The “Karenni Model”: Wartime Governance in Contested Territory

INTRODUCTION

Over the past five years, following the military coup, the Myanmar military regime in Naypyidaw pursued highly centralised, security-driven state consolidation in regime-controlled areas while conflict-ridden territories were left with poor or no public services. During those years, and as a response to governance gaps, territorial self-governance emerged as an inclusive and decentralised form of governance in Karenni (Kayah) State. Karenni State is the smallest in terms of territorial area and population. It has areas where Naypyidaw’s authority is contested, areas of mixed control, and resistance-held areas. Three state-level administrative systems govern and administer different parts of Karenni State: the military’s state administration, and two resistance administrations, namely the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) government, and a post-coup coalition-based administration led by the Interim Executive Council (IEC).

The successful setup of a coalition-based administration, serving as the Karenni Territorial Self Governance (TSG) for the region, boosted Karenni’s governance profile in the post-coup period. This arrangement was initiated in early 2021. Various political groups and existing and new armed groups, as many as seven, decided to work together as the Karenni Nationalities’ Defence Force (KNDF), to fight the military and to establish governing mechanisms, particularly the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) shortly after the 2021 military coup, and the Interim Executive Council (IEC) in late 2023. Strong coordination among resistance actors, state-building initiatives with federal inspiration, and relative territorial control made domestic and international donors, humanitarian agencies, diplomats, policy institutions, civil society organisations, and rights activists view the Karenni State’s TSG, particularly IEC, as a potential governance model for Myanmar’s federal and democratic future.

Despite the early optimism about the “Karenni Model,” Karenni governance today faces more sophisticated challenges. In a conflict-affected territory where nearly three-quarters of the population are displaced, shortages in international funding after the collapse of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and continued armed offensives by the military raise questions about the sustainability of the inclusive governance model. Meanwhile, the military-backed new administration in Naypyitaw has attempted to regain international legitimacy by creating perceptions of governability. This may risk realigning neighbouring countries’ attention toward Naypyidaw’s formal state institutions. Contested areas hold large populations, and these practice different forms of territorial self-governance. Drawing on the Karenni experience, this article raises the broader question of how wartime governance emerges and remains sustainable amid intensified conflict, fragmented political orders, and uneven international engagement.

This article posits that the sustainability of wartime governance depends not only on institutions and legitimacy-building but also on minimum levels of territorial security and conflict de-escalation.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KARENNI SELF-GOVERNANCE

Although the Karenni TSG is better known in the post-coup period, the region has a long history of armed resistance, local political mobilisation, and alternative governance structures. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), established in 1957 and one of the oldest parties in Myanmar, was arguably known for its greater legitimacy among the Karenni people. It has an armed wing, the Karenni Army (KA), and has been maintaining a parallel administrative system—in effect, a Karenni government.

With KNPP’s chairman serving as the prime minister, the KNPP government has been operating with six departments in parts of Kayah State since 1986. At the same time, the region also hosts other armed actors, including the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) and splinter groups from the KNPP. The Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), which split from the KNPP in 1978, was known for maintaining a ceasefire with the military before 2021. Other splinter groups, such as the Karenni National Peace and Development Party (KNPDP) and Karenni National Solidarity Organisation (KNSO), maintain limited territorial influence.

Political coalition and institutions for governance

The 2021 military coup marked a significant turning point in Karenni’s political and security landscape. In the aftermath of the coup and the military’s violent crackdown on anti-coup protests, a diverse range of actors—including the KNPP, its former splinter group the KNPLF, newly formed resistance forces, elected representatives from the 2020 election, youth and women’s organisations, and civil society networks—began working together.

Despite achievements in institution-building and local administration, the overall effectiveness of Karenni’s governance system remains heavily dependent on battlefield developments and security threats posed by the military.

