Betting on the Bulldozer: Why (Most of) Southeast Asia is Warming Up to Trump 2.0

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has triggered a sense of consternation around the world, including in Southeast Asia. The president and his team have demonstrated an inclination towards transactionalism, a preference for tariffs over multilateral trading frameworks, and neglect of US commitment to long-standing alliances.

Ironically, this was not reflected in the State of Southeast Survey 2025. The US scored higher than in 2024 on many questions: US engagement with Southeast Asia, its economic and strategic influence in the region, and respondents’ choices between China and the US. The Trump effect may well be attributed to his robust leadership, affinity for brokering deals with major powers, and expectation that he might pay more attention to the Indo-Pacific.

Among the respondents, 40.7 per cent expect US engagement with Southeast Asia to increase under Trump 2.0. This is quite a marked change from the 2024 survey conducted in the final year of the Biden administration when 25.2 per cent of respondents felt that US engagement with the region had increased.

More Attention from Trump

Trump’s robust leadership style appears to have resonated among respondents. About 38.7 per cent said his tough stance on China would help maintain a balance of power in the region. Another 29.6 per cent believed he might collaborate with Southeast Asian countries to counter China’s influence. Also, 31.7 per cent of respondents believe his decisiveness could help resolve global conflicts, a sentiment particularly strong in Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Among the respondents, the percentage who are confident of the US “doing the right thing to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance” has gone up from 42.4 per cent to 47.2 per cent. The strongest support came from the Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Notably, this trust seems to stem less from ideological affinity and more from perceptions of US military strength and economic capacity.

Stronger US, Sounder Ethics?

Another interesting development is the ranking of ASEAN Dialogue Partners in order of their strategic relevance. In 2025, the US closed China’s lead at the top rank, with Washington scoring a mean score of 8.76 against the latter’s 8.80. In the previous year, it was 8.98 for China and 8.79 for the US. On this measure, it is worth noting that Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam ranked the US as the most strategically relevant partner.

US Closes Gap with China

The Trump bump could be attributed to three reasons. First, in a region where strong leadership, stability, hierarchy, and pragmatism are often valued, Trump’s combative persona may be interpreted not as volatility but as leadership. In Vietnam, for example, he embodies the “ideal leader” who would lead his country from a dark moment to victory.

Second, the more positive perceptions of Trump and the US could stem from the president as a dealmaker, fuelling hopes of a grand bargain with China that might alleviate tensions, at least temporarily. For some in the region, a Trump-brokered bargain, whether over the Ukraine war with Russia or a reset with Beijing, is considered plausible and even desirable.

Trump’s combative persona may be interpreted not as volatility but as leadership. In Vietnam, for example, he embodies the ‘ideal leader’ who would lead his country from a dark moment to victory.

Third, there could be a perception that there is some “method to the madness” — that is, a deliberate strategy to disengage the US from Europe and devote more American resources to counter the US’ real rival in the Indo-Pacific. Trump’s nominee for undersecretary of defence, Elbridge Colby, has argued for deprioritising Europe in favour of focusing US resources on the Indo-Pacific. The idea of “settling Europe” and pivoting to Asia could appeal to Southeast Asian leaders who want sustained attention from Washington.

The more positive sentiment towards Trump, however, does not mean that Southeast Asia is assessing Washington uncritically. The region remains divided on who ASEAN would align with if “forced” to choose between China and the US. A narrow majority of 52.3 per cent said they would side with the US over China (47.7 per cent). Likewise, the US continued to lag China in perceptions of which major power has the strongest economic and political/strategic influence in the region.

A Narrow Win for the US

In addition, perceptions of US leadership in championing free trade have continued to fall. The US was ranked third after ASEAN and China. This is understandable given Trump’s inclination to use tariffs to right trade imbalances with the US’ trading partners.

A major question is whether the expressed perceptions in the survey reflect realities on the ground. The relatively positive view of Trump 2.0 may shift if his approach takes a more dangerous turn. For one, he could pursue a harder approach to defending Taiwan and deterring China. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have severe regional consequences.

Alternatively, a grand bargain with China could see Trump arrive at a quid pro quo with China. Beijing would open its markets to US exports and invest more in the country; in return, the US would reduce its security assistance to the island. This is not merely theoretical, given what Trump has pursued in Ukraine, where he withdrew US military support and supply of intelligence in a bid to force Kyiv into a peace agreement with Russia. A quid pro quo over Taiwan should result in some stability for the region and reduce the risk of escalation. However, this will not portend well for the region as it shows that the US will negotiate with major powers (China), which could lead to a reduction in US security guarantees.

This latest survey shows an improvement in Southeast Asians’ sentiment towards the US under Trump. The survey was conducted over six weeks, between 3 January and 15 February 2025, and straddles Trump’s inauguration on 20 January. The improvement in sentiment could be a dead-cat bounce (that is, momentary) or become more sustained going into his second term. The final outcome would depend on the implications of Trump’s decisions — political, economic, and strategic — on Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. The early optimism is already facing a reality check as Trump unveiled sweeping new reciprocal tariffs on 2 April, including more than 40 per cent levies on several ASEAN countries. As policy unpredictability intensifies, the region’s confidence in Washington may prove fragile, and the next survey could tell a different story.

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