location and economic resources with a nuanced diplomatic approach to maintain a prominent role in the international arena. Brunei is a productive member of the international community, reinforcing international institutions while also prioritising its economic development, especially through ASEAN. However, as Southeast Asia is increasingly becoming an important theatre for great power rivalry, Brunei is seeking to distance itself from the power competition by hedging to reduce over-dependency. Although Brunei is one of the richest countries in Southeast Asia, it is still in the process of nation-building to actualise its National Development Goal 2035. This hedging strategy has been beneficial to Brunei as it seeks to maintain strategic autonomy and keep equal balance with great powers while reducing its overdependency on any specific country.

Singapore and China have a longstanding relationship built on mutual trust. However, Singapore has yet to fully commit to the CSFM. What are the strategic considerations behind Singapore’s stance?

LYE: Singapore conducts its foreign policy based on its national interests, prioritising practical and mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries, including China. Although Singapore has yet to officially sign onto the CSFM, it already engages in substantive cooperation in several areas directly related to this. The Singapore-Chongqing Connectivity Initiative (CCI) is a signature Singapore-China project under China’s BRI. The CCI was launched in 2015 during the 25th anniversary of China-Singapore relations and focuses on promoting cooperation in the four key areas of financial services, ICT, transport and logistics, and aviation. It seeks to connect Singapore-based enterprises to China’s western region and to connect Chinese companies there to Southeast Asia. This project is unique in that it goes beyond China’s traditional approach of investing in physical infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. It includes promoting cross-border financial flows and digital connectivity, such as the use of digital bills of lading to reduce transaction costs for businesses. Ultimately, Singapore’s focus is on achieving practical outcomes which would require both countries to not only build on existing cooperation but also be forward looking to identify new areas of cooperation.

As one of the member states with a majority ethnic Chinese population as well as robust socio-cultural and economic connections to China, how does the Singaporean public view China’s proposal for shaping the new global order, versus the elites’ views?

LYE: As far as I am aware, there is no single public view in Singapore on China’s proposal for shaping the existing global order. The public may not be familiar with the specifics of China’s proposal. However, opinions generally fall into three categories: those who welcome China playing a greater global role, those who prefer Singapore to align more closely with China, and those who would like Singapore to continue to be friends with a variety of major powers. There would be differences of views across age groups and even within each age group. In short, public views are mixed. As for the elites’ views, I take this to mean the views of decision-makers in Singapore. They would have to consider Singapore-China relations from the strategic standpoint of Singapore’s national interests. From this perspective, Singapore seeks to be friends with all countries, big or small, strong or weak. At times, relations between Singapore and these countries may run into difficulties but the more important point is to recognise and respect these differences and explore how relations can continue despite those differences.

Laos is one of the first countries in ASEAN to sign up to China’s Community of Shared Future. In view of its strong trade and investment relations with China, what is your assessment of China’s rising influence in the region?

MOUNNARATH: The CSFM is seen positively by many in Southeast Asia, particularly in Laos, due to substantial economic benefits from trade and investment. This vision promises enhanced regional development and connectivity, aligning with the aspirations of many ASEAN countries for growth and prosperity. However, according to the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey more than 20 per cent of respondents from the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand expressed concerns about potential divisiveness when it comes to issues like the South China Sea (SCS) dispute. Laos can sympathise with these countries’ positions and informally support their desire to maintain their claims while encouraging preventive diplomacy and ASEAN-wide solutions. From my perspective, it is important to recognise the significant infrastructural improvements and economic opportunities that engagement with China can bring. These investments can drive economic growth and reduce poverty. China’s assertiveness in regional matters can be seen as a commitment to stability and security. Its cultural and political influence can also foster deeper mutual understanding and collaboration.

Under its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2024, Laos has prioritised the theme of “Enhancing Connectivity and Resilience”, emphasising the need to bolster resilience to uphold ASEAN centrality and neutrality. However, many argue that Laos is ‘susceptible to Chinese pressure’ when dealing with strategic issues like the South China Sea dispute. What steps should Laos take to correct this perception?

MOUNNARATH: China’s major interest in the region is economic opportunities in resources and markets. While maritime countries with island disputes experience geostrategic tensions, Laos, as a landlocked nation, has no direct stakes in the SCS. China is a major supporter of Laos’ development, providing significant economic assistance. Even with this, Laos should still balance economic dependency on China through diversification, enhance internal resilience via political and economic reforms, and engage in transparent communication about its foreign policy. Active participation in regional forums and investing in diplomatic capacity building can further reinforce Laos’s independent stance. Therefore, Laos would benefit from maintaining positive relations with China to leverage development support, while also engaging in international cooperation to ensure a balanced and diversified foreign policy. This approach will help Laos avoid leaning too heavily towards China and preserve strong relationships with other key Western countries, such as the US and its allies in Europe and beyond.

Despite a cautious relationship between China and Vietnam, the Vietnamese government made a surprising turn by supporting the CSFM. Could you explain the strategic calculations behind this decision?

NGUYEN: China had pressured Vietnam to join the CSFM for quite some time, but it consistently declined. Hanoi finally accepted the offer last December. The decision was based on several strategic calculations. First, this can be seen as Vietnam’s balancing act to appease China following the double upgrade in its bilateral relationship with the US, which brought Washington to the same level as Beijing in Vietnam’s diplomatic hierarchy. Second, Vietnam accepted the CSFM on its own terms, explicitly emphasising the international rules-based order and the UN Charter, which were not included in the original offer. This ensures that joining the CSFM does not interfere with Vietnam’s other main foreign policy goals. Third, as one of the last ASEAN member states to join the scheme (the seventh), Hanoi can limit negative reactions from domestic and international audiences.

