Havana in the Crossfire, Hanoi in a Bind

The Trump administration’s indictment of former Cuban president Raúl Castro and sanctions on his successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, suggest that Washington now views regime change in Havana as a viable policy option. This adds to Cuba’s mounting woes. The fall of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro in January cut off the subsidised oil that had long sustained the island, leaving Cuba in its worst socio-economic crisis since the 1990s.

For most countries, this is a distant problem. For Vietnam, it is a test of friendship, resolve and foreign policy judgment. Hanoi and Havana have been close allies for six decades, bound by shared struggle against imperialism, ideological affinity and genuine camaraderie. Cuba’s predicament presents Vietnam with a difficult dilemma: how to support a longstanding comrade without jeopardising the vital partnership it has painstakingly built with Washington.

For most of those six decades, supporting Cuba came at little cost for Vietnam. Havana’s troubles were chronic rather than existential, US pressure was intermittent and symbolic gestures – whether a UN vote or a shipment of rice – were enough to sustain the friendship. However, Maduro’s fall and the US’ ensuing squeeze on Cuba have changed that calculus. Washington is applying escalating, targeted pressure associated with regime-change efforts. The question Hanoi has long avoided – how much it is willing to sacrifice for Cuba when real costs are involved – can no longer be deferred.

The close Vietnam-Cuba relationship rests not only on their shared political ideology but also on history. In September 1973, Fidel Castro visited the war-ravaged frontline Quang Tri Province and famously declared, “For Vietnam, Cuba is willing to shed its blood”. It was not an empty gesture. Cuba helped rebuild Vietnam, constructing, among other things, a major hotel in Hanoi and a hospital in Quang Binh, contributions of real significance to a country emerging from war.

Hanoi has repaid the debt in kind. Vietnam is now the largest Asian investor in Cuba, with seven active projects and committed capital above US$160 million. Rice remains the spine of the friendship: tens of thousands of tons have gone to Cuba as aid over the past decade alone, including 11,500 tons after President To Lam’s visit in 2024. At the UN, Vietnam has voted every year to call for an end to the American embargo, as it did again last October.

The affection is not merely official. Last year, a Vietnam Red Cross Society appeal marking 65 years of ties raised about US$23 million for Cuba in 65 days, nine times its target, from two million small donations.

That record is precisely what now makes Hanoi uncomfortable. Few expect American boots in Havana tomorrow, but a path that runs from embargo, to the indictment of a former leader, to sanctions on the sitting president leaves little room for optimism about what comes next, for Cuba and those who stand with it.

Hanoi will do what it can to prevent that outcome, through aid, investment, diplomatic support and the power of example.

The case for caution is straightforward. Vietnam upgraded its relations with the US to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023 and is now engaged in sensitive trade negotiations to ease tariffs that threaten its export-driven economy. Picking a public fight with the Trump administration over Cuba would be risky; Hanoi has no desire to become collateral damage.

Yet quietly distancing itself from Cuba would carry different costs. Solidarity with a small circle of ideological partners, foremost among them Cuba, has long been a hallmark of Vietnamese foreign policy and a signal of its reliability to foreign partners. Allowing one of those relationships to be undermined by external pressure without protest would weaken that message.

The domestic political cost could be greater still. There is a depth of public sympathy for Cuba, especially among older Vietnamese. The relationship remains a touchstone for party conservatives, who see solidarity with Havana as evidence that Đổi Mới never severed Vietnam from its ideological roots.

Vietnam’s instinct will be to preserve the rhetoric of solidarity while avoiding costly commitments in Cuba’s defence, but that balancing act is becoming harder. Last October’s UN resolution against the US embargo passed by 165–7 (with 12 abstentions), down sharply from 187–2 (with one abstention) a year earlier. The diplomatic shelter Vietnam has long enjoyed is shrinking; Washington is working to shrink it further.

A more constructive role is available. As one of the few countries that enjoys goodwill in both Havana and Washington, Vietnam could serve as an intermediary should the two sides move toward dialogue. Such a role would cost little while supporting a stable, non-violent outcome.

The longer game matters more. The most valuable thing Vietnam can offer Cuba is not rice but an example. Both countries were stranded by the collapse of the former Soviet Union, yet their paths diverged dramatically. Vietnam transformed a bankrupt command economy into one of the developing world’s great success stories, while Havana clung to the old model. The political dimension is equally instructive. Vietnam once fought wars against both the US and China, leaving those relationships in rubble. Through an open mindset, diplomacy and meaningful economic reforms, it converted both adversaries into indispensable partners. Cuba absorbed the rhetoric of the Vietnamese example without absorbing the substance, deepening its isolation rather than dismantling it.

Hanoi has begun, cautiously, to make this case. Vietnamese leaders offer the lessons of reform to their Cuban counterparts in nearly every exchange, while Vietnamese firms continue investing in Cuba despite significant risks and modest returns. This is where Vietnam’s influence is best spent: encouraging reform and opening before crisis forces a more disruptive transition.

In the worst-case scenario of Cuban regime collapse, Vietnam would lose one of its most enduring diplomatic friendships. Hanoi will do what it can to prevent that outcome, through aid, investment, diplomatic support and the power of example. Ultimately, however, the decisive choices lie in Havana. Vietnam has shown that a socialist state can reform, open up and prosper without sacrificing political stability. The model exists; Cuba must decide whether to follow.

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