In April 2021, the Karenni State Consultative Council (KSCC) was formed to oversee political, military, and governance affairs. Around the same time, the military coalition, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), emerged from an anti-coup protest committee and was later joined by the powerful KA, the armed wing of the KNPP, and members of the People’s Defence Forces. The cooperation later gave rise to checks and balances and governing institutions. The formation of the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) in 2023 has further strengthened Karenni political cooperation and governance within international donor communities.

The IEC sought to move beyond armed resistance by developing interim administrative systems, public service provision, and local governance structures in resistance-controlled territories. Ranging from home affairs and education to humanitarian affairs, seven line departments were initially established in 2023. These later expanded to cover agriculture, trade, and construction. Although the defence line department was established in 2025, there are pending tasks related to the merger of all revolutionary forces into a single army. As of March 2026, there were 12 line departments under IEC.

In a region with a long-established alternative governance system, the emergence of the IEC in the post-coup period was not intended to replace existing mechanisms but to expand the institutional foundation developed by the KNPP government. Senior KNPP leaders became key members of the new executive, taking leadership and key administrative positions. For instance, the KNPP Chair, Khu Oo Reh, assumed the IEC Chair, with the KNDF Chair, Khun Bedu, serving as Vice Chair. This overlap in positions between old and new institutions has allowed the IEC to draw on the local legitimacy and experience the KNPP has built over decades, while simultaneously presenting itself as a more inclusive body that represents multiple stakeholders within the Karenni resistance movement.

In addition, actors ranging from elected politicians, civil society representatives, and NGO practitioners to former civil servants who joined the Civil Disobedience Movement after the 2021 coup, were also appointed to the IEC. Several deputy department heads are CDM participants, and the Karenni State Police was largely established by CDM police officers. These appointments reflect a broader effort to build an inclusive wartime governance system that extends beyond the KNPP’s traditional structures.

Healthcare and education were reportedly two significant areas in which the wartime government has improved the lives of local populations. Within a year of the IEC’s establishment, the interim executive opened 60 clinics and provided healthcare access to more than 50,000 people, including resistance fighters, pregnant women, and children. As of June 2024, IEC has claimed to have opened colleges and universities specialising in arts and sciences, education, medicine, and nursing, and partnered with hundreds of basic education schools. Nonetheless, providing quality governance has been challenging amid ongoing conflicts and humanitarian impacts in the region.  

An executive backed by multiple armed forces

What made Karenni’s interim governance particularly notable was the absence of a single army for three years after its executive was established. The military coalition is currently organised through the Karenni Military Coordination Committee – Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The established EAOs and the new EAOs work together under the leadership of KSCC and IEC. While Khun Bedu, a former politician and the current IEC vice chairperson, leads the KNDF military coalition as its chairperson, the KA’s commander in chief, General Aung Myat, serves as the KNDF’s commander in chief. In this way, KNDF remains politically influential while maintaining coordination with KA.

Allied resistance forces launched a coordinated military offensive in Karenni State on 11 November 2023, calling it Operation 1111. They achieved an impressive victory and occupied some of the Myanmar military’s strongholds, including areas around the state capital, Loikaw. In hybrid arrangements, the IEC worked with local armed groups and administered the resistance-controlled area, except for KNLP territory. While the KNPP government still functions in the KNPP-controlled area, it overlaps with IEC personnel, making the IEC the forefront of the resistance governance in the region. After Operation 1111, the military administration collapsed across the region, including in Loikaw; the villages surrounding Loikaw came to be controlled by the resistance forces. As the military prepared for the election, it initiated offensives at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026, managing to recapture selected towns, highlighted in green dots on the map in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Territorial Control of Different Armed Groups and Local Administrative Arrangements in Karenni (Kayah) State in 2026

