Cambodia’s Crackdown on Scams Needs a Concrete and Durable Strategy  

Online scams have emerged as a serious global non-traditional security threat. Cambodia, the site of rampant transnational criminal operations in recent years, has stepped up its efforts in the war on online scams. In recent months, the government has moved from ad hoc enforcement to a more centralised and coordinated response. The question is whether the war can be won.

The government has enacted the Law on Combating Online Scams, which entered into force in April this year, to provide a dedicated legal basis for criminalising technology-enabled fraud, organised scam operations, money laundering, illegal recruitment, forced labour and related offences.

In November 2025, the government established the Commission for Combating Online Scams (CCOS) as a national coordinating mechanism to detect, disrupt and dismantle scam networks.

Between November 2025 and May 2026, Cambodian authorities reportedly raided more than 400 locations, revoked 25 casino licenses and deported around 20,000 foreign nationals linked to scam operations.

These are important steps. They show that Phnom Penh now recognises online scams not only as a law-enforcement issue but also as a national security, governance and reputational challenge.

In addition to economic and security concerns, Prime Minister Hun Manet has framed the crackdown as part of efforts to restore Cambodia’s international reputation. This matters. For a country seeking investment, tourism, digital transformation and regional credibility, Cambodia’s association with scam compounds is costly.

Despite these efforts, however, structural challenges remain. It is unlikely that Cambodia would be able to eliminate online scams entirely in the short term. The more realistic objective is sustained disruption: breaking their chain of operation and ending the impunity of culprits.

The online scam economy is resilient because it is adaptive.

Recent reporting suggests that Cambodia’s crackdown has placed real pressure on scam operations, but it has also pushed some groups to change tactics and locations. The durability of these operations lies in their networks. Online scam operations sit at the intersection of transnational organised crime, human trafficking, illegal gambling, money laundering, corruption, weak regulation, porous borders and digital vulnerability.

Can Cambodia eradicate online scams? Not completely, and certainly not quickly. The criminal ecosystem is too mobile, too profitable and too transnational.

Three structural constraints stand out.

First, the scam economy is transnational. Potential victims may be located in Singapore or China. Workers can be recruited from one country, trafficked through another and forced to operate in Cambodia. Money moves through banks, crypto wallets, informal brokers and offshore companies. Servers, platforms and messaging channels may be hosted outside Cambodia.

This makes regional and international cooperation critical. Countries should not descend into playing a blame game; instead, they should recognise online scams as a shared cross-border security threat. Cambodia needs to share real-time intelligence with neighbouring countries. Together, countries should conduct joint investigations and offer mutual legal assistance. They should also effect law-enforcement cooperation, extradition arrangements, financial intelligence-sharing and coordinated victim repatriation.

Several partners, including China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam and the US, have already worked with Cambodia to crack down on online scams. These efforts should be further institutionalised.

Second, enforcement must move up the chain. Arresting frontline scammers or ring leaders is insufficient if their higher-ups are not apprehended. The latter includes landlords, recruiters, transport facilitators, document forgers, telecom providers, payment intermediaries, local protectors and financiers.

A serious crackdown, therefore, requires a whole-of-system approach. This includes tracing assets, enhancing oversight, scrutinising company registries, regulating casinos and real estate and strengthening financial surveillance and telecom compliance. In addition, there is a need to enforce the law consistently, report on scam operations transparently and enable public participation and scrutiny.

Third, credibility depends on transparency. Cambodia’s international partners will not assess the sincerity of Phnom Penh’s crackdown based solely on official statements. They will look for verifiable outcomes.

CCOS needs to provide regular public reporting and offer independent verification where possible. Cambodia needs to cooperate with embassies and victim-support organisations and to follow through on prosecuting scam operators in court, regardless of their social standing or the depth of their connections. Together, this would help demonstrate that enforcement is not selective. The message should be that nobody is above the law.

Cambodia’s anti-scam strategy needs a victim-centred outlook as well. Screening procedures should distinguish between commanders of vast scam networks and foot soldiers who have been coerced into working in these operations. The latter needs safe shelters, translation, consular access, legal assistance, medical support and pathways for repatriation.

A more durable strategy should combine five tracks.

The first is command coordination. CCOS must be empowered to serve as a permanent national secretariat with a mandate and enforcement power to coordinate disparate portfolios: law enforcement, immigration, justice, telecommunications, banking, local administration and foreign affairs. A long-term war against scams requires such an approach.

The second is legal enforcement. The new law must be tested by serious prosecutions, especially against organisers and financiers. Convictions will matter more than arrests.

The third is financial disruption. Cambodia should target money flows, including cryptocurrencies, freeze suspicious assets, monitor high-risk real estate and casino-linked transactions, and strengthen cooperation between banks, payment providers and financial intelligence units. 

The fourth is border and digital governance. Various elements — border checkpoints, visa records, work permits, telecom registration, internet service provision and company licensing — should be integrated into a risk-based monitoring system.

The fifth is international cooperation. Cambodia needs to enhance international cooperation and coordination to crack down on online scams.

Can Cambodia eradicate online scams? Not completely, and certainly not quickly. The criminal ecosystem is too mobile, too profitable and too transnational. Even countries with stronger institutions struggle to eliminate cyber-enabled fraud. As the Khmer Times has argued, Cambodia’s campaign against online scams is a major test of state capacity, law enforcement and the culture of accountability.

But Cambodia can do something more practical and politically meaningful. It can make the country inhospitable to scam networks and close off the space for impunity. It can raise operational costs and protect victims. It must demonstrate that enforcement reaches all layers of criminal networks. It can convert a reputational crisis into a governance reform agenda and transform its image from a country ridden by online scams to a resource country that can share best practices.

The government’s call for an unrelenting crackdown on online scams should therefore be matched by concrete outcomes. The political will is clear, but implementation capacity remains the decisive test.

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