Why the Upcoming Bangsamoro Parliamentary Elections Matter

Established under the 2018 Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) following decades of armed struggle, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) represents a landmark and high-stakes experiment in regional self-determination. After several postponements, the upcoming Bangsamoro parliamentary elections on 14 September cannot be reduced to a routine administrative exercise. These elections mark an indispensable phase in fulfilling the promise of the Mindanao peace process given the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The decades-long Moro conflict is rooted in the dispossession and political marginalisation of the Bangsamoro under colonial rule at a cost of well over 100,000 lives and millions displaced. The success of the political settlement that established BARMM is a test of whether the Philippine state can deliver on a peace deal that traded arms for genuine self-rule with the goal of lasting peace in the conflict-ridden region. 

In a post-conflict arena like BARMM, the current political conditions warrant the necessity of undertaking a more complex approach that recognises the challenges posed by a set of ingrained problems: political conflict, economic underdevelopment, social exclusion and  historical grievances. Moving away from idealist, top-down liberal peacebuilding models, a more appropriate approach in effectively governing BARMM is one that acknowledges that peace settlements rarely spawn instantaneous, mature, inclusive and democratic arrangements. Instead, this perspective view institutions as complex arenas where former insurgent forces like the MILF, deeply entrenched traditional family dynasties and central state agencies coexist. As a political institution, BARMM’s parliamentary elections can only endure if emerging political parties, reform-minded leaders and traditional elites engage in a deliberative process of constant re-negotiation and coalition-building to construct genuinely inclusive, party-based democratic structures.

The 14 September polls serve as the litmus test for this hybrid local political order. It will mark the official end of the interim transition under the government-appointed Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) and give birth to the region’s first directly elected parliamentary system. The stakes go beyond simply filling 80 parliamentary seats.

First, the vote is a vital mechanism for generating democratic legitimacy and addressing acute “transition fatigue”. The region has seen repeated electoral deferments since 2022. This was prompted by Covid-19 pandemic disruptions, redistricting hurdles and a Supreme Court’s controversial decision that severed the Sulu region from BARMM. The delays have severely eroded public trust, reinforcing popular suspicions that regional autonomy remained tethered to the national government’s political interference. Transferring authority to an elected legislature is the only way to give power to Bangsamoro’s electorate.

Second, the election puts the region’s ambitious institutional design to an actual test. While reserving 40 seats for regional party lists aims to foster principled and platform-driven politics, the 32 single-member district seats remain dangerously exposed to traditional clan patronage, localised feuds (“rido”) and command-vote networks. The remaining eight seats comprise representatives from various sectors such as indigenous peoples, women and youth (who will also be on the ballot).

Finally, the process lays bare severe internal political fractures within BARMM. Most critically, it exposes a formal schism within the MILF itself, placing Chairman Ahod “Al-Haj Murad” Ebrahim’s United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) in direct competition with rival factions as well as formidable, entrenched clan alliances such as the BARMM Grand Coalition. This reveals the internal differences within the former armed movement that is transitioning toward a political party that seeks to govern BARMM.

Winning the peace is one thing, governing BARMM’s post-conflict environment is a totally different matter.

This electoral contest is being waged before an electorate that is not yet certain how the new system works. For instance,  a survey by the Institute of Autonomy and Governance reveals that nearly half of likely voters remain unfamiliar with the mechanics of the mixed parliamentary ballot composed of district, party and sectoral candidates. Moreover, voters’ confusion is compounded by heightened security risks across the region.

Aggravated by pervasive poverty (the BARMM region has one of the lowest human development scores in the country) and persistent localised threats, ranging from violent extremism to volatile clan feuds, the severe information gap could undermine voter turnout and electoral integrity. Since no single political entity is expected to command an absolute majority in the legislature, the prospects for post-BTA governance hinge on cross-factional coalition building. The long-term viability of a peace process guided by democratic principles in the BARMM will depend entirely on whether progressive reformers, civil society representatives, clan leaders, and former revolutionary figures can move past patronage politics to construct stable and policy-oriented alliances.

Overcoming the electoral hurdle implies that the elected Parliament will have to confront BARMM’s political challenges. Winning the peace is one thing, governing BARMM’s post-conflict environment is a totally different matter. The political transition has proven a far more complex political process, presenting the incoming Parliament with acute structural challenges. At the forefront are severe revenue shortfalls as well as pending legislation inherited from the BTA. The regional Revenue Code has yet to be passed, keeping BARMM heavily reliant on central block grants from Manila, while foundational social policies on gender equality, for example, have yet to be implemented.

The 14 September polls do not constitute the endpoint of the peace process. Transforming a peace agreement into durable regional autonomous governance requires sustained commitments that extend far beyond the MILF-led transition. The national government has to fulfil its socioeconomic promises under the normalisation track of the CAB. Stalled socioeconomic packages for decommissioned combatants, delayed camp transformations and the non-passage of the national Transitional Justice and Reconciliation (TJR) bill in Congress will jeopardise long-term regional stability, leaving former fighters dangerously vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist networks.

Delivering on these national commitments also holds immense strategic value for the country’s security posture. Ensuring a stable and peaceful BARMM would help to free the military from prolonged domestic counter-insurgency operations, enabling national security planning to reorient toward external territorial defence.

International stakeholders and development partners, such as ASEAN, Australia and Japan, play a crucial role in assisting this crucial phase in BARMM’s political journey toward lasting peace. Beyond the upcoming polls, international support should remain focused on strengthening local election monitoring, backing grassroots early-warning response mechanisms and funding targeted civic education. This support should also facilitate community-level conflict resolution and women-led community mediation networks.

As a whole, the crucial test of BARMM’s post-election order is not merely whether 14 September passes peacefully. It is whether the newly elected Parliament can nurture a political system where Bangsamoro citizens resolve their competing interests through democratic institutions and party politics, rather than a previous political order defined by gun, goons and gold.

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