Cambodia and Japan: Firm Friends Amid Great Power Rivalry

The relationship between Japan and Cambodia is generally very positive, underpinned by Japan’s exceptional role in fostering Cambodia’s peace process in the 1990s. At its core, this current bilateral relationship serves as a crucial strategic pillar for both nations, offering a means to navigate the turbulent waters of Sino-U.S. rivalry. There is a consensus within the Cambodian policy community that Japan has become a vital “hedge” for Cambodia, a small state navigating a complex geopolitical landscape to safeguard its interests and strategic autonomy.

In 2023, Cambodia and Japan elevated their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP). The designation was previously reserved solely for China. Japan has substantial economic ties with Cambodia in terms of trade, development and foreign direct investment. Yet this does not come without challenges, given Phnom Penh and Tokyo’s different positions on Sino-U.S. rivalry.

First, Cambodia finds itself caught between China and Japan, which is deemed to be a proxy for the U.S. in the region. This creates a difficult position for Cambodia as a small state trying to navigate the tricky shoals of Sino-U.S. competition. Cambodia and Japan do not share the same threat perception towards China. Japan’s recent labelling of China as an “unprecedented strategic challenge” to international order contrasts with Cambodia’s view of China’s rise as an opportunity for global development. While Tokyo’s concerns stem from China’s growing military might and potential attempts to change the status quo in East and Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh proudly acclaims its relationship with China as an “ironclad friendship”, a term used exclusively for Beijing.

Cambodia’s firm adherence to its “One China policy” stands out within ASEAN due to its robust support for China’s position on Taiwan. This is exemplified by former Prime Minister Hun Sen’s assertion that Phnom Penh “resolutely supports China’s every effort to achieve national unification”, which tacitly does not rule out the option of using force. Cambodia was also the first Southeast Asian state to issue a strong statement, just a day after Taiwan’s presidential election in January, recognising the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate authority representing the entirety of China. This position contrasts with Japan’s “soft” approach, which also acknowledges the “One China” principle but maintains ambivalence through its partnership with Taiwan. Japan’s congratulatory message to Taiwan after the island’s elections in January prompted China’s response that it is sending the “wrong signal” to advocates of Taiwanese independence. Beijing views Tokyo’s message as a “serious interference in China’s internal affairs”.

The two countries have also taken different approaches to U.S.-led minilateralism in the region, especially when it comes to China. Japan is taking a more proactive approach, shifting from the role of an economic powerhouse to security-oriented cooperation with regional states to defend what it refers to as the “rules-based order”. Japan has been instrumental in reviving the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Its potential participation in AUKUS, the trilateral security deal between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, will push Tokyo closer to a working coalition that seeks to manage growing Chinese power.

Cambodia has been cautious, if not sceptical, of the rise of U.S.-led minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. Cambodia is concerned that AUKUS might trigger unhealthy competition and escalate tensions. According to the 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, Cambodia has also adopted a wait-and-see approach towards the Quad, with a significant majority of policy elites (64 per cent of respondents) remaining ambivalent about the potential positive impacts it may bring to the region. In addition, 34.1 per cent of respondents perceived cooperation with the Quad as potentially threatening ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms.

…the expanding influence of China and the ramifications of great power politics would likely complicate Cambodia’s relationship with Japan. However, the future remains optimistic if the two can continue to work based on mutual understanding, especially on strategically sensitive points.

As Cambodia and Japan embark on their future relationship under the CSP framework, these key differences should be addressed. Both sides should strengthen strategic communications, identify common ground, and dispel doubts. This can be achieved by establishing a more comprehensive bilateral consultation process, building upon the recently established sub-cabinet level defence talks. Such consultations should delve deeper into strategic matters rather than solely focusing on political and economic cooperation. One strategic focus area deserving particular attention is maritime security, a priority both countries have emphasised. Engaging Japan in Cambodia’s maritime security modernisation plan could significantly alleviate concerns surrounding China’s exclusive access to the Ream Naval Base.

Looking ahead, the expanding influence of China and the ramifications of great power politics would likely complicate Cambodia’s relationship with Japan. However, the future remains optimistic if the two can continue to work based on mutual understanding, especially on strategically sensitive points. Japan has enjoyed a relatively high level of trust among Cambodian policy elites, who maintain close ties with China. Japan has also taken a more moderate approach than the U.S. and other European partners, who have been critical of Cambodia’s democratic practices and are relying more on punitive measures rather than incentives. This has been welcomed by Cambodian elites and engenders wider geopolitical implications. Japanese engagement affords Cambodia more flexibility in securing diverse sources of aid and investment. By doing so, Cambodia can manoeuvre in challenging geopolitical waters, especially at a time when its alignment with China is being questioned.

Most foreign observers view Cambodia solely through the lens of being a client state of China, But Cambodia is merely another small state seeking freedom of manoeuvre amid Sino-U.S. rivalry. This entails the need to seek out third parties such as Japan for mutual benefit. As long as Japan continues to demonstrate goodwill and assures Phnom Penh of its presence in Cambodia, Tokyo should play a key role in Phnom Penh’s strategy of diversification.

*The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the official stance of his affiliations.

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