How Southeast Asians Experience Chinese-Built Infrastructure

INTRODUCTION

China is a significant partner for large-scale infrastructure building in Southeast Asia through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to AidData, China provided approximately US$163 billion in loans and grants to lower- and middle-income countries in Southeast Asia between 2000 and 2023. A 2017 Asian Development Bank (ADB) report highlighted China’s important role in regional infrastructure investment, noting that without Chinese financing, developing Asian countries would need to raise infrastructure spending by 5% of their GDP to sustain the annual investment of US$1.7 trillion required through 2030 for continued growth.

Despite being a critical source of infrastructure financing, China’s BRI projects have been met with persistent scepticism, including over the “debt-trap” risk, although no credible evidence of this has been found. Nonetheless, China’s emergence as the leading provider of development finance globally has raised concerns that Beijing could leverage this dependency of vulnerable, low-income countries to further its geo-economic and geopolitical ambitions.

Critics also point to the broader environmental and social costs to the host countries. Weak environmental governance by Chinese construction companies has led to accusations of biodiversity damage, habitat loss, pollution, and increased greenhouse gas emissions from the construction of these mega projects. The impact on local communities also led to protests against several Chinese infrastructure projects in the region.

This article examines how these projects are experienced by locals who use them in their daily lives. Through an online survey, this article seeks to capture the lived experiences of Cambodian, Indonesian, Laotian and Vietnamese respondents who have been using the following Chinese-built transport projects: (i) Siem Reap Angkor International Airport (SRAI Airport), Phnom Penh–Sihanoukville Expressway (PPS Expressway), and eight Cambodia–China Friendship Bridges (CCF Bridges); (ii) Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed Rail (WHOOSH); (iii) Laos–China High-Speed Railway (LCHR), and (iv) Cat Linh–Ha Dong Metro (CLHD Metro) in Hanoi.

The study adopts a mixed-methods survey design, comprising 29 questions, including six open-ended follow-up questions, to examine respondents’ perceptions of the quality and impact of Chinese-built projects on their lives and communities. The inclusion of open-ended questions captures qualitative insights to complement the quantitative data. Data were collected between August and December 2025, with 1,134 respondents completing the survey.

POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS OF CHINESE-BUILT INFRASTRUCTURE

Impression of Chinese-built Infrastructure Quality

About 90% of respondents across almost all six projects feel that the Chinese-built projects are of “very good” or “good” quality (Figure 1). Respondents who have used WHOOSH, the LCHR, or the CLHD Metro enjoy their “comfort”, “cleanliness”, and “good service”. Cambodian respondents, in turn, praise the quality of the PPS Expressway and CCF Bridges, explaining that they are well-constructed and make their commutes safer and more comfortable. Given the enhanced travel speed and comfort, some respondents state that the ticket prices across the different Chinese-built railways are “affordable” or “fair”.

Personal Benefits from Chinese-Built Infrastructure

Respondents are largely appreciative that these projects have improved connectivity within their country and enabled local economic growth. Across the six projects, more than 75% believe that the projects have either “improved” or “significantly improved” their lives (Figure 2). More specifically, respondents indicate that these railway, highway and bridge projects have made their commutes more convenient, eased traffic congestion on overcrowded roads, and reduced their travel time. Cambodian respondents also describe how the SRAI Airport has enhanced the country’s international air connectivity, making it easier for them to travel abroad. Overall, over 90% of the respondents “strongly agree” or “agree” that these projects have eased travel for their respective cities or countries (Figure 3).

Respondents also feel that these projects “benefit them financially by facilitating their job/business” (Figure 4). Over 70% of respondents across the six projects believe the projects have brought personal financial benefits, particularly through reduced travel time and greater convenience in reaching business meetings and work. Some respondents who run shops around the newly built stations along WHOOSH and the CLHD Metro share that the projects have boosted their businesses by attracting more locals and tourists to their areas.

Benefits of Chinese-Built Infrastructure for Local Community/Country

The positive impact of Chinese-built infrastructure projects is widely felt across the local community. Citing similar reasons of convenience and high quality, 90% of respondents feel that most of these projects have made a “very positive” or “positive” impact on their respective communities and countries (Figure 5). Respondents also report that these projects are viewed positively within their networks: over 80% overall indicate that their friends and family view these Chinese-built projects as having “very positive” or “positive” impact on their lives (Figure 6).

