The Funan Techo Canal: Treading New Waters, Stirring Old Ripples

The Funan Techo Canal project has emerged as a new controversy in the love-hate relationship between Cambodia and Vietnam, with China lurking in the background as the former’s patron.

The ambitious project, to be funded and built by the state-owned China Bridge and Road Corporation, will connect the Mekong River with the coastal province of Kep through a 180-km channel. It is envisioned to enhance Cambodia’s waterway connectivity by forging a direct route from Phnom Penh to the Cambodian coast, thereby reducing its current reliance on Vietnamese ports for international shipping. Projections suggest that the canal could potentially slash Cambodia’s shipping through Vietnam by 70 per cent and generate US$88 million in annual transportation earnings. This could reach US$570 million by 2050. It is also anticipated to inject economic vitality into economic zones along the canal’s path.

Beneath the veneer of the canal’s economic promise, there are deep layers of historical sensitivities in Cambodia-Vietnam ties, which continually simmer below the surface of their “special relationship”. In a sense, the canal embodies the Cambodian confidence in their country’s present renaissance and grievances over their past. Its name evokes the ancient Funan kingdom in the 1^st-6^th century CE, harkening back to a time when the Khmer people flourished and built their empire in the Mekong Delta before parts of their domain gave way to the Viet southward expansion and Siamese encroachment.

Prime Minister Hun Manet’s description of having the canal as “breathing through our own nose” encapsulates Cambodia’s aspiration of strategic autonomy from Hanoi. As he takes over the premiership from his father, Hun Manet’s quest for legitimacy has been symbolised through the canal project, in which his government promises not only economic benefits but also evokes a “nationalist spirit” among Cambodian people. He highlighted the widespread support among Cambodians for the project as “a huge force of nationalism”, asserting that this is “a national right of Cambodia” and essential for “the Kingdom’s independence”. Additionally, he questioned what he perceives as unfair treatment of Cambodia by foreign entities, who he claimed “wanted to interrogate us” despite other countries along the Mekong undertaking similar projects. His father, Hun Sen, was even more blunt: “Cambodia is not more inferior than Vietnam”, and “Cambodia knows how to protect its interests; Vietnam does not need to care.”

This nationalistic rhetoric, whether intentionally or incidentally, has ignited anti-Vietnam feelings within the Cambodian society. As a matter of fact, a big part of Cambodian nationalism, and also irredentism, is driven by a collective memory of the Khmer people’s perceived historical injustices at the hands of their larger neighbours. Anti-Vietnamese sentiments have long been a political tool of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party. It appears that the ruling Cambodian People’s Party has also selectively leveraged these sentiments to bolster its legitimacy, as seen through the canal project.

As for the Vietnamese, the project has sparked public and expert concerns over the risk of water diversion from the Mekong, not only for the canal’s transportation purposes but also for irrigation in Cambodia’s agricultural lands. This would potentially exacerbate the already serious conditions of drought and salinisation in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, jeopardising its economic well-being. Public responses, as observed from comments on official and social media platforms, are varied. Many seek additional information from Cambodia on the project’s environmental impact, especially how Cambodia will use the water resources from the canal. Some realistically acknowledge that there is little Vietnam can do to alter the course of the canal, given Cambodia’s sovereignty over the project. Other Vietnamese emphasise the imperative for their government to prioritise adaptation strategies to ensure the delta’s water security.

Beyond these pragmatic considerations, the project has triggered a profound sense of betrayal among the Vietnamese, who genuinely believe in their country’s historical role in “liberating” Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal regime. Now, some feel that Cambodia’s pursuit of the canal project represents a disregard for Vietnam’s past assistance. Yet, Cambodian public opinion on Vietnam’s past involvement in the country remains highly divisive. The canal project once again brings to the fore the complexities of Cambodian views on Vietnam, jolting Hanoi from its strategic complacency regarding its influence in the neighbouring country.

Of note, the Vietnamese government has thus far been measured in its response. It has expressed “much interest” rather than downright “concerns” and has even moderated expert and media portrayals of the canal’s catastrophic environmental impact. Hanoi has opted for quiet diplomacy, while Phnom Penh has chosen a different approach. Cambodian leaders have engaged in megaphone diplomacy to demonstrate its defiance, declaring that it has no obligation to provide further information or consult with other countries on the project, despite the spirit and letter of the 1995 Mekong Agreement advising otherwise. Rather than stoking nationalism, Cambodia would better serve its interests, which necessarily rest on a constructive relationship with Vietnam, by ensuring greater transparency. Both countries’ legitimate interests related to the project need not be framed as a zero-sum game.

The canal rekindles historical memories of China’s strategy of “siding with smaller neighbouring states in order to constrain Vietnam’s growing geopolitical ambitions”, a policy with its roots tracing back to the Ming dynasty’s support for the Champa against Dai Viet’s southward conquest in the 15th century.

Cambodia’s defiance reflects its newfound confidence, which has been bolstered significantly by China’s outsized role in its economic development. Coming in the wake of the many dams built by Chinese companies in upstream Mekong countries, the canal is yet another reminder of Beijing’s long shadow over the future of Vietnam. Such a shadow comes from all directions: from the North where they share a land border, to the East where Chinese encroachments in Vietnamese waters have become a daily incurrence, and now from the West and Southwest where Laos and Cambodia are increasingly coming under China’s sway.

The canal rekindles historical memories of China’s strategy of “siding with smaller neighbouring states in order to constrain Vietnam’s growing geopolitical ambitions”, a policy with its roots tracing back to the Ming dynasty’s support for the Champa against Dai Viet’s southward conquest in the 15^th century. More recently, China supported the Khmer Rouge during the Cambodia-Vietnam border war in 1978. Today, China does not need to sail warships down the Mekong to constrain Vietnam’s strategic space; its Belt and Road Initiative mega-projects have already remapped landscapes, redefined connectivity, and upended regional power dynamics to Vietnam’s disadvantage. A “community of shared future” Beijing pledges with both Vietnam and Cambodia may turn out to be less of a “win-win” for all parties than it portrays.

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