Contested region’s hybrid administration approach

Given the presence of multiple armed actors sharing territorial control, it is imperative for the IEC to develop feasible local administrative arrangements and work with local armed actors to deliver services and collect taxes. Since its establishment in 2023, it has focused on providing education and healthcare services, including mobile clinics. Despite limited foreign donations, it also sub-funded local civil society groups to deliver education and healthcare to local IDPs. In some areas where KNPP control is present, the council delivers services through its administrative mechanisms and KNPP’s institutions. In contested areas, service delivery is carried out through a joint administrative committee (JAC) comprised of IEC/KNPP members, local EAO representatives, and civilian local representatives. The Mese administration is a case in point for such an arrangement. Mese Township is a strategic border location and houses the trade station to Thailand. Prior to the 2021 coup, the KNPLF, a splinter group of the KNPP, was supported by the Myanmar military and had long exerted influence in the region. After the 2021 military coup, the KNPLF decided to work with the IEC and the KNPP to implement governance services in the region. In a seven-person joint administration committee, KNPLF becomes the chair, while KNPP serves as the deputy chair. Given the long-standing mistrust between the KNPP and the KNPLF, which supported the military before the coup, this cooperation arrangement was among the strongest examples of successful coalition-building in Karenni.

The hybrid administration of Mawchi mining town is another example of Karenni’s successful local governance. The case illustrates revenue-sharing and resource-sharing arrangements between local authorities. Prior to the 2021 coup, Mawchi was under the control of the Myanmar military and state administrative institutions, with strong influence from EAOs such as KNSO. As a mineral-rich region that produced tin and tungsten, the town’s territorial control was highly contested. In 2024, resistance groups such as KNPP and KNSO took full control of the region. Although the KNSO did not join resistance groups such as the KNDF and the KNPP in fighting the military, it openly aligned itself with them after April 2024. Since then, the Joint Administration Committee – Mawchi (JAC) has been in place, comprising KNSO (the committee chair), KNPP, and residents nominated by the community. Local JCA collected mining and tax revenue in accordance with the tax policy enacted by the KSCC; the detailed revenue-sharing percentages, especially from strategic locations, are not publicly known. Nonetheless, Mawchi’s mining revenues have critically funded military activities and governance services in Karenni state.

SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS AND THE LIMITS OF WARTIME GOVERNANCE

Karenni resistance governance has become a vital means for people to survive; however, sustained warfare and supply chain disruptions continuously undermine the institution-building and governance coordination efforts that Karenni stakeholders have made over the years.

Continued Conflict as a Major Barrier to Effective Governance

Despite achievements in institution-building and local administration, the overall effectiveness of Karenni’s governance system remains heavily dependent on battlefield developments and security threats posed by the military. Public administration activities and humanitarian operations in the region have also experienced significant setbacks due to the Myanmar military’s offensives and ongoing airstrikes, especially after the 2025/2026 election.

Schools and clinics have had to relocate several times a year due to airstrikes, and this seems to be a big obstacle to providing stable services in the region. This has led some family members to relocate along with schools; others have withdrawn their children from school. Although the majority of territorial control in Karenni State remains with resistance groups, the military’s occupation of parts of the main road makes it extremely difficult for resistance administrators to deliver services. With the military’s recapture of Hpasawng town, its roadblocks on part of the Loikaw–Hpasawng road have lengthened trips for aid workers and cross-border assistance. Moreover, excessive checkpoints and roadblocks along traditional trade routes in Kayah state, including the Loikaw–Hpasawng road, make it difficult for local farmers to obtain essential inputs or sell their produce in markets in time, resulting in significant financial losses.

Humanitarian Challenges amid Aid and Fuel Crises

While 60-80% of the population are IDPs, governance is focused mainly on humanitarian assistance. Since defence spending is critical for the Karenni, it accounted for a significant percentage of the revenue collected. Therefore, it relies on foreign donations to finance the majority of humanitarian work, health care, and education. The sudden withdrawal of USAID came as a significant blow not only to Karenni governance but also to civil society organisations working in the region. IEC claimed that it affected nearly 60% of the CSOs operating in the area, leading to the abrupt shutdowns of humanitarian operations in the regions. Healthcare services operating along the Thai-Myanmar border have been hit most severely.