Could you share with us how party-to-party relations between Vietnam and China significantly shape the overall ties between both countries?

NGUYEN: Although Vietnam and China have experienced multiple tensions over the past decades, they maintain solid party-to-party relations as both are communist regimes. This tie plays a crucial role in shaping the general direction of the bilateral relationship, acting as a backdoor communication channel in times of crisis, and guaranteeing strategic trust between Hanoi and Beijing. In a way, it helps prevent maritime disputes from affecting other aspects of their relationship, which explains why Vietnam–China ties have continued to deepen in recent years. However, China can leverage this special ideological bond to drive a wedge between Vietnam and the West by exploiting their common fear of “colour revolutions”. The secret nature of this line of communication also gives China the upper hand in bilateral negotiations with Vietnam. Thus, the unique party tie serves as both a lever and a constraint for Hanoi in its China policy.

The relationship between China and Indonesia has grown substantially under President Joko Widodo, as Indonesia has received significant infrastructural investments from the BRI. Could you share how China’s rising global influence could be an asset or liability for Indonesia in its pursuit of a non-alignment policy?

SULAIMAN: It is a question with no simple answer. At this point, I do not see any linkage between China’s rising global influence and Indonesia’s foreign policy. Even without Chinese investments, Indonesia has been pursuing an independent and active foreign policy, meaning that Indonesia does not want to be involved in military alliances or get dragged into international conflicts. It pursues friendly policies with China, the US, and other major powers. China is indeed a major investor in Indonesia but Singapore was actually the biggest investor in 2023. So, China’s rising global economic influence does not matter that much in influencing Indonesia’s foreign policy.

The question, however, is what will happen in times of conflict. Here, Indonesia’s military weaknesses in terms of lacking air and naval power and reliance on Chinese investment, especially in capital-extensive downstream industries that other countries may be unwilling to invest in such as nickel refineries, will be problematic as it will put Indonesia in a tight spot. In fact, there is real fear in Jakarta that China’s influence may be too much and too expensive, making Indonesia overly dependent on Chinese investment. The problem is that China is the only game in town in terms of providing investment for capital-intensive infrastructural development.

Indonesia is one of the countries in the ASEAN region that supported China’s Community of Shared Future when it was first announced. What will Indonesia gain strategically from China by signing up to such an initiative?

SULAIMAN: Bluntly, nothing much. While this sounds nice and signifies the commitment for a shared goal of building “an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world of lasting peace, universal security and shared prosperity”, these are only nice-sounding words with unclear implementation. It is basically Indonesia showing its commitment for friendship with China, that it will also keep pursuing a good relationship with China, regardless of its military or economic ties with the US and its allies, such as Australia and the United Kingdom. By keeping the relationship with China amicable, Indonesia hopes that the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the SCS will be finalised, an aspiration shared by Indonesia and all ASEAN countries. Essentially, nothing different from the current policy that Indonesia has toward China.

According to the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey conducted by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, respondents from the Philippines expressed the most apprehension (33 per cent) that China’s vision could be divisive for the region and force countries to choose sides. In a way, President Marcos’ so-called pivot to the US to counter Beijing’s aggression could be seen as already choosing a side. Do you see any prospects of the Philippines supporting China’s Community of Shared Future?

VALENCIANO: President Marcos Jr.’s rebalance to the US can be interpreted as choosing a side in the US-China rivalry in the region. However, multiple and uncoordinated statements on recent developments in the SCS show that Manila remains cautious in navigating this rivalry. The 17 June incident in the Second Thomas / Ayungin Shoal was initially described as “intentional” by government agencies, only for them to reclassify that the injury sustained by a Filipino sailor did not constitute “an armed attack”. They categorised it as “accidental” a few days later. Despite the US’ reiteration of its security commitment to the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, some officials do not see the incident as sufficient cause to invoke the treaty. Likewise, during the trilateral summit in April among the Philippines, the US and Japan, Manila downplayed the security dimension of this partnership, highlighting instead economic gains while expressing concerns about Chinese aggression in the SCS.

Nevertheless, trust among Filipinos towards China is at an all-time low and this is echoed in the negative views towards the CSFM. The previous administration saw the BRI as a means to fill the infrastructural deficits in the country but the current leadership is lukewarm to the idea not least because of the controversies surrounding BRI projects in the Philippines. In the short term, we can expect the Philippines to continue its defence and economic relationships with the US, while also exploring and strengthening existing security and economic ties with long-time partners such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea.

Beyond the territorial dispute with China in the SCS (or West Philippine Sea), how do you perceive the overall prospects for economic relations, including trade and investment, between Manila and Beijing in the future?

VALENCIANO: China continues to be the Philippines’ top trading partner with US$41 billion in combined exports and imports in 2023. However, due to the tensions in the SCS, there are growing concerns of potential trade sanctions from China despite assurances from the Philippine government of strong bilateral trade relations. Geopolitical uncertainties render the overall Philippine-China relations volatile. While China has other alternative export markets, the Philippines relies heavily on the Chinese market for its export and import industries. Further, the promised benefits of BRI projects in the Philippines did not fully materialise before they were halted by President Marcos Jr.

The Philippines should continue exploring areas such as the green economy sector for trade cooperation with China. However, as a buffer against a potential decline in its trade relations with China, the Philippines should diversify and look out for alternative economic opportunities and official development assistance (ODA) from other economic partners. For instance, Japan contributes to the Philippines’ maritime security through loans for the purchasing of Multi-Role Response Vessels (MRRV) for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), while the US has expressed its commitment to support the development of the Luzon Economic Corridor under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).

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Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.