Bersama’s ‘Kamikaze Mission’ Might Bomb Out

Parti Bersama Malaysia (Bersama) was founded in 2016 and relaunched by former Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) leaders Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad in 2026. Bersama aims to be an independent and multiracial platform for voters disenchanted with Malaysia’s existing political blocs. This is evident in its 12-point agenda, which emphasises social security, wages, housing, education and institutional reform. Nevertheless, this proposition would be hindered by Malaysia’s first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, where dispersed support can leave a smaller party with marginal wins in elections. Lee Hwok-Aun has identified “some logic” in Bersama serving as an electoral vehicle for jaded voters, while cautioning that FPTP would be unforgiving to smaller parties. The Johor state elections in July illustrate this: Bersama contested 15 seats, lost all of them and polled roughly three to six per cent vote share on average. The key question here is whether Bersama would be able to persuade the voters to turn out to vote and concentrate enough support to win seats.

The Johor state election demonstrates that dissatisfaction with Pakatan Harapan (PH) does not automatically translate into support for Bersama. Former Democratic Action Party (DAP) MP Ong Kian Ming estimated Chinese voter turnout at around 61 per cent, compared with 76 per cent among Malay voters. He attributed much of PH’s decline among Chinese voters to lower turnout rather than a large-scale shift towards Barisan Nasional (BN). This distinction matters. A dissatisfied PH voter has various options: he or she may remain reluctantly loyal to the coalition, switch to another established party, support Bersama or abstain from voting. In essence, Bersama confronts a dual challenge: it competes not only with PH, BN and Perikatan Nasional (PN), but also with political fatigue and withdrawal. It also has to appeal to a heterogeneous electorate, ranging from disillusioned PH supporters to younger and less partisan voters.

Therefore, policy differentiation is of paramount importance. Bersama’s ideology does not represent a clean break from PH’s. Rather, many of its proposals overlap with Buku Harapan (PH’s manifesto for Malaysia’s 2022 General Election). This includes matters such as social protection, childcare, technical and vocational education and training (TVET), healthcare, small and medium enterprises, affordable housing and institutional reform. The difference lies more in policy style and delivery philosophy. Bersama offers a narrower set of quantified targets and system-level interventions, including a 5 per cent foreign-worker cap and measurable healthcare and education benchmarks.  PH’s programme was broader and more encompassing. Consequently, Bersama presents itself less as an ideological alternative to PH’s reformist tradition than as a more target-driven and ostensibly more impatient version of it. Whether Bersama’s fine-tuning of policy will resonate with voters remains to be seen. Voters’ discontent alone can explain why a voter leaves an established bloc, but it does not necessarily mean that they would throw their lot in with Bersama.

The party’s “kamikaze mission” may have made an early defeat politically tolerable, but repeated losses cannot sustain its claim to electoral relevance.

Leadership presents a different litmus test. Rafizi Ramli, Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad and Wong Chen lend Bersama national recognition, campaign experience and political credibility. The three leaders have indicated that they intend to contest their former constituencies of Pandan, Setiawangsa and Subang respectively. Although their political capital may affect votes considerably in those seats, it is worth noting that victories by Bersama’s best-known former PKR figures might not necessarily translate into electoral strength. The caveat is that even established personalities have limits: former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s defeat in Langkawi in GE15 showed that personal stature alone cannot indefinitely compensate for a weak electoral vehicle.

The distinction matters as Bersama expands beyond its recognised leaders. It has made an early announcement of 15 candidates for the Melaka state elections, which are due to be held by February 2027. This gives lesser-known candidates time to establish local familiarity.  Bersama has set a target of up to 15 per cent support (vote share) in the state as a step towards roughly 20 per cent nationally before GE16. The relevant question is not whether Bersama can win seats, but who is winning them and why. If its gains remain confined to constituencies represented by prominent PKR defectors, Bersama may have demonstrated the resilience of individual politicians rather than the emergence of a transferable party brand.

Its decision to sit out the Negeri Sembilan election in August, citing limited time and resources, can be read as a strategic move. The Melaka polls provide the next test of whether Bersama can broaden support beyond its established personalities and position itself as a credible opposition alternative. Even then, aggregate support should not be confused with electoral viability: under the FPTP system, a 15 or 20 per cent vote share spread thinly across constituencies may produce little or no representation.

The party’s “kamikaze mission” may have made an early defeat politically tolerable, but repeated losses cannot sustain its claim to electoral relevance. Johor showed that Bersama can attract some support; Melaka will test whether it can broaden that support beyond a small protest vote and beyond constituencies anchored by its best-known leaders. Its longer-term challenge is harder still: to persuade disenchanted voters that Bersama is not merely another outlet for dissatisfaction, but a credible and stronger opposition capable of winning seats under the FPTP system. This requires converting political fatigue into voter turnout and dispersed sympathy into constituency-level victories.

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