Furthermore, respondents expect these projects to stimulate their local and national economies. For instance, respondents who have used the SRAI Airport highlight its potential to transform Cambodia’s economy by fostering greater development, stimulating commerce, and making the country more accessible to tourists. This is consistent with respondents’ confidence that the BRI will bring economic and financial benefits to their country (Figure 7). More than three-quarters of Cambodian, Laotian, and Indonesian respondents either “strongly agree” or “agree” that engaging with the BRI would lead to greater national development and economic growth in their countries.

Apart from tangible benefits, national prestige is another rationale underlying respondents’ positive perceptions of these projects, albeit less commonly cited. Respondents across all countries noted that China’s high-quality, technologically advanced infrastructure projects – especially high-speed rail – enabled their country to develop transport systems on par with those of more developed countries.

WINNING HEARTS WITH CONCRETE: HOW INFRASTRUCTURE SHAPES PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA

The favourable view of Chinese-built infrastructure projects generally translates into a more positive perception of China among respondents. In each project, more than half of the respondents indicate that their impression of China has either “significantly improved” or “improved” after using these projects (Figure 8). These positive sentiments are especially strong among Cambodian (88.5% on average) and Laotian (87.0%) respondents, who view Beijing as providing essential resources for their country’s infrastructure modernisation and broader economic development. Some Cambodian respondents describe China as a benevolent and helpful partner – “an iron-clad friend” – and commend China’s commitment to “supporting growth and tourism in fellow developing nations”.

In comparison, a significant number of Vietnamese (39.6%) and Indonesian (29.5%) respondents hold more ambivalent views of China, despite recognising the benefits of Chinese-built infrastructure. They see such projects as only one dimension of their respective country’s multifaceted relationship with China. In Indonesia, some note that using WHOOSH has not changed their impression of China, as they already view the country in high esteem as an advanced nation that Indonesia should emulate.

As for Vietnam, a small number of respondents (5.4%) express a more negative perception of China. Despite appreciating the CLHD Metro, some cite a lack of trust and concerns about potential “threats” from China, linking this sentiment to Vietnam-China territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea and to historical grievances between the two countries that continue to shape their views of Beijing.

Degrees of positive perception of China broadly correspond to levels of support for their respective countries to engage Chinese construction companies to build future infrastructure (Figures 9 and 10). Support is strongest in Cambodia and Laos, where nearly 90% of respondents favour Chinese companies to build major infrastructure projects in their countries. Indonesian respondents also show high support, with 77.7% agreeing or strongly agreeing with engaging Chinese firms for WHOOSH and future large-scale infrastructure projects.

The positive impact of Chinese-built infrastructure projects is widely felt across the local community. Citing similar reasons of convenience and high quality, 90% of respondents feel that most of these projects have made a “very positive” or “positive” impact on their respective communities and countries.

In contrast, Vietnamese respondents are less supportive: only 48.7% favour engaging Chinese construction companies for the CLHD Metro, while 39.6% are neutral and 11.8% disagree. Vietnamese support for involving Chinese companies in future projects is also the lowest among the four countries, with 52% expressing a positive view, 32.7% neutral, and 15.4% negative. This more cautious stance likely reflects lingering concerns from the metro’s construction phase – including significant delays, cost overruns, and safety incidents – that had long shaped negative public sentiment before its opening in 2021. However, as noted earlier, perceptions tend to improve once the line becomes operational.

LINGERING CONCERNS REMAIN

The survey results suggest that hesitance to engage China in infrastructure development reflects some persistent regional concerns over its large-scale projects. Chief among these are worries about fiscal risks, cited by 26.3% of all respondents on average (Figure 11).

Respondents express concern that high construction costs – largely financed through Chinese loans – may be fiscally unsustainable. Many worry that the BRI could leave their countries “financially indebted to China” (Figure 12). This concern is pronounced in Cambodia and Indonesia, where over 60% agree or strongly agree with the statement; this is even more so in Laos, where the figure is 80.8%. Vietnamese respondents are more ambivalent, with 49.2% expressing concern over fiscal risks and debt exposure associated with BRI engagement.

These varying degrees of concern largely reflect the underlying fiscal conditions and levels of indebtedness of their respective countries to China. In Vietnam, lower concern corresponds with its relatively sound public finances and moderate debt-to-GDP ratio (31.8% in 2025) Moreover, Vietnam’s limited engagement with Chinese-backed BRI infrastructure so far has constrained its exposure to Chinese loans.