Recent fuel shortages have increased transportation costs, raised the prices of basic goods, and disrupted water distribution and humanitarian operations. Farmers were also affected, as they were unable to sell their crops across different regions. Despite IEC and local communities’ efforts, the amount of assistance needed is far greater. There have been reports of diarrhoea, vomiting, and skin disease among children; this is due to a shortage of drinking water, a lack of vaccines, a shortage of medicine, and difficult access to maternal healthcare.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: LOOKING BEYOND NAYPYITAW

The Karenni experience highlights a practical dilemma of wartime governance: fragmented political orders. Paradoxically, sustainable wartime governance requires conflict de-escalation and fiscal diversification.

… the new administration in Naypyidaw appears to be signalling to the world that governance normalisation is taking place. This risks obscuring Myanmar’s deeper realities, as large populations, particularly those in need of humanitarian assistance, remain under various forms of territorial self-governance.

The Karenni experience demonstrates that territorial self-governance can be implemented in a contested area by building a range of political institutions, from consultative councils and checks-and-balances mechanisms to local administration, as well as detailed policy coordination with various armed stakeholders. Even so, conflict dynamics on the ground and neighbouring Thailand’s refugee policy will still influence the effectiveness and durability of these governance efforts. In the absence of basic security, institution-building and public service delivery become difficult to sustain and are often reduced to short-term emergency assistance. Therefore, beyond focusing on administrative capacity, resistance actors should also invest in conflict-reduction mechanisms, including civilian protection arrangements and the implementation of informal cross-border humanitarian networks or humanitarian corridors with conflict actors and neighbouring countries such as Thailand. Since 2024, Thailand has explored establishing humanitarian assistance mechanisms in Tak Province for the people displaced by conflict in Myanmar. Although the initiative has been criticised for relying heavily on state-led channels, such as the Myanmar Red Cross Society, Karenni governance actors could benefit from similar arrangements, including the establishment of informal networks involving Thai-based NGOs, international humanitarian organisations, and “humanitarian local civil society groups.” In this way, it would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and basic services to communities, potentially minimising military security risks. In addition, Karenni stakeholders should explore fiscal sustainability, as the current service delivery model relies heavily on foreign aid. In the absence of other fiscal avenues, the sudden donor withdrawal might lead to either excessive resource extraction and mining in the Mawchi area or to taxation. Medium-term governance strategies, therefore, should emphasise expanding cross-border economic activity for agricultural trade and small-scale commerce.

The Karenni’s governing experience highlights that ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC) remains relevant, particularly its priorities for the cessation of violence and for constructive humanitarian access in Myanmar. However, the 5PC’s priority for humanitarian assistance assigns the coordination to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), which provided for the establishment of the AHA Centre, includes a clause on “host country consent” for humanitarian assistance. The authorities in Naypyidaw have stipulated since 2021 that the AHA Centre work with the Myanmar Red Cross Society as its local partner. As such, the AHA Centre’s dealings have mainly been with Naypyidaw as interlocutor. Nonetheless, governance activities in Myanmar are no longer confined solely to Naypyidaw, especially given that non-state actors control nearly 40 per cent of the country’s territory. This suggests that regional and international actors should engage more closely with local actors to deliver humanitarian aid effectively. Nonetheless, some ASEAN member states are concerned that working with non-state actors for humanitarian assistance could be interpreted as granting political legitimacy to groups that challenge the central authority. Regardless of the political sensitivity, broader engagement with local actors is critical for the region at this time; it could not only reduce the scale of regional implications from Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis but also provide an avenue for reducing conflict between armed actors.

In summary, the new administration in Naypyidaw appears to be signalling to the world that governance normalisation is taking place. This risks obscuring Myanmar’s deeper realities, as large populations, particularly those in need of humanitarian assistance, remain under various forms of territorial self-governance. While it is imperative to recognise territorial self-governance and institutional-building efforts by local actors during wartime, the Karenni case demonstrates that these efforts are insufficient to build a sustainable governance system during wartime. Governance would endure if the system invests in reducing conflict pressures and in fiscal alternatives in order to ensure a sustainable governance mechanism.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2026/51 published on 16 July 2026. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.