To Lam’s Visit to China: Charting a ‘New Era’ in Sino-Vietnam Ties

General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) To Lam’s four-day state visit to China from 14–17 April 2026 is the most important diplomatic development in bilateral ties this year. The trip produced 32 cooperation agreements and a joint statement on deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the new era. For To Lam, stronger strategic ties with China provide the capital, technology, and models to realise his ambitious vision of national rise amid mounting global uncertainty.

On the eve of his visit, To Lam penned an article in China’s People’s Daily, calling for greater “strategic connectivity” between the two countries and deeper connections across development strategies, economic corridors, supply chains, and infrastructure. He also identified science, technology, innovation, and digital transformation as the new foci of bilateral cooperation. These areas form the heart of Vietnam’s growth strategy as the country seeks to move up the value chain and become a high-income nation by 2045.

To Lam’s call for “strategic connectivity” found its most concrete expression in railway cooperation, which was the centrepiece of his China visit. On the second day of the trip, he boarded a Fuxing high-speed train for a ten-hour journey from Beijing to Nanning — a choreographed demonstration of the technology he wishes to replicate in Vietnam. Some of the agreements signed during his visit dealt directly with rail connectivity. Notably, China formally handed over the completed feasibility study report for the USD8.4 billion Lao Cai–Hanoi–Hai Phong standard-gauge railway. There were also agreements covering railway training, cross-border technical assistance, and the planning of the Lang Son–Hanoi and Mong Cai–Ha Long–Hai Phong lines.

During the visit, To Lam also called for greater cooperation on “strategic technologies”, such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology and semiconductors. The joint statement detailed plans for enhanced cooperation on the research and implementation of 5G, big data, and AI technologies. To Lam further signalled Vietnam’s openness to Chinese technological ecosystems by touring the China–ASEAN Artificial Intelligence Application Cooperation Centre in Guangxi. At the event, he tested AI real-time translation glasses.

However, Vietnam’s warming ties with China should not be read as a reaction to American actions. It is more about what China can offer that the US and other Western partners cannot.

To Lam also sought to deepen security cooperation with China. The bilateral joint statement institutionalised the China–Vietnam “3+3” strategic dialogue: a ministerial-level mechanism linking the foreign, defence, and public security ministries of both countries. The dialogue first convened in March 2026 and is unprecedented in Vietnam’s foreign policy. It reflects the CPV’s recent elevation of diplomacy to a “core and regular task” on par with national defence and public security. The decision allows To Lam to deploy foreign policy as a direct instrument of national development, mobilising external resources in service of his domestic growth agenda.

Both countries also pledged to share intelligence and experience in countering external interference, separatism, colour revolutions (Western-backed uprisings aimed at toppling communist governments), and the influence of hostile forces. A ministerial hotline between the two public security ministries — the first of its kind in any of Vietnam’s bilateral relationships — was also established.

The deepening of strategic ties with China comes after Vietnam’s relations with the US ran into turbulence over the past year. In April 2025, the Trump administration announced sweeping “Liberation Day” tariffs, hitting Vietnam with a 46 per cent rate. A provisional framework deal eventually capped the levy at 20 per cent, but a 40 per cent rate on transshipped goods remained. On 15 April this year — the very day To Lam met with Xi Jinping in Beijing — the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry refuted the US Trade Representative’s recent allegations of overcapacity and forced labour in Vietnam.

However, Vietnam’s warming ties with China should not be read as a reaction to American actions. It is more about what China can offer that the US and other Western partners cannot. China is the leading power in railway technology and offers the most cost-effective option for Vietnam’s infrastructure ambitions. Having already secured rail projects in Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, China anchors an emerging pan-Asian connectivity network. Vietnam risks being progressively isolated from this network if its northern corridors are not plugged into China’s railway system.

Vietnam’s embrace of Chinese 5G and AI is driven by more than just cost competitiveness. Chinese technology comes paired with training programmes and intelligence-sharing arrangements that equip the CPV with tools to uphold regime security. Moreover, China offers a model of governance that aligns with To Lam’s vision of technology-driven growth and the CPV’s imperatives of sustaining one-party rule amid rapid digital transformation.

Deepening economic and security ties with China, however, come with vulnerabilities. Around 82 per cent of Vietnamese respondents in the 2026 State of Southeast Asia Survey expressed anxiety about China’s economic influence on their country. Greater economic linkages bring practical gains, but they also give Beijing additional leverage over Hanoi that could be used as a pressure point when interests diverge. Growing reliance on Chinese technological ecosystems creates cybersecurity vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a South China Sea confrontation. This will also complicate Vietnam’s relations with the US and the EU, which have warned Vietnam against the risks of Chinese involvement in Vietnam’s 5G network.

To Lam now wields consolidated power as party chief and state president. For him, the challenge is to navigate these competing dynamics and preserve Vietnam’s strategic autonomy in the ‘new era’ of Vietnam-China relations.

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