In contrast, in Laos, strong public anxiety mirrors the country’s acute debt distress: total public and publicly guaranteed debt is estimated to exceed GDP, with default averted largely through ad hoc deferrals extended by China, its single-largest creditor. The LCHR, costing an estimated US$5.9 billion, is majority-owned by Chinese state firms (70%), with Laos holding only 30%. To finance its share, the Laotian government borrowed approximately US$1.9 billion from China’s Export-Import Bank – equivalent to 2% of its GDP – adding strain to an already heavy debt burden (84.7% of GDP in 2025). Public concern is also likely shaped by earlier debt distress, including the 2021 crisis that led Vientiane to hand over control of swathes of its power grid to a joint venture majority-owned by China Southern Power Grid, as part of a 25-year concession.

Indonesian respondents express similar, though more moderate, concerns, reflecting comparatively stronger fiscal fundamentals (debt at 41% of GDP in 2024). Nonetheless, questions over the sustainability of the US$7.3 billion WHOOSH high-speed rail project – 75% financed by loans from the China Development Bank – have intensified following reports of lower-than-expected ridership. The CEO of the railway operator PT Kereta Api Indonesia (KAI) has warned that WHOOSH could risk becoming a “financial time bomb”. While the government has sought to reframe WHOOSH as a public service obligation and pledged to use recovered corruption assets for repayment, legal and practical constraints suggest that the burden may ultimately fall on the already limited state budget.

Respondents also express concerns about the environmental damage during construction and potential social costs. Worries about inadequate environmental safeguards in Chinese projects rank as the top concern among Laotian respondents (32.2%) and the second-most prevalent concern among other respondents. Despite Beijing’s efforts under “BRI 2.0” to address environmental criticisms, reports indicate that compliance gaps persist. In Indonesia, for instance, the construction of WHOOSH has been linked to worsening flooding, damage to nearby housing infrastructure, and improper waste dumping during construction. Social considerations likewise appear insufficiently addressed: in Laos, villagers affected by the LCHR were reportedly displaced without adequate financial compensation or resettlement support.

Beyond this, Chinese infrastructure projects had little impact on the daily lives or communities of a smaller group of respondents because they are not aligned with their regular commuting routes and hence are infrequently used. Cost is another barrier, particularly for WHOOSH and the LCHR, which some respondents consider expensive.

The survey results suggest that hesitance to engage China in infrastructure development reflects some persistent regional concerns over its large-scale projects. Chief among these are worries about fiscal risks, cited by 26.3% of all respondents on average.

These perceptions point to broader structural issues highlighted by analysts: the relatively underdeveloped “soft infrastructure” in host countries and the weak integration of Chinese-built infrastructure projects with existing transport networks. In Indonesia, WHOOSH’s lower-than-expected ridership has been attributed in part to inadequate feeder connectivity and competition from more accessible and affordable rail and road options. Similarly, the limited integration of the LCHR into Laos’ transport network and wider economy has constrained its spillover benefits: surrounding infrastructure remains underdeveloped, with reports of “potholed dirt roads” linking stations to nearby cities. As a result, while the LCHR has boosted Chinese tourism and cash flow into the country, its direct benefits for local communities remain limited.

COMPARING CHINA TO OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERS

Respondents generally rate Chinese large-scale infrastructure projects as lower in quality than those built by other countries (Figure 13) – despite their widespread recognition of the quality and practical benefits of the specific Chinese-built projects under the survey. More than 80% of Cambodian and Laotian respondents feel that infrastructure built by other countries is “significantly” (22.2% on average) or “slightly better” (65.1% on average) than China’s. In Indonesia, 69.5% agree that Chinese infrastructure falls short of international standards, while 29.5% feel there is no significant difference. Vietnamese respondents are comparatively less critical, with 54.6% rating other countries’ projects as better and 39.6% considering them on par with China’s. This suggests that lived experience with the projects themselves – such as comfort, speed, or convenience – forms only one dimension of perception. Evaluations of Chinese infrastructure quality are also shaped by broader considerations, including social and environmental impacts, financial cost, and possibly a lingering scepticism towards “Made in/by China” products.

