Why PAS Wants to Avoid Going Solo

As Malaysia heads toward the 16^th General Election, the strategies employed by the Islamist party Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) bear closer scrutiny. PAS emerged as the biggest winner at the 2022 General Election. It secured 43 parliamentary seats, more than doubling its 18 seats from the 2018 General Election. PAS has made inroads into states such as Melaka, Selangor, Pahang and Perak, and is expanding beyond its traditional strongholds in the north and the east coast. Through its vehicle Perikatan Nasional (PN), PAS has, since the 2023 state elections, held overwhelming majorities in Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu.

The fact remains that PAS has fared better electorally when it operated as part of a coalition, in which other parties complemented its strengths and shored up its weaknesses. This is likely to be the PAS strategy going into the next election. Two examples are apt here. PAS’s electoral successes can be attributed to its populist anti-establishment appeal among new and young Malay voters and its partnership with the Malay nationalist party Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu). This has enabled PAS to become competitive in areas long-held by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), another Malay nationalist party and PAS’ erstwhile rival. The question now is whether PAS can retain or even build on its current gains. In 2022 and 2023, PAS did well among Malay nationalists: these voters did not fully agree with its Islamist agenda but still threw in their support because of PAS’ association with its erstwhile PN partner, Bersatu.

Similarly, when PAS was part of the Pakatan Rakyat coalition from 2008 to 2015, it received broad acceptance from a wide swathe of non-Malay voters due to its partnership with the multi-ethnic Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). This allowed PAS to allay fears that it would turn Malaysia into an Islamic state. In the 2008 and 2013 General Elections, PAS gained 23 and 21 parliamentary seats respectively. After leaving Pakatan Rakyat in 2015 and contesting the 2018 General Election on its own, the figure dropped to 18 seats. This allowed it to be a kingmaker but also exposed the electoral limits of the party’s Islamist agenda.

As PN disintegrates, PAS is again at a crossroads. It knows that competing solo means going back to the pre-2022 status quo, in which its appeal is geographically circumscribed. PAS realises that to go from strength to strength, it must form a viable coalition. One option is to work with Barisan Nasional (BN), and specifically, its long-time nemesis UMNO. This happened in the recent state election in Johor and is in force for the 1 August state polls in Negeri Sembilan.

While there is yet an official PAS-BN coalition, PAS’ recent actions have revealed its desire to collaborate with BN and Bersatu splinter party Parti Wawasan Negara (Wawasan).

Despite largely targeting the same voter pool, PAS and UMNO have occasionally allied together, albeit with bitter endings. PAS was briefly part of BN from 1974 to 1977 and again in 2019 as part of the Muafakat Nasional opposition coalition. The impetus for both parties to join forces has always coalesced around the idea of “Malay Unity”, a knee-jerk response to what they perceive as the alarming political ascendancy of non-Malays (read: DAP). The logic here is that Malay nationalist and Islamic parties must unite and not compete against each other to protect the special positions of Malays and Islam.

While there is yet an official PAS-BN coalition, PAS’ recent actions have revealed its desire to collaborate with BN and Bersatu splinter party Parti Wawasan Negara (Wawasan). In the Johor state election, PAS ran a half-hearted campaign. It contested 11 of 56 seats, did not even produce a manifesto, and exhorted its supporters to vote for BN in the other seats. The party is employing a similar strategy in the Negeri Sembilan state election. It has struck an agreement with BN, under which PAS is contesting five of the 36 seats. Another six seats are reserved for PN partners Wawasan and two token non-Malay parties, Gerakan and the Malaysian Indian People’s Party (MIPP). As a result, Bersatu has no choice but to go solo.

Why has PAS adopted this strategy?

For one, given its current inclination to work with UMNO, there is a need to avoid situations where PAS is in direct competition with UMNO. Johor has long been UMNO’s bastion and remains a hard nut to crack for PAS. Hence, it was not a difficult decision for PAS to contest and lose only in a handful of seats for the sake of “Malay Unity.” While it might look like a good-faith gesture by PAS to minimise multi-cornered contests, BN hardly faced a serious challenge in Johor and coasted to win 48 out of 56 seats. In Negeri Sembilan, three PAS incumbents are defending their seats without competition from UMNO. In Ampangan, a Malay-majority seat where PH won in 2022 by a mere 329 votes, PAS reckons it has a clear advantage this time around, given its agreement with UMNO to avoid a three-cornered fight. The Lobak seat, however, remains a tall order since it is 72 per cent Chinese, most of whom are unlikely to vote for PAS (although recent trends suggest it may win a sizeable share of the 21 per cent of voters who are Indian).

Unlike Bersatu, UMNO possesses an extensive and long-established political machinery and patronage networks. It also has a longstanding political legacy. These factors enable it to run its own campaign without relying on PAS. PAS, in turn, has to be more judicious with its resources and focus on areas not contested by UMNO as per their agreement. Presumably, both parties will keep their strongholds and allocate between them seats where their combined votes exceeded 50 per cent in the last elections.

Looking ahead, the questions for PAS will centre on how to allocate these seats and which party will hold the reins in their political cooperation. So far, it seems PAS is willing to cede seats to UMNO where it is not strong. Will PAS reciprocate in the north and the east coast, where it holds sway? History has shown UMNO is unwilling to play second fiddle to another Malay party, rendering UMNO-PAS liaisons short-lived. The question here is whether history will repeat itself.

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