The Philippines and West Philippine Sea: Bringing Deterrence Into the Picture

The securing of strategic interests needs to be done through a higher order of preparation. Despite many challenges, the Philippines maintains its constitutionally enshrined policy of renouncing war as its instrument in its national policy. Since Manila rightfully won its 2016 Arbitral Award in the South China Sea, there should be less of a case for war with China. The strategic space for discussing responses is growing small externally and internally. Beijing’s threat of normalising provocations in recent years leaves the Philippines, and other claimant states, no room for error in its encounters at sea; and any discussion of “war” as a legitimate strategic exercise invokes a sense of dread among policymakers.

The chief concern is whether Manila should push back. Its strategic imperatives need to be developed in a manner consistent with domestic and international laws and the defence of the country’s national interests. How can Manila push its strategic objectives while assuring that it will not provoke open conflict? The key is deterrence.

In late March 2024, the Marcos Jr. administration announced that it would be implementing responses that are “proportionate, deliberate, and reasonable”. This pronouncement sets an important precedent in Philippine foreign policy. This shows that the Philippines remains committed to meeting China on equal footing to ensure a two-fold objective: that conflict does not escalate into full-blown war and to show Beijing that Manila is serious with its concerns at sea.

These objectives beget new questions: Is the Philippines strategically prepared to meet China head-on? How can deterrence be sustained? The Philippines’ introspection must look at policy, operation, and diplomacy. In the interim, the current administration has adopted non-violent strategies to counter Chinese aggression. This is the most prudent approach until the nation has fortified itself with adequate maritime domain capabilities.

Policy-wise, foundational to maritime defence is the Maritime Zones Bill, just one step away from becoming law. This law, following UNCLOS standards, will define the Philippines’ maritime boundaries and legal authority within them. Delaying this critical bill risks upending Manila’s deterrence strategy in the long run. The law will bolster other pending bills such as the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Bill and the Blue Economy Bill, and defence strategies such as National Security Policy and Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept. Consequential to defence posturing is the recently signed New Government Procurement Act (RA 12009), a revamped and modern mechanism for important and time-critical procurements, including defence and security needs. Policy momentum for all these initiatives needs to be sustained.

The Maritime Zones Bill will provide much-needed clarity and certainty regarding the bounds of the Philippine maritime domain, and its rights and obligations as outlined in UNCLOS and other pertinent international legal frameworks. The bill will enable the Philippines to not only confidently practise its jurisdiction over its maritime area but hold those who violate it accountable. Furthermore, the bill will complement future maritime legislation like the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Bill and the Blue Economy Bill. The former will establish rights and measures for foreign ships and aircraft navigating Philippine archipelagic sea lanes, while the latter will enhance the country’s ability to sustainably manage and protect its marine resources. Together, these policies will enhance deterrence.

Thinking about and preparing for deterrence does not take away from the Philippines’ nature as a peace-loving nation. Rather, Manila stresses the need to express in unequivocal terms its willingness to employ commensurate measures that resist aggression.

All these will complement and bolster active initiatives already in place, such as the measured transparency strategy, which has raised awareness among Filipinos about China’s activities in Philippine waters, and the military’s realigned modernisation programme (including that of the Philippine Coast Guard). It is important for these strategies to continue in light of the recent agreement with China to mitigate maritime confrontations. Although mutual solutions were reached by Manila and Beijing during the 9th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism, both sides still express “significant differences”.

Manila needs to deter not only in words but in actions. Operations-wise, the development of rules of engagement (ROE) with allies and partners, specifically to deal with the sporadic Chinese incursions in the interim, will be critical. A prime example in need of ROE is the BRP Sierra Madre, which continues to stand against China’s expansionist ambitions in the West Philippine Sea. The improvement and rehabilitation of the vessel will require a comprehensive ROE for all likely circumstances and the window to do so grows narrower.

Diplomacy-wise, the Philippines must also be proactive with parties it wants to be involved with and be prepared to take the lead, backing its non-negotiables with a strong network of defence tie-ups. The US-Philippines alliance, on the one hand, is steadily growing. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s recent visit to the Philippines with US$500 million in foreign military financing critical to Manila’s defence modernisation is the most important and ambitious support scheme. With the 2+2 meeting between Washington’s and Manila’s foreign and defence ministers in July, a candid exchange on deterrence must be developed for BRP Sierra Madre in the coming months.

On the other hand, the Philippines recently signed an MOU on defence cooperation with Singapore, the latest in a continuing trend of defence tie-ups after Canada and the UK. Japan signed an access agreement with the Philippines. France is in the process of negotiating one. These partnerships help expand the Philippines’ deterrence umbrella, affording it an additional window to prepare and strengthen its capabilities.

Developing a deterrence strategy, however, impacts measured transparency as a preferred policy option. Although largely helpful in the short to medium term, this should take a backseat. The saturation of transparency takes away from its effectiveness and only galvanises a bully to push back more. After all, bilateral ties with China are also a factor in the Philippines’ strategy. This policy tool must be leveraged in a manner that brings China back to the negotiating table, not away from it.

Thinking about and preparing for deterrence does not take away from the Philippines’ nature as a peace-loving nation. Rather, Manila stresses the need to express in unequivocal terms its willingness to employ commensurate measures that resist aggression. Deterrence, therefore, must be foremost in Manila’s West Philippine Sea policy. The corroding BRP Sierra Madre is admittedly a ticking time bomb — if China is preparing for the long term, so should the Philippines, and it must be a national interest to deter. If the Philippines indeed wants to achieve its long-term strategic goals in the West Philippine Sea, it will need to start thinking big picture with a vision of victory. There is no better place to start than with deterrence.

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