In terms of partner preferences, 86.0% of Cambodian and 77.6% of Laotian respondents favour engaging countries other than China for large infrastructure (Figure 14). This does not necessarily signal a rejection of Chinese involvement but arguably reflects a desire for diversification to secure better outcomes and maintain strategic autonomy. In comparison, only 46.6% of Indonesians prefer non-Chinese alternatives, despite a majority perceiving Chinese projects as lower quality. Vietnamese respondents do not overwhelmingly rate Chinese infrastructure as inferior to other partners, yet 79.7% still favour engagement with other partners (Figure 14). These seemingly contradictory patterns suggest that factors beyond technical quality – including strategic, financial, and political considerations – play a role in shaping infrastructure partner preferences. 

Among respondents who prefer their country to engage with alternative partners, Japan is the most favoured (Figure 15). Japan is selected by over half of respondents across all countries, except Laos, where it remains the most favoured partner but with a lower vote share (34.3%). When explaining their preference, respondents highlight the perceived higher quality of Japanese-built infrastructure and, in several cases, prior positive experiences collaborating with Japanese partners. Beyond quality, respondents also cite greater transparency, fiscal responsibility, and security as reasons for preferring Japan – perceiving less risk of foreign interference or strategic dependency with Tokyo compared to Beijing.

The US is generally the second-most-preferred partner, followed by a split between the EU (Indonesia and Vietnam) and international financial institutions (Laos and Cambodia). Preference for the US and EU is often linked to perceptions of higher quality, strong track records of engagement, and lower perceived fiscal risks. Respondents favouring the EU also emphasise transparency, reduced risk of overreliance, and limited foreign interference. These preferences persist despite the US and European countries being scarcely involved in building transport infrastructure in the region, highlighting the role of soft power and reputation in shaping partner choices.

CONCLUSION

This survey reveals nuanced perceptions of Chinese-built infrastructure in Southeast Asia, reflecting both the tangible benefits of these projects and broader considerations shaping regional views of China as an infrastructure development partner. Respondents generally rate the quality, convenience, and practical benefits of Chinese-built transport infrastructure positively, suggesting that good-quality projects aligned with local needs can improve perceptions of China, particularly where alternatives are limited.

Yet, favourable experiences do not automatically translate into unqualified support for future engagement with Beijing. Perceptions are influenced simultaneously by factors such as debt exposure, environmental impacts, and inadequate social safeguards. In Vietnam, historical grievances and the South China Sea disputes further limit the effectiveness of China’s infrastructure building in generating soft power among the local population.

Direct users’ perceptions, shaped by their lived experiences, mirror well-documented challenges associated with BRI projects. For instance, concerns about debt exposure are particularly pronounced in Laos, where fiscal pressures have led to asset concessions to Chinese creditors. Similarly, apprehensions over environmental and social impacts reflect documented construction-phase disruptions and insufficient compensation for displaced communities.

Country-specific perceptions of Chinese-built infrastructure are shaped by bilateral security considerations and the availability of alternative partners. In Cambodia and Laos – which have limited financing options and do not view China as a conventional security threat – positive perceptions of China are pronounced. Indonesia and Vietnam exhibit more measured attitudes, reflecting their greater access to alternative partners, alongside their security concerns about China, e.g. in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, preferences for the US or European partners – despite their limited involvement in financing the region’s transport infrastructure – suggest the enduring influence of reputation, governance standards, and perceived fiscal prudence in shaping partner preferences.

Crucially, the survey suggests that China must address concerns about fiscal sustainability, environmental stewardship, and social equity to translate infrastructure building into sustained influence. Beijing should also work closely with regional governments to ensure integration of Chinese-built projects with existing transport networks and local economic planning for long-term project viability. Lessons from competitors are also instructive: Southeast Asians value transparency and reliability, as demonstrated by their preferences for Japan, the US, and the EU. Incorporating these elements will improve China’s standing as a credible infrastructure partner in the region.

Although China’s BRI 2.0 has shifted to prioritise “small and beautiful” green and digital projects, Beijing remains a major force in regional infrastructure development. Plans are underway to expand the Pan-Asian railway network connecting Kunming to Singapore, with Thailand’s high-speed rail slated to connect to the LCHR by 2030, WHOOSH extending eastward to Banyuwangi and Surabaya in Indonesia, and two new intermodal railways linking northern Vietnam to China, alongside the Techo International Airport in Phnom Penh, which opened in late 2025. Drawing on the experiences of past projects, the success of China’s future infrastructure projects will depend not only on its engineering prowess but also on responsiveness to local perceptions, fiscal prudence, and social and environmental considerations. This will ultimately shape China’s long-term credibility and influence in the region.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2026/33 published on 6 May 2026. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.